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Institute for
Cape Verdean Studies
AT BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY

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The ***Journal of Cape Verdean Studies*** has as a principal function the creation and dissemination of knowledge relating to Cape Verde and the Cape Verdean experience and identities within the context of globalized societies. Through an inter-disciplinary lens, recognizing the pivotal role of Cape Verde as a global-cultural intersecting point for the last 500 years, the journal critically analyzes the history, culture and transnational experiences of Creole peoples and their impact on the world around them. The journal seeks to create a space where intellectual dialogue is encouraged and serves as a pillar for social action.

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Letter from the Editor

João Rosa

The existence of venues of critical intellectual engagement offers above all common spaces where social dissonance is engaged, challenged and where solutions are fostered and nurtured. The Journal of Cape Verdean Studies aims to be a space where such critical intellectual engagement can be embraced with the understanding that in the context of the development of humanity, rigorous debate has historically been one of the fundamental pillars of progress.

With the current edition, The Journal of Cape Verdean Studies deepens its trajectory as it contributes to a better understanding of the role of Cape Verdeans in the Ivory Coast, the patterns of historic and socio-educational development of Cape Verdeans in Italy, economic transnationalism and homeland development, socio-historic effects of the U.S. deportation of Cape Verdeans on second generation youth as well as the historical processes of the ending of slavery in Cape Verde between 1856-1876. With such vast diasporic reach and temporal profundity, these contributions bring greater clarity to the multidimensionality of Cape Verdean experiences and identities. Only through the suturing of the cloth of identities and experiences can the strength of the thread be examined and the richness of the fabric exposed.

The *Journal of Cape Verdean Studies* invites you to be a part of the ongoing dialogue in a journey of discovery.

Joao J. Rosa, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Pedro Pires Institute for Cape Verdean Studies
Bridgewater State University

CONFERENCE

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HISTOIRE DE L'IMMIGRATION CAPVERDIENNE EN CÔTE D'IVOIRE*

Jean-Baptiste Tavares

Introduction

Le thème de cette conférence célèbre le 39ème anniversaire de Cabo Verde. Ce choix thématique, qui est celui du Bureau de l'association «Sodade de Côte d'Ivoire» et de sa présidente, s'inscrit dans un triple champ de la connaissance. Le premier, dans celui de la *psychologie*, puisqu'il s'agit ici de mobiliser la mémoire pour reconstituer des faits. Le deuxième, dans celui de l'*historiographie*, car comment et avec quels repères chronologiques et types de matériaux présenter le tableau de cette immigration qui diffère complètement de toutes celles que la Côte d'Ivoire a connues? Le troisième, est celui de la *géographie*, dans la mesure où il concerne un mouvement migratoire de population, phénomène qui définit l'immigration.

Cet article reprend les grandes lignes d'un vieux projet d'écriture que le Dr. Pierre Franklin Tavares et moi-même avions en préparation sur l'immigration, au travers d'une analyse comparative des communautés capverdiennes de Côte d'Ivoire, de France et du Sénégal.

Pour entrer dans le vif de notre sujet, sacrifions à un devoir de gratitude. En effet, ici et maintenant, et cela pour toujours, en souvenir des Pionniers de cette histoire, nous voudrions réaffirmer le témoignage initial d'une antique hospitalité, en déclarant haut et fort que «a Costa de Marfim é uma

*. Conférence: Semaine de Cabo Verde du 30 juin au 05 juillet 2014 à Abidjan (39ème anniversaire de l'Indépendance de Cabo Verde)

terra de boa gente» [la Côte d'Ivoire est une terre de bonnes gens]. Et les Anciens aujourd'hui disparus, et qui ont vu prospérer la Côte d'Ivoire, aimaient à dire qu'elle est effectivement le «pays de l'hospitalité», une «patrie de la vraie fraternité»[1].

II. Histoire des relations entre la Côte d'Ivoire et Cabo Verde (Cap-Vert)

Au plan historiographique, il se dégage trois grandes séquences historiques bornées par trois repères chronologiques qui permettent de fixer le cadre des trois principales phases de la relation entre la Côte d'Ivoire et le Cabo Verde. Le premier repère temporel s'étend du milieu du 16ème au milieu du 18ème siècle. Il est d'ordre religieux et administratif. À cet égard,rappelons que Cabo Verde a été le siège du premier Évêché ouest-africain. En effet, c'est en 1533 que le diocèse de Cabo Verde sera créé et,douze ans plus tard, en 1545, le premier évêque résidant, Mgr Jean de Parvi, y sera nommé.

Or, la juridiction de cet Évêché s'étendait du fleuve Gambie au fleuve Sassandra, qui une région de la Côte d'Ivoire actuelle.Au demeurant, au plan linguistique, certains noms de villes ivoiriennes attestent de cette influence ancienne: Sassandra (déformation de Santo André), Fresco (ou fraîcheur ou François) et San Pedro (Saint Pierre), par exemple. Mais il est aussi le nom de famille de Mgr Bernard Yago, premier Évêque de Côte d'Ivoire, dont le patronyme «Yago» est dérivé de Thiago ou Tiago et qui signifie Jacques en langue portugaise, comme l'ont signalé Charles Akibodé[2], dans un texte instructif, et Pierre Franklin Tavaresqui s'appuie sur le célèbre texte de l'abbé Grégoire, *De la littérature des Nègres*, où le prélat français évoque comme modèle l'influence de l'église capverdienne sur le continent et jusqu'en Asie (Goa, etc.) par l'envoi de missionnaires caboverdiens noirs. Dans cet ouvrage anti-esclavagiste publié sous Napoléon Bonaparte (qui venait de rétablir l'esclavage et soutenait le Club Massiac), l'abbé Grégoire rappelle le lien étymologique entre Tiago et Jacques.

Ainsi, Cabo Verde, capitale ouest-africaine du catholicisme et rampe de lancement de l'évangélisation comme enjeu de l'expansion portugaise en Afrique, a-t-il établi son premier lien historique avec la Côte d'Ivoire. Sans doute les archives du Vatican conservent-elles maintes informations sur cette relation entre les deux pays. Il faudrait pouvoir les consulter.

1. Ces deux expressions sont des paroles de l'Hymne national de la République de Côte d'Ivoire.
2. Cidade Velha, Centre historique de Ribeira Grande, Cap-Vert : Proposition d'inscription sur la Liste du patrimoine mondiale, janvier 2008.

Le second repère temporel couvre la période de la découverte de Cabo Verdeentre 1460 et 1462, par des navigateurs au service de la Couronne portugaise[3], jusqu'à l'abolition de l'esclavage à la fin du 19ème siècle. Son fondement est d'ordre économique: le commerce triangulaire. En effet, en 1466, par charte royale, la colonie de Cabo Verde est autorisée à faire le commerce des esclaves avec la côte africaine, pour la mise en valeur des terres agricoles.

Mais, cette charte est détournée de son objet initial pour transformer très rapidement l'archipel en une plaque tournante du commerce triangulaire entre le Portugal, l'Afrique et l'Amérique Latine, notamment pour le trafic des esclaves et activités connexes (ravitaillement maritime, industrie du pagne en coton[4], etc.). Le Cap Vert devient alors le plus grand centre de la traite des esclaves: un recensement dénombre 13.700 esclaves en 1532. Cette activité économique très lucrative explique deux faits: d'une part, l'établissement de comptoirs commerciaux portugais sur le littoral ivoirien, à Bassam, San Pedro, Fresco, Sassandra, etc., et, d'autre part, la présence de «Lançados». Qui étaient-ils ?

Au cours de la première période de prospérité économique (16ème et 17èmesiècles), la ville de Ribeira-Grande était également un centre de recouvrement des droits et taxes sur les cargaisons de l'autoroute de la traite négrière, pour le compte de la Couronne portugaise. Dans sa tentative d'accaparement des revenus du commerce lucratif de la traite négrière, la Couronne portugaise édicta des lois fiscales de nature prohibitive et qui eurent pour effet l'expatriation, dès le 16ème siècle, des premiers commerçants capverdiens vers les «Rios da Guiné»,cettevaste étendue de la Sénégambie (sud de l'actuel Sénégal) à la Sierra-Leone[5]. Ces commerçants, sont appelés «Lançados» ou commerçants sans permis royal, et à propos desquels le premier ivoirien agrégé d'Histoire, le professeur Christophe Wondji, a écrit un magnifique ouvrage[6]. Ces «Lançados» exerçaient leurs activités en

3. En 1460, les explorateurs Diogo Gomes et Antonio da Noli découvrent officiellement le Cap-Vert notamment les îles de Santiago, Maio, Boa Vista, Fogo et Brava. Entre 1461 et 1462: Diogo Afonso découvre les îles de São Vicente, Santo Antão, São Nicolau et Sal. Cependant, des chercheurs portugais, qui mènent une étude approfondie sur l'archipel, restent convaincus que la version la plus crédible est celle confirmant la présence de pêcheurs africains, puis des arabes et grecs.
4. La forte demande de pagnes de coton, qui servaient également de monnaie d'échange pour l'achat des esclaves, avait contraint la couronne portugaise, accablée par la concurrence, à interdire dès 1687 leurs ventes aux étrangers, ces dernières étant considérées comme un crime passible de peine de mort.
5. Au 16ème siècle, des navigateurs capverdiens, dont les plus connus sont André Donelha et André Alvares d'Almada, explorèrent pour le compte de la Couronne portugaise les *Rios de Guinée* jusqu'aux fins fonds de la partie continentale de l'Africain de l'ouest encore inexploré.
6. Christophe Wondji, *La côte ouest-africaine : du Sénégal à la Côte d'Ivoire, géographie, société, histoire (1500-1800)*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000.

dehors de toute consigne légale, bravant ainsi les lois de la métropole[7]. Ils ont été les propagateurs du créole qui faisait fonction de «lingua franca» en Afrique de l'ouest.

De l'ensemble des développements précédents, nous retiendrons deux faits majeurs. Tout d'abord, le fait que les juridictions paroissiales de Ribeira--Grande, siège de l'Évêché portugais d'Afrique, comprenait la Côte d'Ivoire. Ensuite, dans le cadre du commerce triangulaire, l'existence de comptoirs commerciaux portugaisen Côte d'Ivoire.

En tous les cas, les deux faits majeurs mis au jour autorisent l'affirmation d'une réalité historique: la possible présence de capverdiens en terre ivoirienne, entre le XVIème siècle et le XVIIème siècle, soit comme personnel de soutien dans les dits comptoirs, soit comme religieux chargés de la propagation de la foi chrétienne. Sur ce point, les archives maritimes portugaises, les correspondances privées, les sources du Vatican et les registres des églises capverdiennes devraient fournir de précieuses informations. Pour lors, si l'on atteste d'une possible présence capverdienne en Côte d'Ivoire dès le 16ème siècle, si l'on peut également définir leurs profils socioprofessionnels, il est impossible de déterminer leur nombre.

Il en va tout autrement avec la troisième séquence historique qui, prenant forme avec la fin progressive du trafic négrier[8], plonge Cabo Verde dans une profonde crise économique, et que viendra aggraver un long cycle de sécheresse et de famine, entre le premier quart du XVIIIème siècle et le milieu du XXème siècle, excepté la courte période de prospérité du port de Mindelo comme base de ravitaillement en charbon de la navigation transatlantique sur la route des Indes orientales[9]. Cabo Verde traverse, bouleversé, la période

7. En 1518, les commerçants capverdiens furent interdits de toute activité sur le continent par la Couronne portugaise qui les soupçonnait de vouloir créer une zone franche dans la sous-région.
8. Entre 1480 et 1494, les Traité de Tolède (partage de l'Atlantique) et Traité de Tordesillas (partage des terres) divisent le monde à découvrir entre l'Espagne et le Portugal. Ce dernier détient ainsi le monopole du commerce atlantique des esclaves capturés en Afrique de l'ouest. De la fin du XVIème au XVIIIème siècle, ce monopole est remis en cause par la concurrence française, britannique et hollandaise. Ces derniers s'emparent d'une grande partie de l'Afrique de l'ouest et détournent le trafic des esclaves vers d'autres ports (Gorée, Ouidah, El Mina, etc.).De ce fait, les mouvements de navires deviennent de plus en plus rares et le port négrier de Ribeira-Grande (Cidade Velha) l'ombre de son passé glorieux. Les raids des corsaires anglais Francis Drake et Hawkins (1577-1585) et le sac du français Jacques Cassard (1712) sur Santiago, notamment Praia et Ribeira-Grande parachèvent ce triste tableau économique (la piraterie fut naguère l'un des plus graves fléaux pour le Cap-Vert). En 1876, l'abolition officielle de l'esclavage n'est qu'un acte juridique consacrant une réalité déjà accomplie dans les faits.
9. À partir de 1830, champions du « libre échange » et seigneurs des mers, les anglais installent des dépôts de charbon dans l'île de S. Vicente pour assurer le ravitaillement de la navigation transatlantique ainsi que la télégraphie par câble reliant l'Europe à l'Amérique du Sud. Au cours de cette période, de nombreux capverdiens se font embaucher sur les

la plus tragique de son histoire. En effet, un tiers des capverdiens meurt de famine. Un deuxième tiers s'expatrie vers les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Europe occidentale, l'Afrique de l'ouest et vers les grandes exploitations de cacao et de café de l'île de Sao Tomé-et-Prince, itinéraire dramatique que traduisent deux émouvantes chansons populaires du répertoire capverdien, la célèbre *Sodade*[10] et le poignant *Caminho de San-Tomé*[11]. Tous, hommes et femmes, allaient dans cette île comme « contratado », cetteforme de salariat proche du travail forcé, abandonnant ainsi, par la douleur, le pays natal.

Cette dure réalité modifiera de manière profonde la relation entre le Cabo Verde et la Côte d'Ivoire, qui devient une terre d'accueil juste après la seconde guerre mondiale, pour des capverdiens qui seront à la base de la formation de leur communauté en Côte d'Ivoire. On les appellera ici et avec grande affection les Pionniers.

III. La communauté capverdienne de Côte d'Ivoire: origine et formation

Pour le détail de notre propos, nous distinguerons les notions de «présence» et de «communauté». Par «présence», s'entend ici l'existence, dans une contrée ou une région donnée, de personnesmais sans que celles-ci ne s'organisent en groupe avec d'autresindividus de même origine ou de même nationalité (compatriotes), de culte ou culture, soit parce que ces personnes sont isolées et mènent une existence solitaire parce que peu nombreux, soit qu'avec leurs compatriotes ils ne se sont pas rassemblés. La «présence» renvoie donc à un état d'individualité hors communauté.

Quant au terme de «communauté», il désigne un groupe social homogène, résidant sur un territoire donné, composé d'hommes et/ou de femmes partageant des caractéristiques identiques, un même mode de vie, pratiquant la même culture et la même langue, et défendant des intérêts spécifiques. Ces personnes sont alors liées par un sentiment d'appartenance à une entité qui les dépasse. À titre d'exemple, citons les communautés chinoises qui s'organisent sous la forme de «china towns» dans les grandes villes d'Amérique du nord. En Côte d'Ivoire, maintes communautéssont établies sur ces bases.

navires, notamment les baleiniers américains, en quête d'une vie meilleure Les États-Unis apparurent ainsi comme la première et la plus importante communauté de la diaspora capverdienne.

10. Cesária Évora, Sodade, in Miss Perfumado, 1992.
11. Bana, Caminho de Sao Tomé, in Ao vivo no Coliseu, 2000.

Précisons toutefois que la «présence» d'individus est antérieure à la formation d'une «communauté». Bref, nous avons vu que la «présence» d'individus capverdiens en Côte d'Ivoire devait remonter à une date entre la fin du 16ème siècle et le début du 17ème siècle. Et que cette «présence» s'est poursuivie jusqu'au milieu du 19ème siècle, avant de se transformer en «communauté», mais sans que les deux phénomènes soient dans un lien mécanique ou d'emboîtement sociologique. En effet, la formation de la «communauté» capverdienne en Côte d'Ivoire marque une rupture avec la «présence» capverdienne.

Dans les récits, la *mémoire* des Pionniers fait elle-même de manière spontanée le *distinguo* entre la «présence» de ressortissants capverdiens en Côte d'Ivoire qu'elle date à partir de la fin de la 1ère guerre mondiale avec «Nha Preta», épouse d'un béninois affecté en Côte d'Ivoire comme cadre de l'administration coloniale. Cette mémoire signale également la présence ultérieure, plus exactement à partir de 1945, de «Nha Maria», la mère de Pama, et de Georges Monteiro *alias* Djiby Loti, militaire démobilisé des forces françaises libres. Ce ne sont que des «présences» qui ne constituent pas encore une «communauté», car leur résidence est liée à des faits contingents (contraction d'un mariage ou démobilisation militaire). Les individus cités ne sont pas organisés en communauté (mode de vie, valeurs communes, langue, etc.). Ils ne se fréquentent pas.

En vérité, si l'on est généralement bien informé sur les causes des migrations capverdiennes successives, remarquons avec intérêt que l'on est beaucoup moins bien renseigné sur leurs conditions d'accueil, leurs modes d'insertion et de vie dans les pays où elles se sont installées. La faiblesse actuelle de la base documentaire et le fait que les récits oraux n'aient pas été recueillis ne constituent qu'un obstacle provisoire dans la reconstitution de l'histoire de l'immigration capverdienne en Côte d'Ivoire. Nous ne devons pas désespérer de retrouver des archives de toutes sortes, des témoignages, des dates et des faits permettant une reconstitution assez fidèle. À cet égard, «Exposition photos» est une initiative opportune, pertinente et surtout novatrice. La recherche qui s'amorce ici doit se poursuivre et approfondir son effort.

Pour lors, il suffira à notre patience de débuter par la remémoration de l'anecdotequi, orientant le cours des événements, sera à la source de la naissance de notre «communauté» en Côte d'Ivoire. Pour autant, il infléchira et déterminera le cours général de notre immigration.

Nous sommes en septembre 1948, à Dakar, au Service d'hygiène. Deux jeunes capverdiens s'y rencontrent, et ce tout à fait par hasard. Une pure coïncidence donc. Ils doivent se faire vacciner et se faire remettre leurs

carnets de vaccination, en vue de leur voyage. L'un s'appelle Cristovão Colombo De BARROS, natif de l'île de Fogo, qui doit partir s'installer à Bamako. L'autre est Gonçalo Amarante TAVARES, natif de l'île de Santiago, qui est attendu à Abidjan par son cousin, Georges Monteiro *alias* Djiby Loti, militaire démobilisé des forces françaises libres.

Le second convainc le premier qu'Abidjan est une meilleure destination. Ils s'y rendent ensemble. «La jeunesse de leur regard découvre une Côte d'Ivoire qui n'est alors qu'un pays, c'est-à-dire une géographie et un paysage [...] Tout était à bâtir ! Une large promesse du temps»[12]. Peu de temps après leur insertion à Abidjan, ils procèdent chacun à un «regroupement familial», faisant venir femmes, enfants et bagages (1949-1950). Ils parviennent également à persuader certains de leurs proches parents à les rejoindre.

Ainsi créent-ilsla première filière d'immigration en Côte d'Ivoire, sur une base patrilinéaire, parce que c'est la décision de deux hommes qui sont des chefs de famille. La période charnière est donc 1948-1950: une anecdote. Une rencontre fortuite. Deux jeunes hommes, en quête d'avenir. Une occasion. Deux familles. Une décision fondatrice. Ce sont eux les premiers immigrés capverdiens et les pères fondateurs de notre «communauté» en Côte d'Ivoire. Par leur décision, ils suscitent un nouveau chemin d'immigration.

Géographique de la population et données sociodémographiques

Entre 1950 et 1965, période de naissance et de consolidation de l'État ivoirien, la communauté capverdienne de Côte d'Ivoire est marquée par une forte croissance démographique sous le triple mode suivant :

– l'arrivée de nouveaux immigrants, transitant par Dakar. Elle se fera essentiellement sous la forme d'extension des familles installées au cours du premier quinquennat des années 1950[13]. Cette forme de croissance est pratiquée notamment par les populations de Boavista et de Fogo et dans une moindre mesure par celles de San Vicente. Concernant les populations de Santiago, l'arrivée des nouveaux immigrants s'est faite sur la

12. Pierre Franklin Tavares, Considérations éparses sur la crise ivoirienne, Editions NEI, Abidjan 2005
13. M. Colombo De Barros facilita l'arrivée de son frère, M. Emmanuel De Barros (Nho Néné), de son beau-frère, Gil Fernandes et de ses deux belle-sœurs, Mmes Winie Gomes et Aida Teixeira Lopes. M. Maxime Brito fit de même avec les familles Da Silva (NhoTifulinho), Orlando Brito, Evora (NhoEanse) de la ville de Cabeça di Tarafa à Boa Vista et M. Hemitério Pinto avec son frère Casimirio et sa sœur, Mme. Firmina Andrade.

base du «compadrage[14]» ou compérage. À partir de 1965, ce flux migratoire disparaitra de façon progressive au profit de pays européens,au travers d'une combinaison de facteurs d'attraction (forte demande de main-d'œuvre qualifiée dans le secteur des BTP, salaires plus élevés, meilleure offre de services sociaux, etc.), notamment en Allemagne, en Belgique, au Luxembourg, en France et en Hollande, et de facteurs de répulsion tels que la mauvaise gouvernance politique (première ère des coups d'Etat). Ces éléments expliquent la structure démographique de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d'Ivoire tout au long de la décennie de 1950: (i) une faible représentation des populations provenant des îles de San Antão, de San Nicolau, de Sal et de Maio (moins de 10%); et (ii) une structure pyramidale déséquilibrée avec près des 2/3 des populations âgées de plus 30 ans et comptant plus d'hommes que de femmes ; et (iii) une forte concentration de la population (plus de 95%) dans la ville d'Abidjan. Au niveau professionnel, les hommes sont actifs dans les différents corps de métiers des secteurs de la construction et du bâtiment (maçonnerie, peinture, carrelage, menuiserie, ferronnerie, etc.), du textile et du cuir (fabrication et réparation de chaussures, couture, etc.) et du maritime (chantier naval, activités portuaires, loisirs nautiques, etc.). Les femmes pour la plupart sont couturières dans les chics boutiques du Plateau, quartier des affaires de la ville d'Abidjan, ou gouvernantes dans les familles européennes expatriées et africaines aisées ;

– un fort croît naturel avec les premières naissances de bébés capverdiens de 1951-1953 et les baby booms de 1955-1957 et de 1959-1962. Par la suite, ce mode de croît connaîtra un net fléchissement avec la nature monogamique des familles et l'option du nombre restreint d'enfants par famille ; et

– les femmes de la communauté capverdienne du Sénégal mariées à des cadres ivoiriens de retour dans leur pays natal entre 1958 (loi cadre) et 1960 (indépendance nationale). Ce groupe (mères et enfants binationaux) vivraen marge de la communauté, constituant ainsi un paradoxedans la mesure où (i) les maris, notamment Messieurs ADDÉ et BLÉGNOUA, participaient activement aux différentes manifestations de la communauté; et (ii) les mères et leurs enfants étaient porteurs de capverdianité avec une bonne maîtrise du créole et des pratiques culturelles spécifiques

14. Dans le système de parenté, le compadrage ou compérage était une institution sociale faisant des parrains et marraines de véritables parents, avec une forte obligation de responsabilité vis-à-vis de leurs filleul(e)s, considérés comme leurs «fils» et «filles» spirituels. Dans les relations sociales capverdiennes marquées par le catholicisme, le compadrage ou le compérage fixait un lien et une alliance solides.

aux capverdiens et plus particulièrement aux «badius».Ce paradoxe n'est qu'apparent, si l'on tient compte du fait que ledit groupe est un produit direct de l'histoire de la communauté capverdienne du Sénégal et représente la 3ème voire la 4ème génération de descendants de Capverdiens avec une forte volonté d'intégration à la société sénégalaise. Le Ministre Jean-Paul DIAZ en est la figure achevée. Des problèmes d'ordre identitaire pourraient également expliquer cette marginalité: (i) l'image négative du Portugal dans les guerres napoléoniennes enseignées dans l'Histoire de France et du Cap-Vert ravagé par un long cycle de famine; (ii) le complexe de supériorité des dakarois du fait de la centralité de la ville de Dakar dans le cadre de l'Afrique occidentale française; (iii) l'ignorance de l'histoire générale de Cabo Verde en liaison avec l'inexistence de relations entre les espaces francophone et lusophone, etc.

Ainsi sous ce triple mode de croissance démographique, la communauté passe d'une dizaine de familles en 1950 à plus de 50 familles, correspondant à près de 400 individus, en 1965. Sa taille, la plus petite minorité d'étrangers vivant en Côte d'Ivoire, constituera l'une de ses principales faiblesses l'empêchant ainsi de profiter pleinement de la forte expansion économique de la Côte d'Ivoire, à l'instardes autres communautés étrangères du Bénin, du Burkina Faso, du Mali, de la Mauritanie, du Nigéria et du Niger.

Pour la période considérée, la structure sociale est dominée à 90% par les entrepreneurs individuels (aristocratie ouvrière) et des tâcherons (maçons, peintres, etc.). C'est donc une petite bourgeoise qui a fait preuve d'un fort dynamisme dans le monde économique avec la création d'une des plus grandes imprimeries modernes par la famille Alfredo MORENO (Imprimerie Commerciale), d'entreprises en bâtiments avec les familles Victorino LOPES, d'avitaillement maritime avec la famille PINTO et d'une fabrique semi-industrielle de bottes et chaussures avec la famille Gonçalo TAVARES, pour ne citer que celles-là. C'est une période de grande prospérité économique pour la communauté et, au lendemain de l'indépendance de la Côte d'Ivoire, quelques-uns de ses membres étaient déjà propriétaires de leurs résidences principales et d'habitations modernes mises en location (accumulation de patrimoines).

La communauté capverdienne comportait de véritables lieux de sociabilité et tout était prétexte pour magnifier les caractéristiques personnelles de la «Morabeza» et de la «Convivença»: fiançailles, mariages, baptêmes, communions, anniversaires, etc. Et si cela ne suffisait pas, on improvisait sur le champ des mariages et des baptêmes de poupéesou de régimes de bananes. Ces manifestations faites de fraternité, à savoir de prévenance et

de gentillesse à l'endroit des uns et des autres, avaient lieu aux domiciles de Nho FRANK à Dabou, de Nho LIXE au Plateau, de Nho PAZÉ et Nha NAZIA, située à l'Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire (IFAN) à Adjamé et, surtout,de Georges MONTEIRO puis Manuel TAVARES à l'Habitat Arras en face de l'AITACI.

Comme mentionné plus haut, l'extinction de la filière d'immigration annonce le déclin de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d'ivoire. Cette dégradation de la courbe démographique s'accentuera avec le départ de nombreuses familles résidentes. Ainsi, la totalité de la composante «bravense» de notre communauté reprendra les chemins de l'exil pour s'installer aux États-Unis d'Amérique, leur seconde patrie, à la fin des années 1960. Il en ira de même avec celle de Fogo, dont les fils choisissent la France comme point de chute à compter des années 1970. Avec l'indépendance en 1975, une dernière vague, constituée de quelques familles et surtout de jeunes cadres, regagnera Cabo Verde. C'est la dispersion de la communauté, par l'affaiblissement de son socle initial.

Faisons ici une courte digression. Cette communauté a su fort habilement compenser son faible poids démographique, par un rôle décisif, au double plan de la diplomatie africaine et de l'effort de guerre dans la lutte armée pour l'indépendance. En effet, mettant à profit l'indéniable importance politique, diplomatique et géostratégique de la Côte d'Ivoire et l'influence mondiale de Son Excellence Félix Houphouët-Boigny, quelques capverdiens de Côte d'Ivoire ont su habilement l'amener à prendre fait et cause, de façon précoce, pour l'Indépendance de la Guinée-Bissau et du Cap Vert. Ainsi, sur le conseil de ces membres de la communauté, Amilcar Cabral fera de l'État ivoirien un de ses principaux alliés et points d'appui, en nouant avec Abidjan des relations fructueuses. Sans cette précision, nul ne peut comprendre que le MPLA qui partageait la même idéologie que le PAIGC n'obtint pas les faveurs du président Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Jamais ce dernier ne fera un quelconque obstacle auPAIGC. Bien au contraire. Il apportera un constant soutien financier.

Pour revenir à l'affaiblissement de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d'Ivoire, signalons que lasaignée démographique, dont nous parlions plus haut, eut un impact négatifsur sa situation économique: la classe entrepreneuriale, fierté de la communauté, a pratiquement disparu. Pas ou peu de relève. Car la nouvelle génération ne parvient pas à reprendre les affaires familiales ou, lorsqu'elle y parvient,avec beaucoup de peine à les faire fructifier. En tous les cas, les effets cumulés et conjugués des différenciations économiques et des divergences politiques naissantes,à la faveurdela lutte pour l'indépendance et l'alternance démocratique,ont accentué le processus

de fragilisation et affaibli la cohésion sociale de la communauté. Les grandes familles constitutives de la communauté s'entredéchirèrent et cette «guerre des clans», sous la forme d'une dictature parentalequi ira jusqu'à se traduire par la disparition des mariages intra-communautaires et renforcer *de facto* le poids démographique des binationaux et le retour à leurs racines par une participation de plus en plus croissante à la vie de la communauté (base sociologique des dernières élections associatives et de la structuration de la direction de SODADE-CI).

En résumé, «une communauté immigrée qui ne sait pas comment elle compose socialement n'est porteuse d'aucun avenir. Elle reste une minorité, à savoir un groupe d'hommes et de femmes qui ne prend pas part à la vie de l'État et de la Nation qui l'accueille»[15].

Tels sont les premiers éléments de l'Histoire de l'immigration capverdienne en Côte d'Ivoire. Aujourd'hui, une quatrième séquence de la vielle relation entre la Côte d'Ivoire et le Cabo Verde a pris forme, à travers un renforcement qualitatif de la coopération entre les deux États et le probable renouveau de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d'ivoire.

IV. Perspectives du développement du partenariat entre Cabo Verde et sa diaspora

Sur la base de l'expérience accumulée en la matière au cours de ces quarante (40) dernières années,des pistes d'amélioration peuvent être dégagées sur la problématique et les enjeux du phénomène de l'immigration. Ce sont:

– **la résorption de l'énorme déficit de connaissance sur les différentes communautés de la diaspora capverdienne**. Ceci doit constituer une tâche historique et politique décisive. En effet, sans données sociales, comment l'État peut-il sérieusement envisager une politique d'ensemble de l'immigration? Toute stratégie nationale de mobilisation de la diaspora nécessite donc de disposer de données et statistiques exactes et complètes[16] sur les flux

15. Pierre Franklin TAVARES, La recherche sociale comme prise de position politique, 11 mai 1991.
16. Certaines stratégies pour mobiliser les ressources financières de la diaspora ne font pas l'objet de recherches approfondies ou d'informations exhaustives. Parfois, elles sont basées sur des données non vérifiées sur les migrants. A titre d'exemple, le Programme national d'investissement (PNI) de la Sierra Leone avait fait des prévisions sur la base de transferts de fonds de 500 000 migrants sierra-léonais contre un taux d'émigration du pays de 2%, soit 114 000 migrants (statistique des Nations Unies).Ceci a compromis les attentes du pays qui comptait sur les importantes ressources financières de sa diaspora pour booster sa croissance et son plan de développement.

migratoires (importance et causes), les communautés immigrées (nature, compositions sociales, modes d'insertion économique; vie politique et culturelle des communautés; etc.).À cet égard, la création et la mise en place de l'Observatoire des migrations est une avancée notable. Cependant, sa mission semble se limiter à la connaissance de l'importance des flux migratoires. La création de centres de recherches appropriés pour adresser l'ensemble des réalités sociales de l'immigration demeure donc une question ouverte et non résolue, en dépit de son caractère urgent;

– la revue de l'histoire de l'émigration capverdienne en remontant ses origines au phénomène des «lançados». Ceci nécessitera une étroite collaboration entre historiens, sociologues et démographes capverdiens de l'intérieur et de la diaspora pour compléter les registres de l'historiographie de l'immigration. Les «lançados» présentent un profil différent (opérateurs économiques, exportation de capitaux,transfert de savoir-faire et de compétences entrepreneuriales, etc.) de celui des immigrés des XIXèmeet XXèmesiècles (main-d'œuvre plus ou moins qualifiée dans les BTP). Et toute politique de l'immigration devrait s'inspirer des «lançados» en faisant des différentes communautés de la diaspora une formidable matrice de distribution commerciale de produits made in Cabo Verde ou/et marchandises réexportés, notamment celles en provenance du Brésil[17];

– la constitution de l'immigration en un corps de citoyens actifs pour devenir des acteurs significatifs du jeu démocratique en Cabo Verdepar l'élargissement de sa représentativité législative, limité actuellement à 5 représentants à l'Assemblée nationale, ou la création d'un conseil économique et social avec un tiers de ses membres issus de l'immigration. En effet, le processus de construction de la nation et de transformation économique du pays exige un dialogue politique et social permanent au service du développement ; et

– la mise en place d'un environnement favorable combinée à une vision nationale partagée entre le Gouvernement et la diaspora[18]. Comme segment de la société capverdienne contribuant significativement au financement de l'économie nationale[19], la diaspora doit être

17. Voir la politique d'appui de l'Etat mauritanien aux différents réseaux de boutiquiers mauritaniens en Afrique de l'ouest.
18. La Chine, la Corée, et l'Inde figurent parmi les pays qui ont montré comment les apports de la diaspora peuvent contribuer de manière significative à transformer les économies nationales. Les approches adoptées par ces nations asiatiques se déclinent comme des initiatives pilotées par les pays et fondées sur des objectifs partagés entre le gouvernement et la diaspora autour de piliers de croissance critiques.
19. Selon le Rapport sur le développement de 2009 du PNUD, les transferts de fonds per capita des migrants capverdiens sont estimés à 262 dollars US en 2007, soit 85% du

considérée comme un partenaire du développement,à travers des initiatives fondées sur des objectifs partagés entre le Gouvernement et la diaspora. À cet effet, la création d'un environnement favorable est une condition *sine qua non* pour réussir la mobilisationdes ressources de la diaspora (expertise, investissements, esprit d'entreprise et réseaux professionnels) autour de piliers de croissance. Parmi les composantes de cet environnement, on peut citer, entre autres: (i) la mise en place des structures de promotion de la transparence et de la responsabilisation qui est un acquis sur lequel Cabo Verde doit continuer de capitaliser sur ses gains en la matière; (ii) la revue des politiques et des mécanismes incitatifs pour promouvoir les investissements, notamment l'amélioration du climat des affaires et de la compétitivité (lourdeurs administratives et rigidités du marché du travail, coût élevé des facteurs, notamment du transport et de l'électricité, etc.);

V. Conclusions

Pour conclure, il faut signaler que le «grand Mensonge» (mot d'Amilcar Cabral) au lendemain de l'indépendance est devenu Vérité, car Cabo Verde a su surmonter ses principaux défis historiques:

– en un peu plus de trente ans (30) d'indépendance, le Cabo Verde est sorti du groupe de Pays les moins avancés (PMA) pour accéder au groupe de Pays à revenu intermédiaire (PRI); et
– en quinze d'indépendance, le Cabo Verde est devenu un des modèles de démocratie dans le monde, avec une remarquable stabilité de son régime parlementaire.

Ainsi, le «Petit pays», comme Césaria Évora aimait à appeler Cabo Verde, montre comment il est possible de faire la synthèse entre développement économique et démocratie. Et c'est fort de ces succès que, partout dans le monde, toutes les composantes de la diaspora capverdienne sont habitées d'une grande fierté.

Je vous remercie pour votre attention.

Abidjan, le 4 juillet 2014.

niveau d'aide publique au développement reçue par habitant.

ARTICLES

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IMMIGRANTS FROM CABO VERDE IN ITALY: HISTORY AND PATHS OF SOCIO-EDUCATIVE INTEGRATION

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Abstract

Cape Verdean migration to Italy started in the early sixties of the nineteenth century as an exclusively female one, mostly caused by the demand for domestic workers by bourgeois families. In the late eighties, the Cape Verdean community migrated to Italy was still composed of more than 90% of women. In 1990, the introduction of a legislation setting forth the right to family reunification allowed many women to reunite with their husbands and children remained in their homeland. In Italy, the gradual social inclusion process and the creation of a network of Cape Verdean migrants' association, allowed to overcome all those problems that troubled the first migrants arrived in Italy. Even though the integration process sets a context generally positive, there are still many problems,

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specially linked to job insecurity – also caused by the low social and professional mobility – and children's education. Families are often divided, and mother have to raise children alone, often living with their employer. The increasing presence of Italian-born children of immigrants, simultaneously to the 'building' of second and third generations, have hastened the process of cultural and social hybridization, however, without weaken Italian-Capo Verdeans' 'Capo-Verdeanity" strong sense of social and cultural identity.

Keywords
Cape Verdean migration, Women, Cultural integration, Cabo Verde, Labor.

1. Cabo Verdeans in Italy: phases and timing of a mostly female phenomenon

Women were the real pioneers of migration to Italy, which started during the mid-sixties when alongside the phenomenon of emigration, which had involved Italian society since the nineteenth century, there began the reverse migration that is still in progress (Demetrio, Favaro, Melotti, Ziglio, 1990; Vicarelli, 1994; de Filippo, 2000). The female component, which now accounts for more than half of the five million regular immigrants in Italy (IDOS Study and Research Centre, 2014), has been a significant slice of Italian immigration since the beginning.

In the specific case of Cabo Verdean migration to Italy, the phenomenon originated as an exclusively female emigration, encouraged by the demand for domestic workers to be employed in the homes of middle-class families in major Italian cities (Jesus, 1989). What was attracting women was the need for labour in the context of domestic work and child care, which emerged in the years of industrialisation that characterised Italy in the decades following the end of the Second World War. This had encouraged Italian women to abandon domestic work to be employed in factories (Silva, 2002, p. 46). Then the demand for care work involving people increased in the nineties to meet the increasingly urgent, social need for care of the no longer self-sufficient elderly, whose number is constantly growing because of increased longevity and aging of the population. Today in the field of care – where most of the so-called "caregivers" (*badanti*) are employed: this was a term introduced by the Italian legislation on immigration of 2002 – women of different countries and continents are involved, mainly from Eastern Europe, but initially concerned mostly Philippine, Eritrean and Cabo Verdean women (Silva, 2012a).

The Cabo Verdean immigration to Italy began sporadically as an exclusively female phenomenon between 1957 and 1962, but it soon took on a continuous nature. At first the goal was Rome; later the other major cities such as Turin, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Naples and Palermo became places of welcome and employment for Cabo Verdeans. The first to emigrate were the women from São Nicolau and acting as go-between were the Capuchin friars who had been on the island for a long time (Cabral, 2012). As soon as the Cabo Verdean women arrived in Italy, usually unmarried and with a basic education, they set about finding work for other fellow compatriots, both relatives and friends. This sparked a real chain of migration that linked Cabo Verde to Italy and that reached its highest peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus the function of the Capuchin friars gradually decreased in importance, giving way to a network of organised and legal migration in which women, also from this point of view, played a role as protagonists. From the second half of the 1960s the flow of Cabo Verdeans to Italy had in the meantime also affected all the other islands (Jesus, 1989).

Until 1970 employment contracts were regular, but since the contracts of domestic workers were not regulated, the rights and duties of such workers depended only on verbal agreements between them and their employers. With the collective contract for domestic workers (called "*colf*" from the Italian "***col****laboratrici* ***f****amiliari*") imposed in 1973 by the Ministry of Labour, labour relations were regulated by law, although in fact the Cabo Verdeans, like other foreign domestic workers, closed in the home, continued to work according to schedules that were too long, not to have holidays and to be underpaid. This situation of regularity might make it appear that the situation of the immigrants at that time was better than the current "caregivers". In some ways it was, if you think that the way to emigrate to Italy is today almost exclusively that of illegality, with all the risks involved, as evidenced by the frequent shipwrecks off the Italian coast. However, even then the situation was not easy if one considers that at that time there was no check on the situation of domestic workers, whose rights were very limited and whose social security and trade union contributions were almost nonexistent.

Between 1970 and 1980 taking the route to Italy were not just very young unmarried girls, but also women and mothers who had left their children and often a husband or companion in Cabo Verde. The presence in Italy of other immigrants coming from various countries of Asia, Africa, Central and South America (Philippines, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, India, Dominican Republic, Peru etc.) over the years generated strong competition in working in the domestic sector, which discouraged departures from Cabo Verde. Fortunately,

at the same time the social, economic and cultural situation of Cabo Verde, after independence in 1975, was steadily improving (Bossu-Picat, 1985), so much so that emigration today is seen more as a forced departure, even though many young people continue to have the desire to emigrate.

In the late 1980s the Cabo Verdean community in Italy was made up, by more than 90%,of women. The issuing of comprehensive legislation on immigration, with law no. 39 of 1990, among other things, introduced the right to family reunification, thus allowing many Cabo Verdean women to be rejoined by their husbands and any children left at home or who had migrated to other countries, so as to constitute a family in Italy.

With the formation of families, Cabo Verdean emigration, just as in general in migration processes, came to lose those traits of provisional and temporary nature that had marked it early on, taking on instead a stable connotation (Silva, 2004). For the Cabo Verdeans Italy became no longer a land of passage in which to look for a certain economic fortune and then return home, but the place where you plan your own future. A new perspective that was certainly helped by many mixed marriages between Italians and Cabo Verdean women.

Whereas during the first phase of immigration, women returned to Cabo Verde after a few years of work (2-5) – often after contracting marriage with compatriots who had emigrated elsewhere in Europe – ensuring that new streams of young women would fill the places left free by those leaving – the stabilisation of Cabo Verdeans in Italy since the early 1990s has severely limited this turnover.

In 1972 there were between 3,500 and 4,000 Cabo Verdeans in Italy, of which about 2,500 from the island of São Nicolau. After reaching a peak in 1978, migration decreased sharply from 1981, following the introduction by the Italian government of more restrictive procedures regarding immigration from non-EU countries in the developing world, such as Cabo Verde. In the mid-1980s, when legal entries were almost totally blocked, Cabo Verdean immigrants resident in Italy numbered 7,000, 90% of whom were women (Altieri, 1992).

Starting from the 1990s we saw the first cases of repatriation or of emigration to other countries by the Cabo Verdeans living in Italy. Returning were especially those women who, having reached retirement age, preferred to return to their country of origin, where life is cheaper. At the same time internal mobility on the Italian territory, initially quite small, became much livelier.

Today the official figures indicate a presence, almost constant since 2009, of about 4,600 Cabo Verdeans legally resident in Italy (ISTAT data).

The number of people of Cabo Verdean origin on the Italian territory, however, is much higher, and hovers between 10 and 12 thousand people, since many women have gradually acquired Italian citizenship, through marriage to Italians, but also by naturalisation.

2. Work and social situation of Cabo Verdean immigrants in Italy

It is estimated that 70% of immigrants from Cabo Verde in Italy are still working in domestic work. Poor labour mobility is due both to the rigidity of the Italian labour market and to the limited opportunities for immigrants in general to acquire new professional skills by attending specialised courses. Nevertheless, since the early 1980s, the Cabo Verdeans have begun to pursue other interests, especially in services and commercial and tourist structures.

For a large number of them, having a full-time housework job implies their total availability for their employers, or being available round the clock, except for one and a half days a week. This prevents them from engaging in any activity of study, work or relationship, which would allow an improvement in their living conditions.

Given the social stereotype for which a domestic worker must be female and given the low level of specialisation of male migrants from Cabo Verde, the latter have more difficulty in finding employment and therefore their rate of unemployment is higher than women's. However, over time some men have adapted to the work of care, possibly working in pairs with their companions. Then the fact that Cabo Verdean adults of first generation migrated to Italy as part of family reunification led in some cases to a certain disorientation and a sense of inadequacy when the men found themselves facing situations already overcome by their companions.

The scarcity of leisure time related to domestic work has not prevented a number of Cabo Verdean immigrants from increasing their level of education. There was, especially with the first to arrive, an important need for training, which was met by setting up a Portuguese School in Rome in 1971. The curriculum was based on the official programmes in force in Portugal and that included early primary education and the preparatory cycle and later extended its classes until the 12th year of schooling. For many years the students of this school were mostly of Cabo Verdean origin and only in the middle of the 1990sdid enrolments decrease substantially.

Another important dimension that has always characterised and continues to characterise the social and cultural life of many Cabo Verdeans

living in Italy is associative (Jesus, 1996). Currently there are Cabo Verdean associations in Rome, Milan, Naples, Florence, Genoa and Palermo. In Rome as early as the mid-1970s there was an association, founded by two Cabo Verdeans originating from São Vicente, who over more than ten years favoured the maintenance of social ties and mutual support among people who were likely to lose themselves in society, supporting their desire for education and training. This association later gave way to a new association, the *Organização das Mulheres Caboverdianas em Italia* (OMCVI), set up in 1988 and still active in various fields, including those of promoting Cabo Verdean culture and maintaining important ties with Cabo Verde. The subsequent emergence of other Cabo Verdean associations in Rome is a sign of great vitality and organisational ability of the Cabo Verdean community in Italy (Jesus, 1989).

Belonging to the Catholic religion has certainly encouraged the relationship between immigrants from Cabo Verde and the local community. The fact that the religion practiced by the Cabo Verdeans is the same as practiced by the autochthonous population facilitated reception of the former, because the Catholic Church is driven by the concern to keep religion alive in them (Monteiro, 1997). Especially in the first phase religious bodies made premises available to the Cabo Verdeans and people responsible for their hospitality during the time left free from work. In Rome a particularly significant role was played by the centre "*Tra Noi*" (Among Us), which set up a meeting place for Cabo Verdean girls. In Naples the Don Orione Institute welcomed and continues to welcome women with children laid off by employers who do not accept the presence of the children of workers or who expect them to send their children to Cabo Verde after their birth.

The gradual integration of women in local society and the lack of free time, gradually more and more absorbed by emotional commitments and family life, has however, weakened ties with religious institutions, somewhat unable to meet the new needs of women, less and less connected with the emergency of the first reception and orientation in the new context of life, and instead connected with the desire for positive integration into Italian society. Furthermore, making a comparison between the religious life conducted in Cabo Verde and that conducted in Italy, we are facing a transformation that we have defined elsewhere in terms of a change in the social and symbolic significance of religious practices. In other words, the social and symbolic significance of the different practices, such as marriage or christening, changes in the new context. In Cabo Verde the rites, as well as having an obviously strictly religious value, are also designed to strengthen the position and the social role of the individual within a network of local

relationships. In Italy, however, the fragility of the network of relationships established by the group and especially the marginalisation suffered by the group itself, prevent the establishment of meaningful relationships with the outside world, so that the same practices are emptied of the symbolic meaning and social importance that they hold in the country of origin. The influence of the cultural context of the country of immigration is then manifested clearly in appropriation of traditional customs of European societies, such as the custom of giving and receiving presents at ceremonies such as a christening, communion, confirmation etc. (Silva, 2000).

What is more, over the years the composition of the Cabo Verdean community in Italy has been transformed and diversified. César Augusto Monteiro, analysing the communities of immigrants from Cabo Verde in Rome, outlined three types: that of the "first generation", formed by women who arrived in Italy in the 1960s, characterised by a low level of education and very connected to the traditional habits and customs of Cabo Verde; that of the "independence generation", made up of women who came to Italy in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, with a relatively higher level of education, a higher level of expectations and with a more conscious and determined migration project, emotionally linked to the first group, but able to deal with Italians on a level of greater equality; and finally the type that consists of the generations born in Cabo Verde or in Italy between 1980 and 1985.

These young people from immigrant families and who sociologists generally call second-generation immigrants - but today in Italy we are already in the presence of a third-generation of Cabo Verdeans descending from the first immigrants - have more self-respect compared to the groups of the first generation and, in any case, even though financially supported by their families, they have less planning ability and in many cases leave school and have conflicting attitudes towards their culture of origin (Monteiro, 1997, pp. 399-403).

3. Bringing up children of immigration: the case of Cabo Verdean mothers

Parents today find it increasingly more difficult to be an important guide for their children in a society marked by a deep crisis of values and models. Disorientation, fear and anxiety, not only in parents, but in all the subjects who have the task of accompanying the growth of the younger generation, are the manifestations of this crisis. Then the multiplication of ways of forming a family or of living in a family is accompanied by a plurality of

educational styles and ways of relating to the family which in turn determines very diversified behaviour in children. For immigrant families raising children is a challenge, even more difficult for the reasons explained above because they live in the most vulnerable conditions due to issues of social integration and cultural adaptation. In order to succeed in their parenting tasks, immigrant parents must develop a different educational approach than the one in which they were educated because for their children to develop a secure identity they need to learn to combine the references and cultural values of their tradition with those of the country where they live. Psychological and cultural lacerations related to the migration experience accompanied by low self-reflexive skills do not always allow immigrant parents to respond appropriately to the educational challenges posed by today's society. In order to educate in immigration parents should reflect critically on the educational model in order to work out a new idea of education and their relationship with their children. Doing so can help them build the capacity to transit between various cultural backgrounds, thereby avoiding the creation in them of a state of dissonance between the values of the family culture and those of the society in which they live (Silva, 2012b).

In the case of Cabo Verdeans in Italy, the children, including those born in the country of immigration of the parents, live the migratory experience of their families as a reflex. At the end of the 1980s Maria de Lourdes Jesus already reported some difficulties faced by Cabo Verdean women in raising and keeping their children born in Italy with them, as well as the inability to transmit the linguistic and cultural elements of their country of origin to them (cf. Jesus, 1989, p. 88).

It should also be noted that having children is not always a rational choice, for immigrants, but perhaps not only for them. In the specific case of the Cabo Verdean women that choice may be motivated by a desire to have their own emotional life and family.

Having children in the working, economic and housing situation described above can cause great difficulty in rearing and educating them. Especially when it is only the mother who is taking responsibility, as in the case of many Cabo Verdeans. Raising children alone, without the material and emotional support of a companion, not only depends on the separation imposed by the experience of migration, but in this case also has roots in cultural patterns and relationships between men and women typical of Cabo Verdean society, where a significant proportion of men live parenting irresponsibly by refusing to deal with all or part of the care and education of children (Filho, 1995).

In the case of Cabo Verdean immigrants in Italy, but this also applies to other immigrant women employed in fixed household collaboration, new

mothers are forced to send their newborn children to relatives in the country of origin and then take them back at school age (normally at 6 years old). Indeed, these women cannot count, like the autochthonous women, on a network of relatives who can support them in taking care of young children while they are at work. This is a problem that in a country like Italy, where childcare services are still insufficient (especially in the southern regions of the country), really affects immigrant families with young children and especially single-parent ones.

Yet another difficulty is that relating to transmission of the language and culture of Cabo Verde. In many cases, the teachers themselves discourage parents from cultivating the language of origin considering that it might be an obstacle to learning Italian for pupils. In others the total and prolonged immersion in the Italian-speaking context, which is accompanied by scarce and sporadic contacts with compatriots, means that the mother may exclusively use the Italian language even in the family, especially in the case of mixed marriages.

When the difficulties of social and cultural inclusion are particularly severe for mothers, children tend to develop a distancing from the cultural context of origin, believing that their origin is thecause of their difficulties. It is especially in adolescence that the problems of identity are more obvious, that is when the search for one's own identity becomes urgent and there is a risk for the adolescent of not finding answers to his/her questions and of falling into a kind of suspension between two worlds. Although as shown in a study conducted in Rome on a group of teenagers from Cabo Verde, they remain anchored to the values and models transferred by families – particularly their traditional idea of family – even with them you notice uncertainty and fragility in comparison with the culture of the majority. A strong need for recognition of their ethnic specificity by society emerges in young people; a recognition that would allow them to earn greater self-esteem (Santos Fermin, 2008). The recovery of the cultural traits of Cabo Verdeans in a creative *métissage* by the second generation – as in the case of music and literature – should be seen as a message to Italian society, still too closed to the symbolic and existential world of the new citizens.

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"THIS COUNTRY DOES NOT HAVE MY BACK!": YOUTH EXPERIENCES WITH A PARENT THREATENED BY DEPORTATION

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Abstract

Using exploratory case study methodology and a critical theoretical perspective, this study examined the impact of parental deportation on three Cape Verdean youths, in one of the largest Cape Verdean immigrant communities in Southeast New England. A particularly focus is given to their schooling experiences following parental deportation as well as their understanding of the event of parental deportation. Participants expressed feeling isolated and disconnected in school and from extended family following their parents' involvement with Immigration services. They questioned or denied their American identity despite being citizens by birth. They described fears and feelings of uncertainty about their future. All participants described having negative schooling experiences following their parents' incarceration with Immigration Customs Enforcement. They all understood the deportation to be unfair and unwarranted. The findings of this study highlight the importance of school districts that serve large immigrant populations, developing structures responsive to the issues of immigration.

Keywords

Diaspora, immigration, parental deportation, school, community.

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Introduction

The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, the Antiterrorism Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, coupled with the reverberations of September 11, 2001 events resulted in an increase of deportations of undocumented as well as legal permanent residents (LPRs) from United States. From the years of 1997 to 2001, approximately one million people of a variety of nationalities were deported of which 20% were lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the U.S., with most having established residency for ten or more years (Baum, Jones & Barry, 2010). On October 6, 2010, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced record-breaking numbers of deportations which is carefully termed by DHS as removals. Between the years of 2009 to 2010 approximately 800,000 people were deported from the United States. According to the United States Department of Homeland Security (2011), 393,289 aliens were removed, and of those removed, 264,944 were removed for non-criminal reasons and less than half of the total numbers (128,345) were identified as criminal aliens. Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez (2008) concluded that a significant number of people deported from the United States are poor Latin American immigrants and for the most part they are removed for non-criminal reasons. Following an in depth study of Immigration Customs Enforcement data, Human Rights Watch (2009), concluded that 77 percent of LPRs who were targeted for removals were deported for non-violent offenses and only 23 percent of LPRs were deported for violent offenses. The Department of Homeland Security (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2013) reports that from the years of 2004 to 2013 a total of 8,420,687 people were apprehended, 3,465,061 removed and 6,797,268 were returned from the United States to country of origin. While the number of apprehensions has maintained, the number of removals has increased and the number of returns has decreased. DHS terms removals, cases which result in a deportation, that is court ordered. Returns are those cases that the person has returned to country of origin voluntarily or under an administrative request by DHS. Removals and returns have the same outcome as deportations, which is expulsion from United States.

Also relevant to the increased number of people deported is that IIRIRA of 1996 and the AEDPA of 1996 limited judicial powers, restricted due process, eliminated family hardship as a relief from deportation and added a retroactivity aspect of the law, which allows for crimes not defined as aggravated felonies, committed prior to 1996 to be punishable by deportation

(Hagan, Eschbach & Rodriguez, 2008; Kanstroom, 2007). Following the 2001 events, the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 was signed into law and the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. These laws are discussed by many U.S. experts as unwarranted, unfair and damaging for the entire U.S. society (Dow, 2004; Kanstroom, 2007; Welch, 2004, 2002).

Debates, discussions and conversations about deportation seldom include information about the consequences to citizens, U. S. children or U. S. spouses of those that are in the process of being deported or have been deported. In fact, most of those I speak to about this subject matter, quickly admit that when thinking about deportation, they do not consider or remember that children, and much less American born children may be impacted. Along with this oversight, the impact of parental deportation in community structures such as health, welfare agencies and school districts, are also seldom considered. The limited information and suppression of historical memory are an effective mechanism in the domination of immigrants and subordinate groups. The dynamics and full impact of deportation appears to have limited and or strategic exposure.

Beginning in 2011, in response to the growing decade long outcry for immigration reforms and recognizing the potential impact of parental deportations on citizen children, made a specific requirement that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) keep data regarding the number of parents of U. S. citizens deported. These data are to be provided in a joint explanatory statement and submitted semi-annually to the Committee and the office of Immigration Statistics. Baum, Jones, and Barry (2010) in an executive summary addressing the plight of children of Lawful Permanent Residents, propose that;

a) Judicial discretion be restore for all cases involving LPRs with U.S. Citizen children.

b) Revert to the pre- 1996 definition of "aggravated felony"

c) Data collection on children of LPRs impacted by parental deportation

d) Strict guidelines for deportation of LPRs with U.S. citizen children. (Baum, Jones, and Barry, 2010, P.I)

Recently President Barack Obama took action to protect families from separation through deportation. However, in his remarks he mainly aimed at undocumented families with children (Obama, 2014). No protections were granted to LPRs with U.S. citizen children (Obama, 2014). These actions came in the form of executive discretion and did not represent changes in the law. The president's attempts at decreasing separation of families through deportation has been met with enormous political resistance.

Deportation of Cape Verdeans

The deportation of Cape Verdeans has serious implications for Cape Verde and the Cape Verdean American communities in the United States. In the United States, the communities in southeast New England are among the largest communities of Cape Verdeans for the Cape Verdean diaspora and as a result these are particularly impacted in cases of deportations.

In the cases of deportation, the Consulate of Republic of Cape Verde in Boston is notified by the Immigration Customs Enforcement of all Cape Verdeans who need travel documents emitted in order to comply with an order of deportation. These notifications do not include Cape Verdeans who have a valid up-to-date passport or who are deemed inadmissible, upon re-entry in the United States. In such cases the deportation is processed within days, leaving the families with little time to contact attorneys or take any legal action. Families of those with standing deportation orders may contact the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde to obtain assistance Not all families contact the Consulate. Lack of information, stigma and fear results in many families not contacting the Consulate to request assistance. Also, Immigration Customs Enforcement does not notify the Consulate of a deportation or return in cases that the agency is in possession of a passport.

According to the data from Department of Homeland Security (Immigration Yearbook, 2013) many more Cape Verdeans are apprehended and incarcerated by ICE, in an attempt to deport than are actually deported. Often those apprehended are not deported due to a stay or

judicial cancellation of deportation. Figure 1. provides a visual representation of those apprehended and those deported between the years of 2004 to 2012.

Figure 1. Cape Verdean Apprehended and Removed by ICE



Department of Homeland Security data (Immigration yearbook, 2013) shows that from the years of 2004 to 2012, a total of 355 Cape Verdeans were deported, averaging approximately 40 people per year. Year 2013 was not reported in an effort to limit data disclosure. An analysis of data from the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde reveals that none of those deported between the years of 1997 to 2013 have returned to the United States. From the 355 people deported between the years of 2004 to 2012, it is reported that 267 were deported for criminal reasons and 88 for non-criminal reasons. From 2004 to 2010 the number of criminal deportations exceeded non-criminal. However in 2011 and 2012 many more Cape Verdeans were deported for non-criminal reasons than criminal. (Immigration Yearbook, 2013.)

Also, Consulate data shows that the population of people deported with travel documents emitted by the Consulate arrived in the United States, for the most part between 6 and 17 years of age. Figure 2 presents the age of arrival in the United States of those with emitted travel documents for the purpose of deportation.

Figure 2. Age of Arrival in the United States of those provided with a travel document 2007-2010.



Between the years of 2007-2010, the majority of Cape Verdeans provided with the travel documents for deportations purposes were between the ages of 19 and 38 (Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde).

Figure 3. Age of those provided with a travel document –2007-2010.



According to the data offered by the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde, and DHS, Capeverdeans who are deported most often arrived in the United States at a very young age (6-17). They generally are in the plenitude of adulthood (19-38) at the time of deportation. An overwhelming majority are lawful permanent residents and have resided in the United States for more that 10 years. They have strong family ties in the United States. They are mostly English speakers and parents of American born children. For the most part they have not returned to Cape Verde since arrival in the United States and according to the interviews provided to the Consulate, most express having no ties to Cape Verde. Families that remain in the United States become responsible for financially assisting relatives that are deported given the unemployment rates and the lack of social supports in Cape Verde.

Outcomes of Family Deportation

The repercussions of living in a state of deportability, or going through deportation of a caretaker can have significant implications for the children involved in the process. One can effectively argue that for children of immigrants, who are born in America the implications are compounded. These children often feel the burden of having to make a choice between their country and their parents' country of origin. During this turmoil and state of uncertainty, children are expected to attend and perform well in school. In the case of parental deportation, the family deals with the added stress of having to choose between permanent separation and relocation. The family may choose to relocate to countries that the children have never

been, speak little of the language and have had limited exposure to the culture. On the other hand, the idea of permanent separation from parents can be traumatic and inconceivable. These children most often remain in the United States in a single parent household or are placed with extended families. It is estimated that between the years of 1997 and 2007 more than 100,000 children were impacted by the deportation of a LPR parent (Baum, Jones & Barry, 2010).

For immigrant students and students that live in mixedstatus homes, the lived realities of immigration may be traumatic. According to the Vermont Department of Health, Division of Health (2005) children may experience trauma due to a variety of circumstances, including loss and separation from caregivers and immigration. For some children, immigration may trigger anxiety, depression and an inability to progress developmentally. These reactions may be further exacerbated if children or other family members have been the victims of persecution, violence, severe poverty, homelessness, exile, or have witnessed violence, death and destruction (Vermont Department of Health, Division of Health, 2005, p.160).

The term "trauma" has its origin in medicine (Braga, et al. 2008). Used first to signify injury to the body, the term trauma has evolved to encompass experiences of situations or events that are perceived by the individual as sudden, negative, and uncontrollable (Carlson, 1997). Trauma in infants and young children is defined as a physical or psychological threat or assault to a child's physical integrity, sense of self, safety or survival or to the physical safety of another person significant to the child" (Vermont Department of Health, Division of Health, 2005, P.170). We know that given protective factors and personal characteristics the experience and intensity of trauma differs from person to person (Riggs & Riggs, 2011), and that trauma can be presented in a variety of situations and results in psychological distress and psychiatric diagnosis (Shnurr, Friedman & Bernardy, 2002). Furthermore, trauma and psychological distress results in poor academic achievement (Porche & Fortuna, 2011; Rothon et al., 2009; Duplehain, Reigner & Packard, 2008). Understanding physical, emotional and psychiatric aspects of trauma leads to an understanding of how and to what extent trauma impacts educational experiences and academic achievement of youth.

Goodman, Miller and West-Olatunji (2012) examined the impact of psychological trauma in education achievement using data from the nationally representative Early Childhood Longitudinal Study of the kindergarten class of 1998-99. The exploratory study included data from 11,820 fifth-grade students and it spanned the years of 1999-2007. Goodman, Miller and West-Olatunji (2012) found that the presence of traumatic stress

significantly increased the likelihood of academic underachievement and placement in special education program.

In an extensive literature review and clinical observations of a cohort of children conducted by Streeck-Fisher and Van Der Kolk (2000) found that exposure to traumatic events results in emotional, psychological and biological deficits that impact learning ability. In essence, memory, and cognitive engagements are compromised by the exposure to multiple traumatic intra familial and medical events (Streeck-Fisher, & Van Der Kolk, 2000).

A series of studies conducted by Saylor, Macias, Wohlfeiler, Morgan and Awkerman (2009) concluded that children exposed to potentially traumatic life events scored significantly higher in school difficulties and behavior problems. Despite the event of immigration or deportation of a parent not being present in the Saylor et. al. study, specific events listed in the study included parental separation (Saylor et.al., 2009).

Upon examining data from the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology Surveys of 2,532 young adults, immigrants and U.S. born, Porche and Fortuna (2011) found that there is an increased likelihood of dropping out among black and immigrant youth. This study was examined through retrospective data and correlates to high school dropout (Porche and Fortuna, 2011). Survey data was collected from U.S. born adults, ages 21-29, who were foreign born and migrated to the United States during various ages specifically age 12 and under, age 13-17, and those that migrated at the age of 18 or older. Porche and Fortuna (2011) found that immigrant youth with childhood anxiety disorders and a history of trauma were more likely to drop out than the non-immigrant student population. The study included African Americans, Afrocaribbean, Asian, Latino, and non-Latino white. Goodman and West-Olatunji (2010) argue that members of socially marginalized groups are under persistent traumatic stress due to systemic oppression and educational hegemony. Recognizing systemic injustice and structural subjection as a source of trauma for socially marginalized groups, Zalaquett, Fuerth, Stein, Ivey, and Ivey (2008) proposed an approach to diagnosis that is inclusive of individual perception and contextual issues. Researchers in the field of psychology, public health, social work and counseling (Forman, 2003; Goodman & West-Olatunji, 2009; Harell, Hall & Taliaferro, 2003; Paradies, 2006) have studied and consistently linked the effects of trauma caused by discrimination and systemic oppression on the well-being of culturally and linguistically diverse population.

The deportation of a parent can be a traumatic life event for children. Androff et al., (2011) positioned the argument specifically for children of

undocumented aliens suggesting that the stress of immigration, possible deportation, and economic insecurity results in barriers to education, poor health outcomes, discrimination, trauma and harm to the children, families and to entire communities. Studies focused on legal permanent residents are limited. The purpose of this study was to uncover the impact of parental deportation on schooling experiences with a focus on Cape Verdean American youth with parents that are lawfully permanent residents.

Linguistic diversity and Immigration

There are many challenges to providing services to students who are culturally, linguistically diverse and immigrant. Limited English proficiency and language barriers between home and school officials are some of the immediate obstacles for this population of students (Lima, 2011). To further complicate matters there have been limited number of empirical studies that address the instructional needs of the population of students who are culturally, linguistically diverse and immigrant (Shyyan, Thurlow & Liu, 2008) and there have been even fewer studies that address the impact of public policies in the education of these youth. Such studies are important because culturally and linguistically diverse youth live within the boundaries of immigration. In The United States there are specific public policies that address immigration and there is a social climate that responds and instigates these policies. An exploration of such policies and an understanding of the impact of the climate are long overdue given current predictions of increased diversity in racial and ethnic composition of American population.

The linguistic condition of Cape Verde is particularly complex given its diglossic imposition. Diglossia is a condition where two languages are in use. One language is used in formal and the other for informal encounters. This condition allows for a linguistic power relationship between the two languages resulting in the poor and least educate segments of the population being placed in a socially vulnerable position. The official language of Cape Verde is Portuguese; however, the cultural and oral language is Cape Verdean Krioulo. The development of Krioulo in its written form has only recently been addressed and its oral form has significant variations depending on the island it originates from. Service providers attest to the difficulties in serving the Cape Verdean community given its linguistic diversity (Thomas & Sanchez, 1999) Limited English skills place the Cape Verdean communities in a vulnerable position.

Cape Verdean Youth and Development of Bicultural Identity

Cape Verdean immigrant and first generation Cape Verdean youth develop their identity while living in between cultural spaces. Interaction between culture of origin and host culture influences identity perception. Chen, Benet-Martinez and Bond (2008) suggest the development of a bicultural identity from direct and mediated intercultural exchanges between culture of origin and host culture. A study completed in 2013 (Chen, Benet--Martinez, Wu, Lam, and Bond, 2013) indicated how bicultural identities can be impacted by individuals perceptions of contradicting elements such as the experiences of cultural isolation and discrimination. Understanding biculturalism, cultural identification in the study of Cape Verdean youth of is important due to multiple factors imbedded within this population.

Schwartz, Zamboanga and Weisskirch (2008) provided measures of personal identity processes, heritage and American cultural practices, values, and identifications to 2,411 emerging adults at 30 United States Universities and Colleges, who were either born abroad or with parents born outside the United States to determine the extent to which measures would differ across personal identity statuses. Their findings, for both groups of participants (those born abroad, or those with parents born abroad) suggests a convergence of personal identity and cultural identity (Schwartz, et. al., 2008.) This convergence is punctuated by the elements of exploration and choice. The exchange of ideas and experiences in and between cultures of origin and host is a determinant in the development of cultural identity.

Scholars have also explored threats to the development of personal and cultural identity. Petriglieri (2011) suggests that individuals respond in two different ways when presented with threats to their identity. Some may restructure their identity by re-aligning with dominant or culture of origin depending on the threat and others respond by protecting their identity through maintaining and underlining elements of primary culture (Petriglieri, 2011). Furthermore, Petriglieri's (2011) framework suggests that individual's responses to acculturation when presented with a threat may take three courses; deflating or devaluating those who present a threat, conceal their identity, or re-structure identity through identity deletion. In exploring identity and acculturation processes in youth with mixed heritages, Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson (2014) found that acculturation is "dynamic, situated, and multifaceted" (p.81). Furthermore they found that acculturation and identities are constructed through oppositional themes which they list as "cultural maintenance versus cultural contact; identity

as inclusion versus identity as exclusion; institutionalized ideologies versus agency" (Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson, 2014, p.81)

Consistently studies in the various facets of identity development and acculturation point to the importance of experiences and environment as determinant factors (Badea, Jetten, Iyer, and Er-Rafiy, 2011; Neto, 2006; Mana, Orr and Mana, 2009; Fisher and Model, 2012). Bowskill, Lyons and Coyle (2007) point to a tendency for research in acculturation to be integrated in rhetoric, that conceals the (re-)production of a more implicit assimilationism (p.793) andsuggest the need for research in acculturation that is more environmentally grounded, and attentive to the hegemonic structures. Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson (2014) concluded their study by positing that "acculturation strategies are profoundly political *and* psychological as they are embedded in the politics of intercultural relations, social histories, family dynamics, and systems of social support" (p. 93). Studies that targeted immigration policies and the impact of such policies on immigrant populations can be revealing and provocative to the understanding of identity development and acculturation processes.

Method

This study explored the impact of parental deportation on youth's schooling experiences using a critical theoretical perspective. Exploratory case study methodology conducted within a critical theoretical framework seeks to produce a sociopolitical critique in an effort to transform and promote change in the communities under study. A critical perspective focuses on issues of power that are particular to a cultural context and assumes that oppression is multifaceted and that in every situation privilege exists (Carspecken, 1996). It is also crucial that this study be undertaken within the critical framework given that the issue is deportation. The idea of deportation creates a sense of them versus us and as a result lends support to the hegemonic views present in American society. Hegemony refers to the social, political, intellectual, economic control of a dominant group over subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971). The system of deportation points to social inequities in the law and a hierarchical system of who has the right to stay and who must leave.

With this study, I sought to add to the conversation about immigration policies, in particular deportation policies that lie outside the school walls but that ultimately may produce academic risks for youth. I understand that the subject is exploratory in nature because there have not been

studies focused on the impact on schooling experiences of Cape Verdean youth subsequent to parents being deported. It made sense that this study be qualitative given the specificity of the topic studied, the exploratory nature of the study and the potential for hypothesis generation rather than hypothesis testing.

Research Questions

This study was guided by one broad question and one supporting question.

1. How do youth understand and experience the deportation of their Cape Verdean parent (s)?

a. In what ways are the schooling experiences of youth impacted when their parent is ordered deported?

Case Selection

This study included three youth participants between the ages of 13-21. The participants were purposefully selected through the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde. Families who chose to participate have youth between the ages of 13-21 and had a parent with a deportation order. Also the crime that led to the order of deportation occurred ten years prior to the issuance of order of deportation; therefore, with parental incarceration occurring prior to the birth of the children. I also targeted cases that had no other incarcerations that occurred after the birth of the children. These criteria resulted in the youth having a more clear recollection of the incidence of parental incarceration by Immigration Customs Enforcement and it also provided greater assurance that the youth had maximum access to the parent while growing up. Parent(s), who are currently primary caretakers also participated in the study. Parent(s), and primary caretakers were interviewed once to allow for data triangulation.

A reduction of the number of cases allowed me to make explicit data that may be extreme, contradictory or unique. I was aware of the exploratory nature of this multiple case study and as a result I planned for the possibility of encountering data that seemed contradictory, extreme, or unique by limiting the number of cases to be selected and allowing more opportunities

for canvassing the data. A large number of cases may have resulted in small intricacies or minimally invasive data that is contradictory to be lost.

Data Collection

Data were collected through interviews, field notes and observations as this constituted the most important form of data collection in case methodology (Stake, 2006). Youth participants' interviews were formatted into three series (Seidman, 2006), with six types of variation questions (Madison, 2005). I asked behavior or experience questions, opinion or value questions, feeling questions, knowledge questions, sensory questions, and background/demographic questions. Given the intricacies and challenges of the subject matter of this study, all six types of variations questions were used. Iunderstood that all parts of the interviews were important sources of information.

Findings

This exploratory case study sought to answer the question, how do youth understand and experience the deportation of a parent? And in what ways are the schooling experiences of youth impacted when their parents are ordered deported?

Youth interviews were analyzed for themes. The results of this study found that youth participants experienced a deep sense of fear, anxiety, uncertainty and anger subsequent to the possibility of their parent being deported. All three youth participants described being impacted by the experience of having a parent deported or in process of deportation. The impact seemed to be immediate, negative, long-lasting and extensive to immediate social context and school settings. All participants have been given a Pseudonym.

Understanding and Negotiating the Event

As to the question how do youth understand and experience the deportation of a parent, three main themes emerged. Youth spoke of their experiences with the event of deportation in terms of feeling isolated and disconnected, fearful and uncertain of the future, guilty and angry. None of

the youth interviewed knew the exact reasons that led to the deportation and overall, the reasons did not seem relevant. All participants expressed not being interested in the reasons that led to the deportation. Youth participants felt the deportation to be unfair and unwarranted based on who they knew their parents to be as persons. All participant youth focused on the injustice of deporting their parent given their belief that their parent is a good person. Upon being confronted with the possibility of deportation, youth participants sought for a resolution and experienced the event in all its intensity. They were fearful, felt isolated and disconnected. They felt angry, guilty about the lack of control and were uncertain about the future

Youth participants negotiated their experiences by disconnecting and isolating from others. The disconnection was also evident in their hesitation in identifying themselves as American citizens, despite being born and raised in the United States. They felt their identity was compromised by the event of parental deportation. Sara admitted to still struggling by feeling ambivalence when identifying herself as an American. Keenan denied his identity as an American pointing to the lack of protections America offers. He clearly stated that the United States is not his country despite being born in the U.S because "this country does not have my back" (Keenan, interview 1). This was in direct relationship with his experiences as an American youth undergoing the event of parental deportation.

None of the youth interviewed demonstrated or had specific knowledge of the reasons their parents were deported or became involved with immigration. When asked they exhibited confusion and negotiated the reason for their parents' involvement with ICE by blaming the agency. One participant stated that the father had missed an interview with the agency, another stated that the agency did not have accurate information and the third simply stated not knowing the reason. Guilt due to lack of control and the inability to resolve their parents' situation and anger towards federal agencies involved were also part of the conversation.

All participants expressed changes in living, social context arrangements and understood these changes to be a consequence of the event of parental deportation. Two participants were forced to change schools, with one changing from one state to another. Sara chose to change from a private catholic school to a much larger public school, in an effort to lessen the financial hardship on the mother. Sara's mother described an event where Sara broke down. While crying and feeling completely overwhelmed she demanded answers from the mother. According to the mother it was evident that Sara had reached the breaking point due to lack of answers, uncertainty and fear.

Keenan was forced to move due to a change in living arrangement. Given his father's incarceration, he was forced to go live with his mother. The change in schools resulted in having to establish a different circle of friends for Sara and Keenan. Keenan went to live with his mother for the first time. He acknowledges that the friendships he made in the other State were not always positive. He was often involved in fights and was often suspended. Kennan perception of self is that "given a chance I can be a troublemaker" (keenan, interview 3). Sara's description of the friendships she made following the change in school, were short and superficial. She denied connecting to school friends in a significant way and admitted that due to having to deal with the stress of her father's deportation she mainly kept to herself. Sara also made statements as to other people, mainly relatives and school officials not understanding what she was going through.

Derrick was separated from his younger sisters, who were sent to live with their father. He understood the change in living arrangments as necessary but described feeling worried and missing his sisters. Derrick also states that he became quieter following his mother's incarceration. Derrick's aunt also agreed with Derrick's description stating that she felt he was no longer the same kid. Derrick maintained the same group of friends in school but denied discussing what was happening at home with any of his friends. Derrick admitted that his homeroom teacher knew about the situation at home. However he denied ever being supported or asking for support at school. All three youth exhibit a deep sense of disconnection with school, family and friends. It was clear that all three negotiated the experience by isolating themselves. For all three youth interviewed, the event of parental deportation and involvement with immigration impacted their schooling experiences.

Schooling Experiences

All participants expressed deep levels of stress and anxiety which impacted school work. Sara negotiated her stress and anxiety by focusing on school work. She admits that this was a mechanical way of keeping busy, and keeping her mind occupy with something other than what was happening at home. Keenan's behaviors in school also allowed for an escape. His suspensions due to fights and the exhibition of inappropriate social behaviors released some of the anxiety and resulted in some attention being paid to his emotional state. Derrick seemed to have limited coping strategies. His stress and anxiety immediately resulted in a drop in grades, which

he explained by his inability to concentrate and focus on the work. Derrick described himself as a good student prior to his mother's incarceration with ICE and has a "bad" student after his mother's incarceration.

Keenan discredited his schooling experiences and academic achievement by stating that "about 80% of the knowledge I have right now, I didn't learn in school" (Keenan, interview 3). Sara described her sarcastic attitude (chuckling) about statements she heard in social studies class about America being a country of immigrants. Sara also made statements as to her immediately noticing the contradictions in materials and ideologies presented in school. Derrick, the only participant still in school, much younger and with his mother still with a pending order of deportation, describes his disconnection with school as well as his drop in grades but appeared to have difficulties articulating his feelings and experiences in school.

Youth feelings of isolation and disconnection extended to the school setting. All youth participants spoke of lack of intervention by school officials in terms of guidance or support related to counseling or academics. This lack of support resulted in negative experiences in the school setting. One youth participant used academic activities to distance herself from the event of having a parent under order of deportation. She used school work to escape the stressors of her home situation, but her overall connection to school and school personnel was superficial. Sara recognized that her oral participation in classes decreased following her father's involvement with Immigration Customs Enforcement. She admitted to not talking to her teachers or seeking the help of guidance. She stated that school personnel did not know about her situation at home and it was her impression that they did not care to know. These statements underlined her feelings of isolation and disconnection. These feelings might also have been in part the result of her change from private to public school after her father's incarceration by Immigration Services. The change was necessary due to the financial stressors at home. She recognized having many friends in the private school, prior to her father's incarceration. She clarified that her father was well known in the community of the private school, given his work with the church. In the public school, her family was not known and as a result her father's contribution to the community was not recognized. On the other hand, Sara stated that she distanced herself from those who knew her father such as extended family, friends and community acquaintances. According to her, those who knew her father saw her with pity and often made questions that made her uncomfortable.

Derrick, a 14 year old, is aware of the negative impact the experience of parental deportation had in his school standing. He attributed his lower

grades to not caring and feeling unmotivated. He expressed feelings of sadness over his poor performance in school, following his mother's incarceration with Immigration Customs Enforcement. He explained that despite wanting to do well, like he had done before, he had difficulties focusing and concentrating in school work. His schooling experiences were impacted in that he no longer perceived himself as a good student. Derrick also spoke of isolation and disconnection. He admitted that school personnel did not contact him, sought to help by talking to him or provided assistance in any way despite their knowledge about what was happening at home.

Kennan, while highly aware of his academic abilities and felt that his behaviors such as not turning in homework, skipping school, engaging in fights which resulted in suspensions were a direct result of the anger and uncertainty he felt. From all three youth participants, Kennan was the only one that became involved with law enforcement and was incarcerated for a few months after High School completion. According to him his anger is directed towards the structure that allows for deportation and incarceration. He spoke of his own incarceration and alluded to the fact of being poor and black as directly related to his father's deportation and his incarceration. Subsequent to high school graduation, Keenan was incarcerated for assaulting a law enforcement officer. He stated that if he had retained a private lawyer he would have beaten his case. He often alluded to the idea that America only works for those who are white and have money. He reported that school personnel found out of his father's incarceration with immigration Customs Enforcement and possible deportation through the newspaper. The day following the media reports school personnel approached him to ask him if any of his peers had bothered him about his father's incarceration. He stated that school personnel only did that to make sure there would be no trouble in school and that in no time school personnel sought to help him understand or work through the situation that was happening at home. His conclusions were based on the fact that this was the only time school personnel ever approached him and questioned about the incident. His reports provided strong indication of the quality of his schooling experiences. Through this event he gained knowledge of his value or lack there of, as a student in the school. Subsequent to his father's incarceration, he often missed school, became involved in fights, was suspended and spent time in an alternative school. After completing high school, Keenan was incarcerated for a period of time. Despite being born in the United States he does not identify himself as an American.

Two youth participants spoke of becoming more aware of the inconsistencies in some curricular content and questioning the presentations made

at school. One youth participant spoke of her difficulties when presented with the idea of America being a country of immigrants. Alluding to the idea of how can it be, if immigrants are mistreated? An older male youth participant spoke of his anger towards the "system" as well as the inconsistencies in the treatment of black and white people.

Throughout the interviews, youth participants were very aware and connected to the experience of their parents' deportation. They spoke of the event intensely and continually returned to their feelings which related to the overall event rather than specific experiences in school, signaling their schooling and education as having been placed in the background. The acknowledgement of impact on schooling experiences followed by a consistent return to the discussion about the experience of dealing with the deportation of a parent signaled the intensity and power of the experience as a whole rather than the sole experiences within the school subsequent to the parents' deportation. This was also an indication of their need to focus and talk about the event in totality.

Discussion and Recommendations

Belief of Permanence versus the Reality of Transience

In the United States, deportation and state of deportability is associated with undocumented immigrants. However deportation and state of deportability is also a reality for those with Legal Permanent Residence status (LPR). Deportability is defined as the "specific vulnerability to arrest and the spatial removal, as well as linked legal penalties, such as the loss of rights to future 'legal 'immigration" (Talavera, Núñez-Mchiri & Heyman, 2010, pp. 166-167). Changes in immigration law in 1996 (IIRRRA, AEDPA) in response to Oklahoma City bombing, the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent creation of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) resulted in increased legal vulnerabilities for lawful permanent residents. These laws limited judicial powers, restricted due process, and eliminated family hardship as a relief from deportation. These laws allow for crimes, otherwise considered misdemeanors to be defined as aggravated felonies, punishable by incarceration followed by deportation. Often and in desperation, those I visited while they were incarcerated spoke of the outlook of deportation as being much worse than being incarcerated. Many stated that they would prefer to be incarcerated for double the amount of time than to be forcibly separated from their families through deportation. They

spoke of the fears of returning to a country that would exclude and ostracize them given their identification as deportees. They begged for their lives, hoping that in my role with the consulate I would have some control over their situation.

The retroactivity aspect of the laws result in deportations for crimes that occurred many years prior to the deportation order. While working at the Consulate of Cape Verde in 2010 and 2011, I often dealt with cases with an order of deportation for crimes committed in the 1980's. As a result, those in process of deportation were now older, heads of households, and primary income earners for their families. I recall a case of a man in his late 60's. He was charged with domestic violence in 1986. Subsequent to the charge, he went through a divorce. In 2010, married to another person and with six adult children from the second marriage, he was apprehended and incarcerated for approximately 6 months by immigration customs enforcement and placed under deportation order. The order of deportation was given due to the charges of domestic violence incurred in 1986. All six adult children were born in the United States and had no knowledge of their father's first marriage history. The first wife wrote a letter requesting ICE to release him, to no avail. After 180 days of incarceration, and due to inability to obtain travel documents, ICE released him under supervision.

Those who seek and are granted legal permanent residency in the United States, leave the country of origin with the expectation and accepting the perduring quality of their actions. The move almost always requires letting go of employment, personal property and for some, the giving up of social status in the country of origin. This move is not made without fears. The idea of physically disconnecting from a known environment and attempting to reconnect and be successful to an unknown social cultural environment brings to mind uncertainties and anxieties that for many is traumatic. Also, linguistic differences between country of origin and receiving country impacts levels of independence, and ultimately ability to succeed in receiving country. Given what is left behind, it is important that the move be done with the guarantee of permanency in the receiving country. The dreams and hopes of legal permanent residents is often grounded in educational advancement, better employment, social and financial stability and an access to opportunities that would otherwise not be available in country of origin. Despite these dreams and hopes, success and the realization of such dreams is not a guarantee; and it is also challenging given the social and political limitations of LPR status. The status of LPR limits opportunities for educational advancement, access to certain property, and or type of employment, and increases political and social vulnerability.

According to Immigration and Customs enforcement data most of those deported hold the status of lawful permanent residents. This status is clearly stated on an official card, provided by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services. Individuals and families must apply and meet all requirements in order to be granted legal entry in the United States. Meeting requirements is the result of careful background investigation, health clearances and provision of financial statements of support. Those who apply for a lawful permanent residency seek to establish permanent residency in the United States. The statement of permanency in the documents is misleading. In reality an LPR status increases social and legal vulnerability, in fact placing individuals and families in a state of transiency. This state can only be alleviated by entering the process of citizenship, which is only possible following 5 years of residence. For some the process of citizenship is not an option given the requirements. As the parents remain under an LPR status, their American born children enter into a state of social and political vulnerability.

The Climate

Constructing a populous rationale that supports deportations requires narratives of fear. In the United States these narratives rely heavily on the idea that immigrants may hold ideological stances that are "counter" American interests and or that immigrants take jobs from U. S citizens. In the presidential remarks of November 2014 about Immigration, President Obama acknowledged these fears by stating "I know some worry immigration will change the very fabric of who we are, or take our jobs, or stick it to middle-class families at a time when they already feel they've gotten the raw deal of the decade" (Obama, 2014). He attempts to dissipate these fears by reminding that "our history and the fact shows that immigrants are a net plus for our economy and our society" (Obama, 2014). President Obama's executive action of November 20, 2014 was aimed at protecting undocumented families from deportation. Through this executive action approximately 5 million people who are undocumented, may apply for temporary residency, work permits, driver licenses, etc. In response to President's Obama's executive action, and demonstrating strong opposition to immigration reform aimed at protecting undocumented individuals and families, the speaker of the house John Boehner as well as a number of republican leaders accused the president of "violating the law", "ignoring the will of the American people", and "political grandstanding". Former

Governor of Florida threatened political inaction by stating that the president's action "undermines all efforts to forge a permanent solution to this crisis" (Bradner & Rosche, 2014). The blogs that followed the president's remarks on immigration were also indicative of the negative climate of immigration reforms. Some of these blogs were entitled "Obama's amnesty benefits lawbreaking employers" (Freere, 2014), "Amnesty requires immigration cuts" (Krikorian, 2014), "Bluelight Special on Naturalization to help Fund Obama's Amnesty" (Vaughan, 2014). Many suggested that Obama's approach to immigration justified impeachment procedures. The difficulties in putting immigration reform on the table and the historically oppressive anti-immigration climate is a testament as to the ideological complexities existent within the issue of immigration.

This climate is also present at the local community level. The Enterprise, a daily Brockton newspaper, often runs articles on immigrants that were rounded for deportation. The articles often provides full names and at times street addresses of immigrants involved with ICE. This information is extremely damaging to the families involved and it places the community in check given the high numbers of immigrant population and the stigma around deportation within the community. The lack of disclosure on the characteristics of those deported in terms of the family composition (i.e. parents of American born children, spouses of American citizens, type of crimes that are deportable) serves a purpose. Populous knowledge of the characteristics could be a push for change in immigration laws. The limited information presented by the media also works to generate misconceptions and assumptions around the issue. The media most often works to manufacture consent around political and social issues (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

According to DHS data, between the years of 2004 to 2012 and average of 39.4 Cape Verdeans obtained orders of deportation, nationwide. The average number of travel documents requested to the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde between the years of 2007 and 2010 was 36.5 annually. These requests are nationwide and do not only represent the community of Brockton; however despite this number being considerably small, there is the perception that there are numerous deportations in the Cape Verdean community. Media presentation about deportations in the community of Brockton adds to the perception that there are numerous deportations within the Cape Verdean community. It is also important to note that given that the community is close knit, and Cape Verde is a small nation of approximately 500.000 people, one deportation impacts many families thus adding to the perception that there are many deportations.

The perception of high numbers of Cape Verdeans being deported adds to fears, stigmatization, and shame within the community. Reasoning these numbers requires that community members develop a rationale regarding the reasons why Cape Verdeans are being deported. Community leaders consistently point to youth and difficulties in acculturation as being the problem. In an analysis of the data from the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde we conclude that most travel documents provided to ICE, subsequent to an order of deportation were for people between the ages of 24 to 33 with arrivals in the United States between the ages of 6-11. Most of those deported to Cape Verde began and completed elementary and secondary education in the United States. Community leaders were aware of the educational history of most of those deported. One noting the failure of the American educational system in terms of immigrant youth, stated "everything that they learned, they learned here, not in Cape Verde. So if they are in trouble, they learned trouble here". According to data from the Consulate General of the Republic of Cape Verde, between the years of 2007 and 2010 more than half of the travel documents provided for the purpose of deportation were for males between the ages of 25 and 38, who arrived in the United States between the ages of 6 through 17. Most claimed English as their primary language.

What is Immediately Felt

Like the participants, it is likely that most children of immigrants are not fully aware of their parents' legal status in the country. None of the three participants were aware of their parents legal vulnerability with Immigration agencies prior to their parents being threaten with deportation. All participants stated that they assumed that their parents were American citizens or never considered the subject of citizenship. The participants never considered the possibility of parental deportation. The confusion generated by their parents' arrest with immigration resulted in fear and feelings of uncertainty about the future. One participant described the feeling of disbelief when confronted with the formation of the possibility of his mother's deportation. Menjivar & Abrego (2012) suggest that conditions of vulnerability and fear affect educational experiences.

Participants described impact on their school placement, school work and relationships. Two participants were forced to move schools due to a change in living arrangements. All three participants suggested decreased parental involvement and family involvement in school matters. And all

three reported to having disconnected from friends and school personnel. All three reported not talking about their situation or asking for help in school. While two male participants suggested that their feelings impacted their school work as evidenced by a drop in grades, and subsequent multiple suspensions, the female participant suggested that she used her school work to escape the climate of tension she experienced at home. As a result her grades were maintained. The same female participant also stated that she withdrew from school friendships and felt particularly impacted when subject matter related to immigration was presented in class. These presentations resulted in feelings of sadness and anger.

Participants' feelings of stability were jolted by the possibility of parental separation through deportation. The possibility of parental expulsion from the United States lead the participants to becoming more aware and to questioning their own citizenship. All of the participants hesitated presenting themselves as Americans but they also hesitated when identifying themselves as Cape Verdean. This was an indication of their fragmented realities and identification challenges. In this respect their sense of belonging seemed to be compromised.

Moving Beyond Appearances: Recommendations and Study Implications

At the Federal Level: Exposing Senseless Policies. The deportation of legal permanent residents impacts American born children, destroys families, hurts the community, and burdens state services. Giroux (2013) endorses the understanding of the current hardened social climate by recognizing the presence of "brutalizing psychology of desensitization". He explains that these grow "out of a formative culture in which war, violence, and the dehumanization of others becomes routine, commonplace, and removed from any sense of ethical accountability" (Giroux, 2013, P. 71). When Federal policies fail to recognize the harm to children and youth, placing the emphasis on homeland security, these same policies violate what it was intended to protect in the first place, re-reproducing the same dangers it was meant to counter. Youth disconnect and question their national identity, and lose sense of belonging due to policies that hurt and impact them directly. In 2012, in a Brockton community meeting held by the Department of Homeland Security, when I posed the issue to Dorothy E. Herrera Niles, the director of DHS for New England, of the vulnerability of American born children, she responded that " the children are free to leave with the

parent." She dismissed the children's American citizenship and right to live in their country and failed to consider the significance of having American born children, who hold American passports leave under such conditions. When pressed about the United States increased vulnerability, given that these children are almost "expelled" and as a result may fail to build any allegiance to the US, she punctuated by stating "there are plenty of American children that chose to live abroad." The conditions under which these children leave the United States were not considered. I recalled leaving the meeting, in a cold November Fall day feeling hopeless for the children caught in the process. They are citizens, but they are second class citizens.

Deporting legal permanent residents because a crime was committed, amounts to the senseless idea of racial and ethnic cleansing the country. The Immigration Policy Center (2007) stated that "the problem of crime in the United States is not caused or even aggravated by immigrants, regardless of their legal status" (p.1) Through an analysis of previously conducted studies, Rumbaut Et. Al. (2006) situated the topic of crimes by immigrant population by concluding the following:

1. Violent and Property Crime Rates Fell as the Undocumented Population Doubled in Size
2. Immigrants are Five Times Less Likely than the Native-Born to be in Prison
3. Immigrants from Nations that Account for Most of the Undocumented Have Lower Incarceration Rates than the Native-Born
4. Focusing on the Immigrant Share of Inmates in Federal Prison Distorts the Real Story
5. The Skinny on the SCAPP (State Criminal Alien Assistance program) Sound-Bite: SCAPP Data Cannot Be Verified

The numbers of expulsions/deportations are often used by politicians to explain to their constituency how the country is safer with the policies of deportation. This presentation also adds to the belief that crimes are mostly committed by the "others" that reside in the United States. The impact to American born children, American spouses and American extended families are never discussed. The American political, economic, and social structures that allow and even support criminal behavior is also never questioned or discussed. As such current immigration policies remain in place. Giroux (2013), while calling for structural reforms, notes that "governing through-crime model produces a highly authoritarian and mechanistic approach to addressing social problems that often focuses on low-income

and poor minorities, promotes highly repressive politics, and places undue emphasis on personal security rather than considering the larger complex of social and structural forces that fuels violence in the first place" (p.73)

It is imperative that current immigration policies be reformed. Such reforms must be driven by current data and research. A critical portion of immigration policies requiring changes is the retroactivity aspect of the law. Given that Immigration Customs and Enforcement has no limitations on time and crime, the potential for Citizen Children to become involved may be greater. The need for immigration reform is undisputable. The risks of posed by current deportation policies outweighs the benefits.

At the Community Level: Developing Responsive Structures. Schools must design structures that sustain and support students who are undocumented and/or whose parents are immigrants. School District policies must also respond to issues of immigration in communities that are immigrant and highly diverse. For undocumented students, these structures should focus around access to legal information and advocacy. Schools must develop close, trusting relationships with families, youth and community at large.

Hiring a number of personnel that belong to the cultural groups found within the community and that can represent the community within the school seems to have positive results for all involved. Families must be offered direct access to this type of personnel if a relationship of trust is to exist between the community and the school. This effort represents a conscious, deliberate effort by the school to access the families and to be available to the families. School personnel must be aware of the matter of immigration policies, deportation and deportability just as much as they seek to be aware of homelessness. The awareness must serve to develop structures within the school walls that support students emotionally but also that allow for students to acquire a voice. Work aimed at assisting students with writing letters to key political figures, researching information about deportation and immigration, and engaging in political projects that respond to their experiences are important. Curricular content and instructional methodology must be infused with deliberate information and action aimed at developing students voice and social awareness. All aspect of the curriculum must be penetrated

Access to guidance counselors to discuss issues of immigration which without guidance may increase stress and impact performance may be crucial for some students. Intense work at assisting students at developing coping strategies around issues of immigration should be a primary concern in schools densely populated with immigrants students and parents. In

developing such response it is also important for the guidance counselor to have access to a cohort of professionals for support and information.

Community Mapping

The dynamics of each particular context is different and as such, the issues and opportunities available for service provision for each school district or school community is also different. It is essential that schools know the community, the neighborhoods, the families well enough to understand what the problems are and to consider what works and does not work. Any response that aims at being prescriptive is at best limited and may work counter intent. Understanding the dynamics of each community requires that schools engage in community mapping. This exercise must be undertaken in collaboration with the community, thus involving community organizations, agencies, business leaders, and community leaders. Understanding community dynamics must be a deliberate and explicit exercise with the purposeful objective of better understanding the community. Engaging the community will allow school administrators to see and understand aspects of the community that they would otherwise have no or limited exposure. In doing community mapping it is important to first identify a critical cohort of school personnel that is interested in researching community dynamics, understanding the community, disseminating information within the school walls, and finally organizing the possibilities for solution at the collaborative as well as at the individual case level. The composition of this cohort of scholars should be diverse in terms of background and function held in school. This diversity will allow for more in depth rich conversations as well as the potential development of response plans that will include every aspect of student life. The cohort must meet regularly, research questions posed by the school staff, and make presentations to the staff regarding their findings. Regular continuous conversations are crucial to better understanding the community they serve. Getting to know the political structure within the community is also crucial in the development of any plan. This work must be informed by a strategic entry into the community as well as the development of a culture of negotiation between school personnel, students, families, organizations and community officials. Schools that serve communities with high number of immigrants, and with public officials that are sensitive to immigrants, will have more opportunities to push the boundaries and harness community support in terms of response to immigrant issues. One such example is the imposition of secure

communities by the Department of Homeland Security in Brockton in May of 2012. This program allows data inputted by local law enforcement to be digitally transmitted to Department of Homeland security, thus increasing apprehensions and deportations of undocumented and legal permanent residents that are in violation of the law. The governor of Massachusetts was in opposition to such program. The secure communities program has a direct impact in schools because it increases apprehensions and deportations of parents and ultimately prevents people from requesting assistance from law enforcement in fear of being apprehended by immigration service. However lack of knowledge by the school officials and school district facilitated the imposition of such program with little push back. I have met several Cape Verdean social workers in the community of Brockton that openly disclose that they advise mothers not to call law enforcement in case of domestic violence because of the implication of referrals to immigration service subsequent to law enforcement involvement. These social workers have devised creative ways to address the issue of domestic violence in some immigrant families in an effort not to trigger law enforcement. Immigration services may also be triggered by school officials in cases that require a report to the state of a suspected child abuse case, particularly if police become involved. It may be that in certain cases, involvement of law enforcement is unavoidable. However knowledge of the possible repercussions by school personnel may result in more effective responses prior to the event and an appropriate plan subsequent to the event of police involvement.

Tackling Ideologies

School personnel that serve school districts with large numbers of immigrant families are aware that fear of deportation and being in a state of deportability can be devastating for families and children of immigrants. These fears impact the way schools serve undocumented and immigrant students. A research study by Jefferies (2014) concluded that threat of deportation prevented administrators from collecting information from students that could assist with service provision, given fears that law enforcement may access such information and use it against the students. Administrators were aware of the immigration status and the fears of students because the students included in the study were undocumented. In the case of American born children living in mixed status homes, administrators most often are unaware of the threat of parental deportability.

Jefferies (2014) noted that administrators and teachers resisted talking openly about the issue of undocumented students. School administrators, participants in the study expressed reservations about addressing this issue with their personnel. However schools that serve immigrant communities and highly diverse population must deliberately, and explicitly design services and programs that are aimed at building trusting relationships within school personnel, between student and school personnel, student and student, and school personnel and families. These efforts must take shape and be visible from the front door office of the school to the most distant corner of the school.

A plan that attempts to develop services for immigrants students and students that live in a mixed status home can only be productive if dominant ideologies of school personnel are tackled. The provision of professional development around the issue of immigration was also difficult given the "volatile political atmosphere surrounding undocumented migration and the delicateness of the issue" (Jefferies, 2014, P. 288). Jefferies's (2014) study suggests that administrators and teachers have great difficulties dealing with issues that may be ideologically grounded. This requires in-service work for teachers and administrators aimed at analysis and reflection around dominant ideologies. This work must also be done at pre-service level in order to grant teachers and administrators with the opportunity to fully prepare for the work in communities that are highly diverse. Bartolomé (2008) suggests that teacher preparation programs are not addressing ideological and political dimensions of educating subordinated students." as a result "the hegemonic ideologies that inform our perceptions and the treatment of subordinated groups" (p. x) goes unchecked. Without an analysis and continuous reflective activities about how our actions further subordinates and victimizes those that have different experiences from the dominant group, we are unable to develop appropriate responses with realistic alternatives. Without this we are also unable to understand how certain programs and or policies impact the community and ultimately impact our work.

Schools must design structures within the school walls that sustain and support students who are undocumented and/or whose parents are immigrants, potentially live in a mixed home status and or impacted particularly in communities densely populated by immigrant families. For undocumented students, these structures should focus around access to legal information and advocacy. For students that are American born and live in mixed home status, the support must come after the fact. Schools must develop close trusting relationships with families. This requires hiring a number of personnel

that belong to the cultural groups found within the community and that can represent the community within the school. Families must be offered direct access to this type of personnel if a relationship of trust is to exist between the community and the school. This effort represents a conscious, deliberate effort by the school district to access the families and to be available to the families. School personnel must be aware of the matter of deportation just as much as they seek to be aware of homelessness. The awareness must serve to develop structures within the school walls that supporting students emotionally but also that allow for students' to acquire a voice. Work aimed at assisting students at writing letters to key political figures, researching information about deportation and immigration, and engaging in political projects that respond to their experiences are important. Access to guidance counselors to discuss issues of immigration which without guidance may increase stress and impact performance may be crucial for some students. Intense work at assisting students at developing coping strategies around issues of immigration should be a primary concern in schools densely populated with immigrants students and parents. In developing such response it is also important for the guidance counselor to have access to a cohort of professionals for support and information.

Academic Work

Much more must be done to improve school and community partnerships. Academic work must be aimed at improving quality of community life, increasing social awareness, and increasing youth's opportunity at success, while informing policies. It is crucial that research on the topic of deportation and in particular impact of deportation on children be conducted. These studies should be community specific. It is undeniable that deportation is impactful regardless of the ethnic group. However the meaning and dynamics of deportation may differ according to community. For smaller countries such as Cape Verde, being deported may carry implications for the family for generations. We must also consider geographically location. For the Cape Verdean population, a country with no borders with United States or any other country, being that Cape Verde is an island on the west coast of Africa, the feeling of isolation and finality may be more pronounce in case of deportation. Qualitative studies have the potential of informing future quantitative work.

This study was exploratory in nature and included a small number of participants as such it is limited. Longitudinal studies, and studies with a larger

number of participants are crucial in identifying issues and determining solutions. Nonprofit organizations such as MIRA, and the Policy Center for Immigrants work to inform and develop social awareness on the topic of immigrants. However its projection has been limited. This type of work should also be undertaken by governmental agencies that are independent from Homeland Security. It is important to uncover the full impact of deportation including the repercussions on the work of social, health agencies and school districts.

The Researcher and the Research Process

I spent many afternoons on the phone and in my office meeting with relatives whose desperation completely filled my office. Between tears, and pleas for mercy, they offered everything they had in exchange for clemency for the relative being deported. Often they went through countless hours of vignettes attesting to how good their sons, brothers, fathers, mothers were and how deporting them was the most absolute act of injustice. When I was completely exhausted, I hid in my office and told the secretary to ask them to come the following week. The largest pile of letters always landed at my desk. Letters with children's drawings, family pictures of barbecues and birthday parties, recommendations for mercy from employers, letters from doctors attesting to the emotional and psychological damage to sons, daughters, mothers and fathers. Every Tuesday for 3 months without fail I received the visit of an elderly father. Shaking, sustained by a cane, visibly frail and continuously apologizing for coming to my office yet once more, he would sit in the Consulate's waiting room and wait for me to call him. I realized that he came just to make sure I would not forget his son. He came to make sure that I did not sign the travel document. I never signed the document. After 180 days of incarceration, his son was released under supervision of ICE. I received a note from him many months after the son's release, expressing gratitude for my time and explaining that on Tuesday he counted on his "fill of hope" simply by seeing me seating at my desk at the Consulate.

I quickly, I learned that in pain and suffering, hides fear. I also learned that the most important function of injustice when coupled with power and is to silence those that most desire to speak. Many relatives called upon learning about the study, but most called to apologized for their hesitation and or inability to participate given their fears.

In research, all plans are conditioned to the dynamics of space, time and context. Despite speaking to many people, it took many months to be able

to find the youth participants that were willing to record their voice about the subject matter. Many spoke to me off the record for hours. I realize now that research that touches on human conditions that are imbedded in an unjust system and are guided by power offers its own challenges. Fear is controlling in of itself.

It is also naïve to assume that once one overcomes the condition of fear, one is guided by clarity of mind.

Remaining hopeful in a socio-political environment which feels to be anti-immigrant is a struggle. I continue my work, guided by the words of Paulo Freire "it is imperative to maintain hope even when the harshness of reality may suggest the opposite" (Freire in hooks, 2003)

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CAPE VERDE AND ITS DIASPORA: ECONOMIC TRANSNATIONALISM AND HOMELAND DEVELOPMENT

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Resumo:
This study examines the historical role of the diaspora in Cape Verde's socioeconomic development. It analyzes the prospects and limitations of its diaspora as a transnational economic development resource. While it is policy oriented, the study offers a conceptual framework to analyze its diaspora engagement policies and efforts since 1975. Cape Verde has emerged as a success story. The diaspora's contribution was one of the four essential factors behind this relative success: migration and remittances, overseas development assistance, large scale public investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship of public finances. Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. An externally dependent micro state in the world economy, with exceedingly limited internal capacity to generate growth and employment, Cape Verde has few viable options in this new phase of development. Its biggest and most dynamic sector, tourism, is disconnected from the rest of the economy. Foreign aid and emigration opportunities are disappearing. This study argues, however, that Cape Verde's reliance on its diaspora as an economic resource will only increase. However, a number of obstacles continue to hamper the country's ability to harness the full potential of its diaspora for development.

Palavras-chave:
Cape Verde, diaspora, economic development, transnationalism, policy, remittances.

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Introduction

This study examines the prospects and limitations of the diaspora as an economic development resource for Cape Verde. The underlying sources of the country's post-independence economic development and growth performance can be reduced to four essential factors, or ingredients: migration and remittances, overseas development assistance, large scale public investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship of public finances. Cape Verde has emerged as a comparatively successful case of development over the last four decades (AfDB 2012a; 2012b).The diaspora's contribution was critical. The country's robust performance across many social and economic indicators resulted in the 2008 decision by the United Nations to graduate Cape Verde from the list of Least Developed Country (LDC). Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. Foreign aid and emigration opportunities are disappearing, and the lingering Eurozone crisis has exposed its over dependence on Europe for all its trade, tourists and foreign investments. Despite its graduation, the micro state remains structurally vulnerable and externally dependent. The country must search for a new development model and sources of growth. It is in this broader development context, and structural weakness of its economy, that the economic significance of Cape Verde's diaspora comes into crisper view. Ironically, even as emigration prospects and monetary remittances shrink, the country's large diaspora will become even more important, not less, to homeland development in the future. Comprising both permanent and temporary migrants, its diaspora has been a vital economic resource historically. The diaspora's structural role in the economy today remains large, with its direct financial flows accounting for perhaps 50% of GDP. The open question today is whether Cape Verde will be able to devise an effective strategy to deepen and extend its role in national development. A number of obstacles, on both sides, continue to hamper the country's ability to harness the full potential of its diaspora in homeland development.

This is a study on the political economy of diaspora-homeland transnational relations. Emigrants, and the diaspora communities that result from migration, are important but overlooked transnational actors. Their practices and ties involving the homeland can have significant impact, positive or negative, on the social, cultural, political, and economic development of their country of origin. The study examines the historical role of the diaspora in Cape Verde's socioeconomic development, and analyzes the prospects and limitations of its future contribution. As a policy focused study, it examines

diaspora engagement policies and actions adopted by the homeland since 1975. At the same time, the study offers a conceptual framework to analyze and assess these diaspora engagement policies. It argues that effective mobilization of the full economic contribution of the diaspora requires three categories of efforts: diaspora enabling conditions, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration. An analysis of the Cape Verdean case will show that, first, the migrant economic transnationalism can positively contribute to development and, second, that the diaspora's potential economic contribution extends far beyond financial and goods remittances. Harnessing this full potential requires a broad range of efforts that enlarge the scale and modes of the diaspora's participation in homeland development. The diaspora's economic contribution, however, is conditioned by factors and motivations on the part of the diaspora itself as well as the homeland. This study focuses primarily on the policy and institutional strategies adopted by Cape Verde to harness this economic transnationalism. As such, the study focuses on only one side of the equation. Sustained research is needed on the factors, strategies and conditions that determine the diaspora's own motivations, capacity, practices, and contribution.

The value of Cape Verde's large diaspora as a development asset must be considered in the context of the country's vulnerabilities and limitations. First, Cape Verde is a small island development state, with a micro economy, no exploitable mineral resources, poor natural and climatic endowments, and thus an exceedingly limited productive base. That is, Cape Verde is a small state with few viable options to generate growth and long term development. Development constraints and growth bottlenecks abound. Its micro size, insularity, limited human and natural endowments have meant that the country is structurally vulnerable and externally dependent for nearly everything, including 80% or more of its food. Second, historically, it has relied on donor aid and emigrant remittances. Both sources of free money are vanishing. The country's graduation from the LDC list resulted in losing important sources of non-debt external financing – aid, concessional loans, and other grants and preferential treatment available to LDCs. In the past, foreign aid and concessional loans financed a large public sector and extensive public investments that spurred growth and created jobs. With the end of aid, and the unsustainability of debt-led growth, the state can no longer play this role. Third, in its new phase of development, the country must now rely much more on internal resources and sources of growth and jobs creation. Cape Verde's biggest immediate – and structural – challenge is to create jobs and income generating opportunities for the resident population. Unemployment is structural. The unemployment rate today is over 16%

but over 30% for among the young and educated (INE 2015). Aid-financed large public sectors and public investments have disappeared. An industrial or manufacturing base that can generate the jobs and growth necessary is impossible, and the private sector as a whole remains weak and limited in its investment capacity. Tourism has been the fastest growing and dynamic economic sector, but it is an all-inclusive mass tourism model disconnected from the rest of the economy. A high leakage rate undercuts its contribution to national income and growth. Aside from diversifying the tourism product, the country must diversify the economy by fostering new sectors to spur growth and create jobs. Fisheries, agribusiness, creative industries, ICT, and international transportation and logistics services have been receiving policy attention. Each of these sectors faces severe limitations in terms of scale, productivity, financing, human capital, quality, and commercialization. Moreover, Cape Verde will never be a producer or competitor in any of these sectors for global markets. However, it can foster these sectors to generate jobs by producing for the domestic market and exporting to niche markets, primary among them the diaspora market. Fourth, the post-graduation exigency to spur growth and diversify the economy will require new sources external financing. A debt-led growth strategy is neither possible nor long term sustainable. Total public external debt has been rising rapidly, reaching an alarming 98% of GDP at the end of 2013 (IMF 2014). Encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) is necessarily an integral part of the effort, but the country's micro scale and limited non-tourism economy make attracting substantial FDI difficult. In nearly all these areas, such as foreign investments, tourism development, and economic diversification, there is potential to widen and deepen the diaspora's contribution.

The November 2014 eruption of the volcano on the Island of Fogo was a microcosm of the relationship between Cape Verde and its global diaspora. Diaspora communities were gripped by the unfolding natural disaster, closely following news reports from back home and calling relatives daily. For a country where few families are unaffected by emigration, the alarm and anxiety over the wellbeing of relatives were palpable. Individuals, church groups, businesses, students, and civic groups each quickly mobilized to raise money, food, clothing and other humanitarian supplies to send for disaster relief. This rapid and extensive outpouring of support was evidence a relationship between the Cape Verdean diaspora and its homeland that is intimate, intense, and cemented by strong emotional and material links. The widespread use today of information and communications technologies, such as social media and low cost telecommunications services, has only magnified the intensity and closeness of this relationship. On the other

hand, the volcanic eruption also revealed the limitations and weaknesses in this transnational relationship. Lack of organization, poor coordination, the absence of any effective means of communication and collaboration between the diaspora and the homeland, meant that individuals and groups were scrambling on their own and working in isolation. Policy and government officials were invisible. Hometown associations do not exist, nor umbrella diaspora organizations, both of which could pool and coordinate efforts. Other types of transnational networks, associations, and collaborative arrangements between the diaspora and homeland civil society are nonexistent. Neither the diaspora, the government, nor homeland civil society has established a credible framework or mechanism to mobilize emergency relief supplies or charitable contributions, let alone promote homeland development. These weaknesses are exacerbated by policy and institutional failures in the homeland, such as inefficient customs procedures, poor transportation, and administrative fragility that frustrate diaspora contributions in the form of donations, investments or tourism.

Aims of the Study

This study examines the evolution and future prospects of Cape Verde's efforts to incorporate its diaspora in the country's development. The study is organized as follows. The first section examines Cape Verde's development in the context of economic transnationalism. The section then discusses the nature of Cape Verde's diaspora population, and analyzes its past and present economic roles. The second section develops a typology of the modes and types of the diaspora's potential economic contribution. It examines the nature of the relationship between Cape Verde and its diaspora, the policy and institutional measures adopted by the homeland and, lastly, assesses the prospects and limitations for expanding the scope and modes of its participation in the country's new development strategy.

Since 1975, governmentsin Cape Verde have embraced the diaspora in national life. Cape Verde is not alone. National governments in the developing world, along with the major international development agencies and donor countries, have been placing increasing emphasis on mobilizing diaspora communities as a resource for economic development in their homeland. Countries like Israel, South Korea, India, Mexico, Ireland, and China are often cited as successful cases of a diaspora-assisted development, whereby their transnational communities actively participate in homeland social and economic progress (Patterson, 2006; Landolt, 2001).

Many African governments and regional agencies, such asthe African Union (AU) have been keen to replicate this success (Kamei, 2011). Many advanced industrial countries have also been rediscovering their nationals abroad (Gamlen, 2005). The relationship between migration and development has attracted much scholarly attention. A paradigm shift has occurred such that migration is no longer viewed as always harmful to development, but major debates rage over its significance and net impact. The surge of interest in migration and development, especially among donor countries and agencies, may certainly reflect a neoliberal agenda that exaggerates the development benefits of migration while ignoring global power inequalities, restrictive immigration policies, declining aid, and the precarious socioeconomic and legal situation of migrant populations (Glick Schiller, 2012; de Haas, 2012; Skeldon, 2008). The premise of this study, however, is that Cape Verde's emigrant population has always been, and can continue to be, a development resource. That is, this form of economic transnationalism – harnessing the economic practices, resources, ties and transactions between the diaspora and the homeland – can be utilized as a development tool for the homeland. With a diaspora estimated to be twice the size of the resident population, for Cape Verde, the migration-development nexus is not a novelty or neoliberal policy fad. Migration has been the central reality of the country's historical formation and, in good and bad ways, has intimately shaped its economic development across the centuries. Cases like Cape Verde, while perhaps *sui generis* or outliers, demonstrate the central role of migration in a country's development, if not its national viability. For a country without the domestic productive base and natural resources to feed its own people and ensure their welfare, migration has been both as a vital relief valve for its people to escape poverty, famine, unemployment, and lack of economic opportunities as well as a source remittances in the form of money, goods, medicine, food, clothing, and even ideas. However, this economic role of the diaspora has been limited largely to financial and goods remittances. The diaspora has never been a consumer market for its merchandise exports, a source of tourism demand, knowledge and skills transfer, or a political lobby advocating support for homeland development.

Given its analytical and explanatory objectives, this study focuses on the political economy dimension of homeland-diaspora relations. This is not the only, or even most important, dimension. Migrant transnationalism encompasses all areas of social life and not just ties and transactions that are purely economic. Transnational economic relations and flows of people, money, goods, and ideas are themselves embedded in larger social practices, relations and identities. While this study is solely preoccupied with the

diaspora's economic role, diaspora-homeland relations are multifaceted and span a broad range of social-cultural, political, religious, economic, and psychological interactions, transactions, and connections. They comprise both material and immaterial dimensions and relationships. Even if we narrowly focus on the material and economic dimension, we expect immaterial, or social and ideational, dimension can also impact development. Social remittances of ideas, knowledge, attitudes, identities, norms and values, or other forms of transnational ideational and social interactions, indirectly impact development in positive or negative ways. Important as these dimensions of diaspora-homeland relations are, even for economic development, they lie beyond the immediate purview of this study. In similar vein, there is no suggestion here that Cape Verde's economic development can be reduced to migration and diaspora contribution. Such reductionism would also obscure the fact that economic development of small developing countries like Cape Verde is embedded in a broader global political economy of power relations, hierarchy, inequality, and vestiges of colonialism and neocolonialism. Finally, despite its focus is on political economy, the study brackets from direct consideration the *politics* of diaspora-homeland relations and the *politics* of diaspora mobilization. That is, diaspora mobilization is not a politically neutral or partisan free process. The Cape Verdean diaspora is also an electoral constituency. This is a source of promise as well as peril, and it merits a separate study.

Despite its historical and economic significance, there are only few works in English on the Cape Verdean diaspora – loosely defined as all Cape Verdeans and their descendants living abroad permanently or temporarily, sharing a common identity and ties to the homeland.[1] Most research on the Cape Verdean diaspora has focused on issues of transnational identity and citizenship, social formation, migration patterns, immigrant incorporation and other cultural and ethnographic questions (Halter, 1993; Challinor, 2008; Batalha and Carling, 2008; Carling and Akensson, 2009; Marques, Santos, and Araújo, 2001). A rare few explicitly examine the dimension of political economy (Cardoso, 2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Studies on the Cape Verdean diaspora, therefore, face daunting challenges in terms of the scarcity of research and data. Its geographical dispersion and historical depth present additional research challenges. As discussed below, we do not know the true size of this diaspora,

1. This definition of diaspora departs from the classic definition of diaspora as exiled populations forcibly expelled from a homeland, and sharing a common identity and attachment to the homeland. The definition also departs from others that exclude temporary migrants.

its socioeconomic composition, the depth of sentimental and material connections, the scale of return and circular migration, or the scale and composition of different kinds of transnational transactions that take place. The problem is especially acute for studies on political economy. We have good, albeit incomplete, data on monetary remittances and emigrant deposits in homeland banks, but data is either limited or nonexistent for goods remittances, diaspora return visits, diaspora foreign investment, skills and knowledge transfer, consumption of homeland products, and other types of transnational economic transactions.

The Cape Verdean Diaspora, Transnationalism and Development

Broadly defined for the purposes of this study, economic transnationalism consists of all economically relevant practices, flows, and transactions between diaspora communities and the homeland. Its most visible and recognizable manifestation is the sending of financial remittances. For Cape Verdeans, *bidons* (drums) filled with goods sent to family members has become emblematic. No other social group or sub-state actor embodies transnationalism better than diaspora communities. Since they retain emotional and material ties to the homeland, and engage in practices that span or cut across multiple borders, migrants and diaspora communities are among the most tangible and weighty transnational actors (Portes, 2001). For good or ill, therefore, migration has been an intimate aspect of Cape Verde's social formation and development process, and remains one of the few viable options available as it transitions into its new phase of development. However, to capitalize fully on this potential, the country and its diaspora must move away from the traditional methodology of relations; new strategies and instruments are needed to expand the scope and modes of the diaspora's participation. Indeed, in light of ever restrictive immigration policies in host countries and the long term decline of remittances, the new framework must move diaspora-homeland relations beyond monetary remittances and *bidons*. More still, since the diaspora's economic role remains large – and its withdrawal catastrophic – a policy priority must be to nurture, expand and manage this role.

Harnessing the diaspora for development compels us to rethink and reconceptualize our traditional notions and theories of economic development. In the case of a small developing country like Cape Verde, the building blocs of economic development have tended to focus on governments, international intergovernmental agencies, state-to-state relations, trade

regimes and global markets, and other state-centric actors and interactions. Transnational actors, such as diasporas, are rarely considered as a potentially weighty factor – good or bad – in a country's social, political, and economic development. For countries like Cape Verde, economic transnationalism has been central. As this paper argues, it is not possible to understand Cape Verde's social and economic formation, before and after independence, in the absence of economic transnationalism.

A vast literature on transnationalism and migration exists (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003; Vertovec, 2003, 2004; Portes, 2001; Faist, 2009). As such, conceptual and theoretical debates need not detract our analytical objectives in this study. Migrant transnationalism is just one of several forms of the phenomena of sub-national, non-state, non-institutional actors interacting and transacting across or above multiple national borders (Portes, 2001). Transnationalism, and diaspora communities as distinct agents and actors in global affairs, shifts our methodological and conceptual focus from the nation-state as the unit of analysis to non-state actors and forces transcending sovereign borders. Globalization intensifies these flows and practices that cross, span, and transcend borders. Migrants occupy a distinct transnational space that encompasses material and immaterial facets and transactions. Of great policy and theoretical significance of transnationalism is that it can lie, fully or partially, beyond the purview, control, regulation or preferences of formal governing structures or agents of the state. In the case of the diaspora, some facets of its transnational activities may be partially or fully controlled by the state, such as migration, remittances, investment, return visits, but other facets lie beyond the state's reach and capacity. A significant portion of monetary remittances, for example, flow through informal channels. New communications and information technologies further strengthen the ability of transnational actors and flows to escape the purview of states. Transnationalism, moreover, is not always a positive force. Not all forms of migrant transnational practices benefit homeland development (Faist, 2009). Transnationalism, including migrant transnationalism, can involve illicit trafficking, international organized criminal networks, cybercrime, pandemics, terrorism, and so on. Migrant transnationalism can often entail activities and transactions – such as protest, organized opposition, and other anti-system behavior – that threaten both the security and prosperity of the homeland state. Viewing it as a threat, not all countries wish to involve their diaspora in national life. These are not major concerns in the case of Cape Verde. Nonetheless, many people express concerns over perceived negative cultural and social influences from the diaspora or the troubled integration of deported youth.

Thus, transnationalism in the context of migration encompasses multiple *and interacting* dimensions and spaces (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003). This study focuses exclusively on migration and the political economy of homeland-diaspora relations. However, the transnational lives and practices of migrants cannot be reduced solely or even primarily to economic interactions with the homeland. A vast literature examines the cultural, social, and ideational dimensions of transnationalism and its impact. Given its analytical and explanatory objectives, this study isolates the economic aspects of transnational migration, specifically diaspora-homeland economic relations, but no suggestion is made here that this facet is insulated from or impervious to the other dimensions. These facets interact and transform one another. Indeed, the social, cultural and ideational dimensions of transnational interaction between diaspora and homeland, especially as they impact identity formation, may have a determining role in shaping diaspora-homeland economic relations.

Economic transnationalism has its limits. The diaspora has not been, and will not be, the only critical factor is Cape Verde's development. Migration has been, and might continue to be, a central reality for Cape Verde, but its socioeconomic development cannot be reduced to migration and diaspora. Mobilizing the diaspora's full contribution must necessarily be only one component in a much broader national development strategy and post-graduation growth model. For any country, especially small developing countries, development is conditioned, positively or negatively, by a number of factors internal and external to the country. Vital as migration and the diaspora's contribution may be, the development of a small, highly open and vulnerable, and externally dependent country like Cape Verde will always be conditioned by global forces over which it has no control, including a global asymmetries of power, wealth resources, and economic exchange. As such, the prospects and limitations of the diaspora's contribution must be placed in this larger context of global relations and local capacity. Notwithstanding these larger global constraints and development handicaps, homeland policies, institutions and conditions remain critical. The Cape Verdean diaspora, as discussed below, is an economic diaspora – in that emigration over the centuries involved individuals and families driven by poverty at home and searching of better economic opportunities abroad. Put differently, caution is necessary in analyzing the positive links between migration and development for Cape Verde, since migration has been a product of the country's poverty and underdevelopment. In good and bad ways, migration and development in Cape Verde are inseparable. The country's high rate of out migration since the beginning reflected its limited internal capacity to gener-

ate growth and development. In a land of poverty, drought and scant natural resources, migration constituted a vital safety valve. The export of people reduced the pressures at home for food, jobs, education, and resources. On the other hand, migration was also a positive economic resource in terms of the monetary and goods remittances that resulted. The small island country, with a long history of emigration, implicitly has always relied on diaspora-based economic transnationalism as a major resource.

It is not the purpose of this study to engage in debates about the migration and development nexus. Others review this debate (Skeldon, 2008; Ratha, Mohapratha, and Scheja, 2011; de Haas, 2012; Schiller, 2012; Faist, 2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Ratha, 2003; Durand, Parrado, and Massey, 1996). The relationship between migration and development is neither linear, simple, or unidirectional. As de Haas (2012) notes, it is context dependent. There are limits and challenges to migration's potential contribution to development, many of which are beyond the control of either the homeland or its emigrants. Unavoidably, migration has negative and positive impacts on the homeland, especially for a country like Cape Verde with a high proportion of emigration consisting of skilled labor. We can assume a high degree of brain drain in the Cape Verde case, but data and empirical research are scarce as is data on brain gain and circulation (Cabral, 2009). Migration deprives a country of social and human capital essential to productivity, creativity and entrepreneurship; it can result in negative social and cultural impacts, such as family separation, breakdown, and negative cultural influences. There is a widespread view in Cape Verde that emigration results in reduced work ethic and entrepreneurship by relatives in the homeland who simply rely on remittances from family members abroad. That the diaspora retains strong material connections to the homeland may mean more remittances and circular migration, but it also means diaspora-owned houses, farmland, and other productive assets frequently remain frozen, unused, and an obstacle to local and national development planning.

Given Cape Verde's structural characteristics and severe development limitations, it is safe to conclude that emigration has resulted in a net positive impact and that the diaspora's direct contribution has been vital. Compared to other countries, Cape Verde may be an outlier in that migration looms so large in its development, today as in the past. The reason is not solely based on the disproportionately large size of its diaspora and high rate of out migration, but also based on the sizeable financial role of the diaspora in the economy. As discussed below, 40% of Cape Verde's GDP today is accounted for by the direct financial transfers (remittances and emigrant bank deposits) from its diaspora. As such, the role of the diaspora and

migration in the country's development is not merely a theoretical exercise. Understanding the prospects and limitations of this economic transnationalism, and devising an effective framework to manage and nurture it, becomes a practical, timely and urgent policy necessity.

The paucity of empirical research on the economic impact of migration in Cape Verde tempers any firm conclusions and net assessments (Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Migration has contributed positively to Cape Verde's development at both the macroeconomic and micro, or individual and household, levels. Migration becomes a development resource for countries with Cape Verde's characteristics. To put it crudely, Cape Verde has always been a country unable to feed itself, let alone possess the scale or productive endowments for large scale economic activities to employ everyone. Cape Verde's historical vocation has been the export of people, including skilled labor. As noted above, this has not only been an important social and economic pressure relief valve but also a source of economic value. Migration results in an inflow of financial resources that can stimulate consumption, production, improve balance of payments and the current accounts, increase hard currency reserves, and boost private investments. Financial remittances became one of the two biggest sources of external financing for the economy during the first three decades after independence. The macroeconomic impact of remittances and emigrant deposits extended even further. Such financial inflows by migrants are non-debt. Combined with the fact that remittances are also a stable, non-volatile source of financing, they were pivotal to Cape Verde's macroeconomic stability and long term sustainability. Finally, the experience of countries like India, China and others, demonstrate how a well-articulated and managed diaspora engagement framework can transform skilled emigration into an important source of growth and innovation for the homeland economy. At the micro level, the positive impact of migration is visible, both in terms of remittances as well as circular migration and social remittances of skills, ideas, knowledge, entrepreneurship. Remittances have been critical sustaining household consumption, reducing poverty and even stimulating entrepreneurial activities. Since those early years, the remittance by emigrants to relatives of money, food, clothing, medicine, home goods, tools, farm equipment, vehicles, machinery, and other goods made the difference between famine and survival, abject poverty and prospects for improved living standards by family members back home.

The Cape Verdean Diaspora and the Role of Migration

The Cape Verdean diaspora is unique. On both theoretical and policy grounds, Cape Verde offers a novel and fertile case study on migration and homeland development. Cape Verde is notable among countries with large emigrant populations because of the relative size of the diaspora, the historical depth of its formation, and the unusually strong bond the diaspora maintains with the homeland. Cape Verde has the largest diaspora population in Africa, relative to the resident population, and ranks among the largest in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011). Cape Verde and emigration are synonymous. Transnationalism thus defines Cape Verde and the Cape Verdean experience in the modern world. Indeed, as a vulnerable micro state in the world economy with near total dependency on the outside, Cape Verde's development and national survival have been determined by the external dimension – trade, migration, remittances, donor aid.

Migration is thus at the heart of Cape Verde's historical formation as a society and economy (Batalha and Carling, 2008; Halters, 1993). The history of Cape Verde is a history of migration. Its formation as a society has roots in migration – from the brutality of colonial "discovery" and the violence of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, to centuries of voluntary out migration driven by famine and poverty. Cape Verde is unique among countries of the global South because its transnational and transatlantic migration, both coercive and voluntary, began so early (Halters, 1993). This economic transnationalism, in effect, started with the country's social formation and origins as an *entrepôt* during the Atlantic slave trade. In its non-coercive manifestation it has been reproduced across centuries of out migration driven by poverty, famine, colonial repression, and lack of economic opportunities. The indelible traces of transnationalism are visible as early as the nineteenth century when the so-called packet boats and whaling ships transported people, goods, money and ideas back and forth between the Islands and the Americas. The Cape Verdean diaspora is also unique because, despite its long history, it retains strong sentimental and material ties to the homeland even after becoming permanently settled in host countries. With a large diaspora relative to its tiny resident population, few families in Cape Verde are unaffected by migration. Cape Verde continues to have one of the highest rates of emigration in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011).

Cape Verde, perhaps more than any other country, can be considered a nation, a culture and society whose history and identity are intimately shaped by and through its diaspora and history of emigration (Challinor, 2008; Batalha and Carling, 2008). Cape Verdeans are among the first free

Blacks in the United States. Ship manifests and other official records show Cape Verdean emigrants in the United States by the mid-1700s (Halters, 1993). In general, prior to independence in 1975, there were three great waves of outmigration (OIM, 2010a, p.26). The first big wave of outmigration from the Portuguese colony, approximately 1900-1926, was destined primarily toward the United States (although arrivals had begun over a century earlier). The second wave, 1927-1945, was oriented primarily toward Latin America and Africa, while the third wave during 1945-1973 went to Europe. In general, the Cape Verdean diaspora communities in Europe are more recent and comprise a much higher percentage of temporary migrants (Batalha and Carling, 2008). Most official figures indicate that the majority of emigrants from Cape Verde in the last two decades went to Europe. Thus, Cape Verde's diaspora does not consist only or primarily of temporary migrants, but also long established, permanent communities with a high level of social and economic integration in their host countries. Its diaspora is quite varied in terms of history, geography, genealogy, and socioeconomic composition. That is, while it is a large global diaspora, Cape Verdean communities abroad are heterogeneous in terms of socioeconomic conditions, legal status, host country incorporation, wealth resources, and overall levels of human development. On the other hand, it is a culturally, linguistically, and ethnically homogeneous diaspora, and reinforces the transnational identity of the people as one nation.

No one knows the true size of Cape Verde's diaspora. Census data in the US or Europe are nonexistent. Is is likely that Cape Verde has the largest Diaspora in the world relative to the resident population. A widely shared assumption is that the Cape Verdean diaspora is 'twice the size' of the resident population of roughly 500,000. The largest diaspora communities are in the United States and Europe, primarily Portugal, France, the Netherlands (Holland), Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and more recently Spain. Scatterings of Cape Verdean emigrants can be found in nearly every part of the world, from nearby Senegal and São Tome e Príncipe, to Argentina and Brazil to China. The United Nations database on international migration estimates a total stock of 171,737 Cape Verdean emigrants in 2013 (UN-DESA, 2014), or 35% of the resident population. The Global Migrant Origin Database of the Development Research Center (DRC) places the estimate at 199,644 in 2007 (DRC, 2014). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates 116,248 Cape Verdeans living and working in OECD countries in 2011 (OECD, 2011). The World Bank's Global Bilateral Migration databank calculates a size of 152,411 (World Bank, 2014), roughly 31% of the resident

population.[2] A now extinct government agency responsible for emigrant support services had estimated a diaspora population size of 518,180 in 1998 (OIM, 2009, p.18). An early World Bank report in 1985 estimated a high range of 454,00 compared to 296,000 residents (World Bank, 1985a). A recent study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2010b, p.9) puts the size of Cape Verde's emigrant population at 450,000, or 90% of the resident population. Even if we use a low conservative estimate, it still would represent a significant stock relative to the tiny resident population. Based on the UN migration data, Cape Verde's diaspora size relative to national population is much higher than comparative figures for Senegal (4%), Liberia (8%), Ghana (3%), and Côte d'Ivoire (4%).[3] Cape Verde's relative diaspora size is more comparable to high emigration countries like El Salvador, whose total emigrant stock is roughly 24% of the resident population.

Evolution of the Diaspora's Economic Role

There is strong empirical and historical reason to assert that Cape Verde's economic viability and social progress since 1975 would have been improbable without its diaspora's contribution. This study argues that in order for the diaspora to remain a valuable economic resource in the next phase of Cape Verde's development, a new framework must be devised that expands the modes of its contribution. The diaspora's historical contribution has been largely limited to goods and monetary remittances, as this section discusses below. Today, the economic value of Cape Verde's diaspora is neither limited to, nor primarily, in the form of financial remittances. Yet Cape Verde and its diaspora have yet to develop a framework to mobilize the full extent and modes of the diaspora's contribution. However, this does not imply absence of substantial contribution today and in the past. Financial remittances remain important today. Since 1975, the diaspora's primary contribution has been channeled through monetary remittances, but today it is also emerging as an important source of investments.

2. Note that the methodology and definition used by many international agencies tend to rely on official census data as well as define migrants as only foreign born, non-citizen individuals residing in a different country. As such, this methodology would severely undercount the Cape Verdean diaspora, especially older and rooted communities in the United States.
3. Author's calculations based on UN migration data and World Bank population data.



Figure 1. Cape Verde Migrant Remittances[4]

Universally, remittances are the most visible and direct manifestation of the diaspora's contribution to homeland development. Officially recorded remittance inflows from Cape Verde's diaspora in 2013 totaled $13.7 *billion* escudos, or roughly $172 million dollars (BCV, 2014b). Remittances were three times the size of foreign aid, and bigger than donor aid and FDI combined. Remittances are two to three times bigger than merchandise export earnings. In fact, it is safe to say that the export of workers (emigration) is Cape Verde's single biggest export. As percentage of GDP and in per capita terms, Cape Verde is among the highest recipient countries in the world. Cape Verde was the 6th largest remittances recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2013, as percentage of GDP, and 29th in the world, according to World Bank data (World Bank, 2014). In per capita terms, Cape Verde remittance inflows in 2013 infused an additional $352 dollars into the personal income of every resident, more than double the minimum monthly salary. This per capita contribution of remittances ranks Cape Verde among the highest recipient countries in the world such as El Salvador ($664), Guatemala ($349), the Philippines ($258) and Nepal ($187).[5] Cape Verde's remittanceper capita is the highest in the West Africa subregion, with Senegal ($116) trailing a distant second. Historically until the mid-1990s, remittances and foreign aid have been the dominant inflows, accounting for as high as 80% of the

4. World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (WDI), 2014.
5. Author's calculations based on World Bank remittances and population data for 2013.

country's GDP (World Bank, 1985b, 6). For most the decade and half after independence, remittances ranged between 40% and 25% of GDP. The World Bank estimates that remittances accounted for over 40% of GDP during 1978-82 (World Bank, 1985a, p.29).As is commonly observed, official statistics on monetary remittances underreport their actual size. An unknown but presumably significant portion, as high as 50% of official figures, is transferred through informal channels (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Likewise, official data do not capture non-monetary remittances, or goods remittances. Goods remittances have been just as equally important as monetary remittances, especially in terms of their role in household consumption and poverty alleviation.

Today, officially recorded remittances account for roughly 9% of Cape Verde's GDP, which is much lower than in the past (BCV, 2014a). However, this figure is far above the regional average of 2.6 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa (Ratha, Mohapratha and Scheja, 2011). Remittances have been steadily rising in absolute terms for more than two decades. Despite its declining share in GDP, remittances remain one of the four main sources of financial inflows into Cape Verde today, along with ODA, FDI, and tourism travel receipts. During the 2005-2011 period, remittances averaged 10.3% share of GDP. Tourism receipts have averaged 18.7 percent of GDP during 2005-2011, ranging between 12-21 percent.[6] For its part, FDI averaged 10 percent of GDP during this period, oscillating between 6.3 to 14.2 percent of GDP. In the last few years since the 2008 crisis, remittances have been a bigger source of external financing than FDI – indeed the largest source not including tourism receipts. Remittances inflows in 2009 experienced an expected but almost negligible dip, 1.6%, in contrast to the -36.5 decline in FDI. Inflows of approved FDI resumed in 2010, but took another steep drop, 21.6%, in 2011.[7] Remittance inflows rebounded, to a peak of 28% in 2011. Importantly, unlike FDI and ODA, remittances are not only stable but also non-seasonal. In terms of the economic geography of remittances, Cape Verde enjoys significant remittance inflows from eleven countries, the majority of them in the European Union. Over the last three decades or so, the top source countries for roughly 80% of Cape Verde's remittances have been Portugal, France, Netherlands, and the United States. Italy has been a distant fifth for most years, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg, and increasingly Spain and the United Kingdom. Portugal, traditionally home to the largest Cape Verdean migrant worker community, has remained the largest single source country (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008).That

6. Author's calculations based on BCV normalized balance of payments data.
7. Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV), *Relatório de Política Monetária*, (Praia: BCV, May 2012).

the European based diaspora, comprising a higher proportion of temporary migrants, remits more than the historically older US diaspora is not surprising. Research has shown that temporary migrants tend to remit much more and more frequently.



Figure 2. Trends in Main Sources of External Financing, GDP Shares[8]

In summary, monetary remittances continue to be a crucial source of development financing and poverty alleviation for Cape Verde. They have proven resilient and stable, confirming research findings that remittances are more stable and counter-cyclical. The overall relative decline of remittances in GDP may primarily reflect the fast growth of the homeland economy in the past two decades, rather than restrictive immigration policies or generational turnover. Undoubtedly, however, the latter two phenomena are occurring.

Even as remittances decline, Cape Verde has been making good progress in expanding the modes of diaspora contribution. The most important change in the diaspora's role has been its rise as a source of foreign investments. Cape Verde's diaspora is depositing its savings in specially designated "emigrant accounts" in homeland banks. The origins of these emigrant deposits date to a 1984 law, revised and amended in late 1995. The accounts can be in local or foreign currency time deposits. They are tax-free and carry high interest rates. In addition, emigrants may borrow up to twice their value. Emigrant deposits are conceptually and qualitatively different from remittances.

8. Author's calculations compiled from various official reports by the Banco de Cabo Verde, including *Boletim de Estatísticas 20 Anos* (Praia: BCV 2012).

They are investments, as emigrants pursue higher rates of return on their money. More than three times the size of annual remittance inflows, by the end of calendar year 2013, Cape Verde's emigrants had deposited over $545 million dollars in Cape Verde's commercial banks (BCV, 2014b). As alluded to previously, emigrant deposits and officially reported financial remittances combined account for about 40% of Cape Verde's GDP. This share is likely much higher since some portion of remittances is informal and emigrant investments are included in FDI figures.



Figure 3. Financing Cape Verde's Economy - Main Sources 2013[9]

Emigrant deposits are by far the largest single category of deposits in the national banking system. Fruit of a policy innovation in the mid-1990s, emigrant deposits now constitute a substantial portion of assets in national banks. Representing nearly 30% of GDP, emigrant deposits also account for over 32.4% of M2, or monetary mass. Like remittances, emigrant deposits have proven very stable, even during the crisis years following 2008. Indeed, this stable and steady growth, without any reversals, is characteristic of emigrant deposits since 1991 (BCV, 2012). Emigrant deposits also represent46% of the outstanding commercial credit to the economy during the fourth quarter of 2013 (BCV, 2014b). This external financing has helped fuelled the country's growth by supporting domestic investment and business development. As such, emigrant deposits have been a significant source of liquidity

9. Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV), *Boletim de Estatísticas*. (Praia: BCV, November 2014).

for the banking system, which has converted these assets into investment credit. Diaspora savings, in other words, have been supporting the credit expansion that has benefitted business and consumers alike. The substantial amount of emigrant deposits is not risk free, since sudden withdrawal can cripple the banking system and trigger economic ruin. Growth and stability in the deposits have been the norm, even after the 2008 global and Eurozone crises. For now, emigrant deposits constitute a diaspora vote of confidence in the homeland. The country's stable and predictable exchange rate, based on a fixed peg with the *euro*, provides added confidence.

Finally, observational evidence suggests two other notable trends. The first is a growing trend of 'transnational entrepreneurship', as emigrants start or finance businesses in the homeland or launch new ventures that cater to this transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). The second trend, often intertwined with the first, is that emigrants themselves are using their savings to finance their own housing construction, other property investments, and entrepreneurial ventures. The last two decades have witnessed a veritable boom in emigrant home construction and real estate purchases by emigrants. Aside from depositing their savings in homeland banks, emigrants are also investing in real estate, farmland, transportation, hotels, and new business ventures. Reliable statistics on emigrant foreign direct investment are lacking. Reports of the Central Bank of Cape Verde (BCV) over the last few years have inserted a new rubric labeled "emigrant investments," but there is no consistency in reporting, explanation, or systematic treatment.[10] In one of its random reporting, BCV data indicates that emigrant investments accounted for 42% and 28% of total FDI in 2012 and 2013 respectively (BCV 2014b, 25).

Lastly, observational evidence suggests that potential exists to extend the diaspora's contribution in other modes. Based on current trends and market signals, two areas of biggest potential are tourism demand and so-called "nostalgic" trade. Not only is there already a detectable amount of informal transnational trade taking place between Cape Verde and its diaspora, but circular migration is also substantial. Significant deepening of diaspora participation in either or both of these areas, trade and tourism, can have significant multiplier and secondary effects on homeland economic growth, diversification of the economy, business development, rural poverty alleviation and jobs creation. The strong emotional and material bonds

10. Care is necessary in treating statistical data from all sources. It should be noted that there is frequent discrepancy and inconsistency across different statistical reports from the Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV) or in different editions of the same reports. Some data is always reported as preliminary.

between the homeland and its diaspora mean that Cape Verdeans are returning and visiting in substantial numbers. A growing trend is emigrants returning to retire. Most return to vacation and participate in annual cultural festivals. The diaspora is consuming the few 'made in Cape Verde' products available on store shelves in community supermarkets and shops in the US and Europe. In other words, a ready-made consumer market exists for Cape Verdean exporters. The biggest consumption item has always been cultural products, music especially, but there is high demand for other goods, especially agro-foods and traditional alcoholic beverages.

Notwithstanding these many positive developments, Cape Verde and its diaspora have failed to extend the scale and modes of diaspora contribution beyond the areas above. Progress in transforming the diaspora into a source of foreign investment has been notable, but the diaspora is still not a source of tourism demand or consumer market for national products. Nor is the diaspora a meaningful source of knowledge and skills transfer. As noted above, emigrant direct investment and transnational entrepreneurship appear to be substantial and gaining momentum, but there is neither reliable statistical monitoring of it or a policy framework to guide it. Philanthropy and charity are widespread but ad hoc. Despite a good deal of enthusiasm and efforts among diaspora individuals and groups to send donations and other charitable contributions, no credible framework exists to marshal, coordinate, manage and catalyze such efforts. The inability to harness the full potential contribution of the diaspora is puzzling because of the unusually strong and positive ties between the diaspora and the homeland. Diaspora-homeland and diaspora-state relations have always been positive, rather than hostile, historically. What explains this incomplete success in harnessing the diaspora as a development resource? As noted previously, there are numerous facets to this questions, and a complete explanation would have to examine the many social, political, economic, cultural and ideational factors inside the diaspora itself. The importance of these other factors notwithstanding, diaspora engagement policies of the homeland are also determining in the success and failure of diaspora mobilization. The section below develops a typology of diaspora engagement policies and mechanisms, and assesses Cape Verde's policy performance in each of the categories.

Harnessing the Diaspora for Development

Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated into the middle income country category, it must readapt development strategy

to find new sources of growth and innovation. Given the size and historical significance of its diaspora, and limited in its options, Cape Verde is rethinking ways to leverage its diaspora as a resource. Since independence, Cape Verde has sought to incorporate its diaspora in all facets of national life. Only recently has this goal taken a more focused and comprehensive form, but it builds on years of individual policies and laws aimed at encouraging greater diaspora participation in all aspects of national life. The 2014 *National Strategy on Emigration and Development* (ENED) outlines a general framework and goals. The document is aware of the need to mobilize the diaspora along multiple forms, or modes, of participation. It identifies four broad areas: promoting dialogue and information sharing; increasing remittances, including charitable contributions and philanthropy; skills remittances; and investment and trade promotion. The importance of the diaspora is also cited in other key development documents like the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRS) and the Plan of Government. As noted below, however, these documents remain largely aspirational, having generic goals and lacking an operational or implementation plan for diaspora mobilization. Nonetheless, there is a durable political will and broad partisan support in the homeland to embrace the diaspora.

Largely implicitly, and without a comprehensive strategy, migration has always been an integral part of Cape Verde's development strategy since 1975. Strong emotional and material bonds retained by emigrants materialized as monetary and goods remittances, requiring little effort in policy or institutional innovation on the part of the homeland. Today, for all the reasons discussed in this study, the *laissez-faire* approach of the past is no longer relevant. Migration must be translated into positive economic contributions through deliberate and sustained efforts by the homeland *and* its diaspora. Diaspora engagement policies are one crucial component of this process of translating migration into a development resource. In both policy and the academic literature, the focus has concentrated on financial remittances, skills transfer, remittance capture and immigration policies (Bhagwati, 2003). This is a narrow conception of the possible economic roles of the diaspora, since today its role as tourists, investors or consumers of nostalgic goods will have far greater growth-inducing impact. To leverage fully its diaspora, Cape Verde must go beyond monetary remittances to harness the diaspora as a source of growth, jobs creation, innovation and global economic integration. Although a number of policy and institutional deficits stand in the way, as discussed below, Cape Verde has good reasons to believe its diaspora can continue its historically significant economic role into the future. Harnessing this full potential will require effective policy and

institutional supports on multiple fronts. These policy and institutional supports fall into three distinct but mutually reinforcing analytical categories: diaspora enabling, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration.

The section below offers a typology of diaspora engagement policies. It is important to re-emphasize that, while this study focuses primarily on the efforts of the homeland state, constructing an effective and sustainable framework is a two-way street, and it must involve both governmental, non--government, civil society and private sector actors on both sides. Moreover, as De Haas (2012) and others have observed, the laws and policies of diaspora host countries – on immigration, banking and money transfers, social security, taxation, mobility and guest workers, circular migration – have considerable impact on the scale and modes of the diaspora's contribution to the homeland. Even with a fully developed diaspora engagement framework, the homeland may not be able to derive migration's full contribution if the policies of host countries areincompatible. Nevertheless, homeland policyis crucially important. The experience of other countries, and the practical necessities of development planning, suggest that the homeland state can play a pivotal role: devising appropriate policy and institutional mechanisms, creating an enabling environment, but also an equally important role as facilitator and promoter of bottom-up transnational initiatives by the diaspora and homeland civil society. Lastly, as Portes (2001) has observed, harnessing the full potential contribution of a diaspora does not require the active participation of every member of the diaspora, only a portion. It does not require substantial circular movement or even conscious effort by diaspora individuals or groups to structure or direct their activities as contributions to development. Activists, grassroots groups, transnational entrepreneurs and other similar groups and individuals are important, but passive and occasional consumers of homeland exports can be equally significant from the standpoint of development. As noted previously, the socioeconomic profile of the Cape Verdean diaspora is heterogeneous, comprising established middle and professional classes as well as low skilled temporary migrants and marginal communities. Moreover, not everyone has to contribute in the exact same extent or frequency. Considerable variation is to be expected in the intensity, scope, frequency and modes of participation. The bulk of the diaspora's contribution occurs through individual actions and decisions – remittances are a great example – but incrementally and cumulatively they can have major economic impact and the micro and macroeconomic levels (Vertovec, 2004; Levitt, 2001).This is all the more reason that it is critical to devise a diaspora engagement framework that fosters different levels and modes of individual and collective contribution. That is, the importance of a

strategic framework lies precisely in its capacity to mobilize and facilitate diaspora participation across a broad range of modes: as investors, knowledge remitters, consumers of homeland exports, tourists, and so on.

Typology of Diaspora Engagement Policies

In terms of its direct economic participation in homeland development, the diaspora's potential contribution spans a broad range of activities, modes, and roles. It can be direct and visible as well as indirect and not easily quantifiable. Contribution is used here in a wider meaning rather than narrowly to mean direct giving, as in remittances, donations, or voluntarism. Important as monetary remittances are, it is more appropriate to view the diaspora's potential contribution in terms of the multiple *modes* of participation. As such, a framework constructed to harness the diaspora as an economic resource must be able to do so across all the possible modes of contribution. The experience of countries like Israel, South Korea and, recently, Ireland, China and India, illustrate that the diaspora's contribution can extend across multiple modes. This experience has drawn much scholarly attention to what Patterson (2006) has called "diaspora-homeland collaborative development." The scope and number of these modes will differ from country to country and will depend, in part, on the three categories of diaspora engagement efforts. Not all modes may be possible at once, nor materialize in the same depth. For Cape Verde's political economy profile, we can identify several possible modes.

The possible economic roles of Cape Verde's diaspora can be divided into five or six distinct categories, or modes: a source of monetary remittances; a source of direct investment; a consumer market for homeland or nostalgic exports; a tourist demand market; and as a source of brain gain. The sixth mode, while not strictly economic in character, can be consequential for development – namely, the diaspora as a transnational political lobby. A politically well-organized diaspora can be an effective advocate and promoter of homeland development by lobbying and pressuring host governments and international donor agencies. The case of Israel may be *sui generis*. No suggestion is made that Cape Verde's diaspora is similar in size, wealth or organizational capacity. A major handicap Cape Verde and its diaspora confront is the low levels of organization and political mobilization inside diaspora communities. The diaspora is poorly organized. It can neither defend nor advocate for its own community interests and welfare, let alone advocate for the homeland. More importantly, it cannot mobilize, coordinate,

and manage its own contribution to homeland development, as the recent volcanic eruption illustrated. This internal weakness obstructs the diaspora's full potential irrespective of the efforts of the homeland. Finally, the list of modes above is not exhaustive. There are several other potential modes not mentioned. Diaspora transnational entrepreneurship, a variant of direct investment, can be a transformative force in the both the homeland and host countries (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). As diaspora reaction to the volcanic eruption illustrates, for example, the diaspora can be an important source of charity and humanitarian relief. Similarly, another potential is philanthropy oriented toward community development, youth empowerment, education and training, and entrepreneurship, including microfinancing, scholarships, and project grants. The effectiveness of diaspora hometown associations in the cases of El Salvador and Mexico illustrates not just the potential impact of diasporas on community development but also the importance of diaspora organization (Durand, Parrado and Massey, 1996; Landolt, 2001; Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007). New information and communication technologies open up a range of unexplored opportunities for virtual diaspora engagement, especially in knowledge and skills transfer.

This study examines the types of diaspora engagement policies necessary to harness these various modes and expand the scale of each type of contribution. Like the diaspora's modes of participation, diaspora engagement policies and mechanisms vary widely. A universal formula or set of policies does not exist. Gamen (2006) suggests we can classify diaspora engagement policies into general types of policies homeland governments pursue, namely, policies oriented toward diaspora capacity building, extending rights, and extracting obligations. Brinkerhoff (2012) and others argue that efforts to harness the diaspora for development are effective only if broader conditions in the homeland are conducive. For analytical convenience, and borrowing from Brinkerhoff (2012) and Gamlen (2010), we can organize these policies and conditions into three distinct categories, or typologies: diaspora enablers, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration. The three categories are interrelated and mutually supporting. Success in harnessing the diaspora's full potential requires substantive progress in all three categories of diaspora engagement policies.

Diaspora Enabling Conditions

Diaspora enabling conditions comprise all macro level social, economic, political, and historical conditions and factors that either obstruct or

facilitate the participation of diaspora members in national life of the home country. These conditions include among them: the nature of diaspora-homeland relations, especially the character of the diaspora exit; social and political stability; macroeconomic conditions; and governancequality in the homeland. In other words, enabling conditions and policies are not directly related to, or aimed, at the diaspora, but encompass the general socioeconomic and political conditions in the homeland. These conditions impact the lives, behavior and economic activities of everyone – residents, diaspora, foreign investors, tourists, donors. By shaping the wider structure of incentives, risk, and productivity, enabling conditions spur growth by facilitating economic activity, entrepreneurship, trade, investment, and business development.[11] While gaps and challenges remain, Cape Verde enjoys a number of enabling conditions that favor diaspora engagement.

Of the three categories, Cape Verde has made most progress in the area of enabling conditions. First, diaspora-homeland relations have always been positive historically. It is not a relationship characterized by mutual hostility, fear, or rejection. The diaspora is not an exiled population forcibly removed or fled persecution. Migration has been free of exit trauma. Poverty and famine have been the main drivers, not civil wars, ethnic cleansing, persecution, or expulsion. Aside from the exuberance and competitiveness of partisan politics, the Cape Verde case is free of anti-system behavior, deep social, ethnic or political cleavages, political exclusion or trauma. Government--diaspora relations are equally positive. Partisan squabbles and criticisms of government policies are routine but normal.

Second, political stability, social peace and durable institutions have been crucial enablers of the country's underlying economic and political success since independence. Problems remain. Comparatively, however, the country has performed well. It ranks high in Africa and the world in terms of democracy, governance, transparency, and human development (AfDB, 2012a).Aside from a competitive multiparty democracy, there is rule of law, secure property rights, and investor protection.

Third, good governance and sound macroeconomic management have been the country's trademark, and ensured its credibility with donors, foreign investors, and diaspora alike. Over the last two decades, Cape Verde has pursued economic and trade liberalization as well as reforms to improve

11. For a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions and the business climate in Cape Verde, see: Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Finance and Planning, *Cape Verde: Constraints to Growth, Transformation and Poverty Alleviation* (Praia: MFP, 2010); and Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy (MTIE), *Cape Verde: Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 2013* (Praia: MTIE 2013). See also the AfDB (2012a; 2012b) studies.

the business and investment climate, including reforms to improve the efficiency of public administration to deliver services to citizens and businesses. The reforms, still incomplete, have been improving the business and investment climate for all investors – nationals, foreigners as well as diaspora. For example, one important reform has been in electronic government, and the creation of a one-stop-shop platform, the *Casa do Cidadão* (House of the Citizen) which allows nationals and emigrants to access common services virtually or in person at any consulate. Progress is uneven and big challenges remain, especially in the areas of public administration efficiency, customs procedures, business and investment regulations, and regulatory environment. Even though institutions generally work, favoritism, judicial delays, and bureaucratic inefficiencies are common. The two biggest areas of diaspora complaints in Cape Verde are transportation and customs administration. Diaspora visitors and returning emigrants overlook the inadequacies of health care, water, electricity and other services, but the low quality and inefficiencies of international and inter-island transportation as well as customs administration generate a level of frustration that dampens diaspora enthusiasm for the homeland. Today, growing external debt is threatening macroeconomic stability. Social inequality, crime and public insecurity, weak accountability of elected officials, policy dysfunctions, and other ills still exist, and may threaten long term stability and democratic governance. Despite these challenges, Cape Verde possesses a still durable and favorable enabling environment for effective diaspora engagement.

Diaspora Building Policies

Diaspora building, in essence, entails constructing a shared identity and common purpose that can be harnessed for homeland development. There is nothing automatic in collective identity formation, and translating identify into collective action. This is especially true of the Cape Verdean diaspora, which is dispersed geographically and spans generations. Diaspora building policies are measures and initiatives aimed at constructing solidarity, shared identity, common purpose, patriotism, and strengthening emotional bonds with the homeland and inside the diaspora. They involve the construction of a transnational imagined community. They also include activities that constitute and recognize diaspora communities (Gamlen, 2010). In social science jargon, diaspora building entails symbolic as well as concrete actions involving transnational nation-building. Although this study focuses only on homeland initiatives to support and promote it, diaspora building

necessarily depends much more on the diaspora's own internal efforts, conditions and dynamics. As noted, the diaspora's motivations, incentives, and mobilizational capacity are critical determining factors (Vertovec, 2003).

Diaspora building efforts can be subdivided into five subcategories, namely, cultural affirmation, community support and consular services, diaspora organization, circular migration, and diaspora focused administrative structures. Cultural affirmation efforts by the diaspora and the homeland are oriented toward fostering collective identity, cultural pride, solidarity, and transnationalism nationalism. Commonly used diaspora building initiatives by homelands include promoting cultural festivals, sponsoring and facilitating national day celebrations, community outreach, diaspora return festivals, among others. The Cape Verdean diaspora is also unusual in the strength and vitality of its collective identity and cultural affirmation. Diaspora communities retain cultural practices and customs, turning their local communities into little 'Cape Verdes' in host countries. Cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity further strengthens this transnational collective identity and sense of nationhood. The use of the native language, *creolu*, is a powerful cement and dimension of collective identity that unifies diaspora Cape Verdeans irrespective of their geographic residency. The homeland government has typically not focused on cultural affirmation activities. Some of its policies, such as refusal to recognize *creolu* as an official language, undermine cultural affirmation. Community outreach is also an important element. Frequent official visit to diaspora communities by government leaders is a common practice, even though they are social orpartisan events rather than development promotion.

Homeland governments have been attentive to providing consular services to diaspora communities, including a focus on providing social and financial assistance to distressed communities. Cape Verde's principal diplomatic representations are precisely in the countries with substantial Cape Verdean immigrants. The advent of electronic government, specifically the one-stop-shop *Casa do Cidadão*, offers greater reach and efficiency in providing consular services. In a pattern established since the 1980s, much homeland policy attention continues to be on social work, focused on providing social services and integration assistance to diaspora communities. The recently endorsed III GPRSP (2012-2016) allocates financial resources under the "Global Nation" category, but these are destined for "improving the quality of life of emigrants" and reinforcing consular and diplomatic representation in the main diaspora host countries.

Diaspora organization and circular migration are two areas in which neither the diaspora nor the homeland have performed well. Indeed, both

are practically non-existing. First, the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and in Europe is poorly organized, as noted above. Notwithstanding a proliferation of small neighborhood and church based groups and social clubs, intermediary organizations and umbrella associations do not exist. A separate study is necessary to untangle the myriad of social, economic, political, cultural, and even psychological factors that shape and condition the diaspora's weak organization (Vertovec, 2003). Island groupings and hometown associations are few; if they function at all, activities are primarily social and rarely inclusive. The Cape Verdean Associations in many urban centers in the Boston-Providence corridor function as a community resource center, offering language classes, translation services, and meeting point. However, a peak organization, umbrella association or network of organization does not exist in neither the US or in Europe. Diaspora professional networks and associations do not exist. Despite its long history in the United States, the Cape Verdean diaspora does not have a national umbrella organization – not even at the state or municipal levels – that can lobby, represent, defend and advocate for its interests. Organizational fragmentation and low levels of political participation are the norm. The diaspora in the US is characterized by low levels of voter registration and electoral participation despite its large size in certain urban centers.

Various governments have made ad hoc and limited efforts to encourage circular migration and return visits. However, a comprehensive policy does not exist, especially policies that either focus on promoting diaspora building through return visits and 'rediscovering ancestral roots' or that focus on promoting diaspora investment and brain gain. Circular migration is valuable both in strengthening or renewing diaspora bonds, especially with younger generations, and in encouraging economic investments. Ad hoc and limited efforts have been tried, including attempts to encourage brain gain. With financial support from various European Union countries, the government initiated a "Diaspora Contribution" and "Diaspora Cape Verde" programs to support short term visits by diaspora professionals based in Europe to offer training programs in public and private sector organizations. Currently, Cape Verde participates in the Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals program, financed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The substantive impact of these one-time, two to three weeks training programs is uncertain. Sporadic, individual efforts by businesses, ministries, universities and other agencies to attract temporary or permanent return by skilled diaspora professionals are common. Nevertheless, a specific policy to encourage, organize and support return and circular migration does not exist.

Cape Verde has performed much better in terms of creating dedicated bureaucratic structures to manage diaspora-homeland relations. First, since the early years, the government has experimented with an assortment of institutional arrangements, although none had the specific mandate to mobilizing the diaspora for development. An early mechanism was the creation of a directorate general for emigration and consular services in the foreign ministry, followed a few years later in 1984 with the creation of the Institute for Emigrant Support (IAPE – Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante). This institute was renamed the Institute of Communities (Instituto das Comunidades) in 2001, also inside in the foreign ministry. These early structures, however, were not focused on diaspora economic mobilization. Rather, much of their mandate focused on social and consular services. A more recent institutional innovation is the creation of "focal points" for migration in all 22 municipalities. In 2008, a separate ministry, the Ministry of Communities, was created. In practice, three separate government bodies – the Ministry of Communities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Institute of Communities – are responsible for diaspora affairs. As such, conflicting and imprecise mandates, together with institutional fragmentation, is the norm. A national diaspora council exists, under the aegis of the Ministry of Communities, but it is not clear how operational it is and it functions as a consultative rather than policy making body. Notwithstanding the elevation of the diaspora as a policy priority, the strategic objective of diaspora mobilization for homeland development is neither at the core of policy nor institutional mandate.

There is one final aspect of diaspora building that merits attention. As noted, Cape Verde has not performed well in encouraging circular migration, but it has made limited progress in enhancing emigration opportunities for its people. Namely, it has been active on the diplomatic front in an effort to widen emigration opportunities through special mobility and temporary workers' accords with European Union countries. It signed a mobility agreement with the EU in 2008, involving the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Spain, and Luxembourg. Finally, Cape Verde enjoys preferential access to the world's two biggest economic blocs, the United States and the European Union. While this preferential access is underutilized by Cape Verde and other African countries, they give Cape Verde easy access to its diaspora communities as well as the wider market in these countries.

Diaspora Integration Policies

Diaspora integration involves efforts to strengthen emotional and

material connections to the homeland, including cultivating direct diaspora participation in all spheres of national life.[12] Two important subcategories of diaspora integration measures include the extension of constitutional rights, such as dual citizenship, and specific policies aimed at attracting diaspora participation in development. Cape Verde has been an innovator in both areas, although institutional and policy deficits continue to hamper its ability to harness fully its diaspora.

Asa matter of constitutional principle, the country has embraced the principle of political and legal equality for all Cape Verdeans irrespective of their residence or place of birth. Granting automatic dual citizenship and the right to vote to its diaspora sets Cape Verde apart from most other countries with large diaspora populations. This constitutional principle has a practical consequence beyond the importance of patriotism and emotional bonds – it facilitates circular migration. Second, and related to this constitutional principle, universal suffrage was extended to the diaspora in national elections. Cape Verde's diaspora is one of the few in the world able to vote in national elections. Suffrage is limited to parliamentary elections, rather than municipal elections. The diaspora is represented in parliament by deputies directly chosen by the diaspora constituency. There is uncertainty in terms of taxation and social rights, such as pensions and social security, although Cape Verde has attempted agreements with some European countries.

However, diaspora integration, such as extending suffrage rights, can be a dual edge sword. It too is not risk free. There is an ever present risk that diaspora-homeland relations will become politicized and infused with partisan divisions. As an electoral constituency, the diaspora becomes a domestic political actor. It can influence political and electoral outcomes – as it did in the controversial 2006 presidential elections – or become embroiled in domestic squabbles. Harnessing and mobilizing the diaspora for its development contributions in an intimately political endeavor, not a technical or bureaucratic process. The process can easily become partisan or engender acrimony and suspicions between the diaspora and the homeland government, thus undermining the overall national objective.

In terms of standalone policies, Cape Verde has made a lot of progress. As discussed above, Cape Verde has been one of the largest recipients of financial remittances in the world. Remittances are driven by personal and familial motivations rather than primarily by policy. However, policy matters directly and indirectly to the extent that remittance inflows are affected by

12. A useful reference on Cape Verde's diaspora policies and institutions is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development: Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices* (Geneva: IOM, 2010).

monetary and exchange rate policies, macroeconomic governance, and general enabling conditions in the homeland. Moving beyond monetary remittances, Cape Verdehas embraced policy innovations that have proven quite successful. The most outstanding policy success has been the 1984 law creating the emigrant deposit bank accounts. That policy alone has been responsible for infusing half a billion dollars into the economy. In addition, a number of fiscal and other incentives are in place aimed at fostering diaspora investment and circular migration. To encourage emigrants to return, the country has a number of customs exemptions. As noted, a noticeable trend is retired permanent emigrants returning, with their pensions. Returning emigrants can ship their belongings, including vehicles and household durable goods, duty free. To encourage emigrants to invest in real estate, for example, fiscal and administration fees are waived or reduced. In addition, emigrants are also eligible for any of the investment incentives in place that benefit foreign investors, including sector specific investments in tourism and renewable energy.

Progress and partial success notwithstanding, Cape Verde still lacks a coherent diaspora policy, or strategy. Its diaspora 'policies' are disjointed. As Gamlen (2006) observed, for most countries, diaspora engagement policies tend to emerge in ad hoc fashion, unplanned, driven by disparate interests and motivations, for different reasons at different times. Cape Verde is no exception. In order to harness the diaspora in the post-graduation phase of development, a qualitative leap in policy formulation, policy coordination and implementation capacity will be necessary. Serious policy and institutional deficits must be addressed. There are three distinct aspects to this policy deficit – policy mainstreaming, bureaucratic capacity, and policy coordination and implementation. Streamlining and integrating diaspora policy in all areas and phases of development planning has never been practiced in Cape Verde. Rather than mainstream diaspora mobilization across all policy making and institutions, diaspora policy has been scattered and pigeonholed in bureaucratic silos. As a policy issue area, the diaspora is cross-cutting and multidisciplinary. Diaspora mobilization implicates active involvement of multiple agencies. It entails active roles from a mix of public and private sector agencies covering finance, investment and trade promotion, customs, marketing, economic diplomacy, banking services, tourism, transportation, and so on. Put differently, diaspora mobilization policies must be mainstreamed in overall development planning and project implementation.

For the diaspora to participate across all modes of potential contribution, all policy and institutional supports must be aligned. For example, observational evidence suggests the diaspora can be an important demand

market for the country's merchandise and tourism products. However, tourism and trade policies have simply ignored the diaspora market despite having a diaspora potentially twice the size of the resident population. The 2010 Tourism Strategic Plan, the first of its kind and subsequently shelved, does not even mention the word diaspora. Despite the fact that the diaspora is doing tourism in the homeland in large numbers, there is no effort to court them, cater to them, or treat them as tourists. No effort has ever been made to market and sell the country's tourism to its diaspora. In both policy practice and the theoretical literature, diaspora visitors are not counted as tourists, thus Cape Verde not unusual is disregarding this market. It is a missed opportunity. Diaspora visitors go in large numbers, especially for the big national festivals and cultural celebrations. Even if they choose to stay in family homes rather than the all-inclusive hotels, diaspora visitors spend more money, stay longer and leave more in local communities through their general vacation spending and gift giving to relatives and friends. For good or ill, tourism is a critical sector. In the short term, Cape Verde faces a dual challenge of increasing the national income effects of tourism by diversifying the product, and increasing its linkages to the rest of the economy. The diaspora as a tourism demand market can be a significant component of the wider diversification strategy.

Similarly, in trade and investment policies the diaspora is missing. A major development bottleneck in Cape Verde is its small and geographically fragmented domestic market. Incorporating the diaspora population would potentially double the size of the 'domestic' market, and thus alleviate the bottleneck of economies of scale. Despite the apparent avidity with which diaspora consumers seek out nostalgicproducts, trade policy has never targeted this export market. Absence of a diaspora trade policy is glaring in light of the fact the country enjoys preferential access to the world's two richest markets and home to its largest diaspora communities. It has a Special Partnership Agreement with the European for its exports, and duty free access to the US market under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As in tourism, there is urgent need to diversify the primary sectors in order to address unemployment and rural poverty. Duty free access and high diaspora demand can serve as the base for transforming certain agribusiness product chains where the country has demonstrated some potential, such as wine and traditional alcoholic beverages, goat cheese, fresh, canned and frozen fish, dried and processed fruits, traditional spices and sauces, and coffee. To be sure, a diaspora export strategy will not be easy. Cape Verdean producers face daunting supply side constraints, such as production limitations, financing, high cost of inputs, high transportation costs, poor quality

management and nonexistent national certification. That is, a diaspora export strategy will require interventions along the entire product chain, from production, to commercialization to market entry requirements. Finally, as noted previously, a diaspora trade policy can also engender a number of secondary effects that boost growth and business development.

Despite increasing reliance on FDI, investment promotion policy does not include any explicit diaspora investor targeting, or creative schemes such as diaspora public-private partnerships. Several decades of heavy public investments in economic infrastructure, in addition to government procurement policy and privatization, never attempted to incorporate participation of diaspora investors and businesses. Cape Verde sustained nearly four decades of heavy public investments in infrastructure. Yet no effort was ever made to target diaspora investors and diaspora-owned businesses (or even domestic firms) to participate or bid on projects, nearly all of which went to foreign companies. Four decades of missed opportunities in diaspora-homeland economic relations. The recently launched "Technology Park," data center and other ICT initiatives do not have any explicit plan to incorporate or mobilize the knowledge diaspora. Diaspora investment promotion does not require special or preferential treatment, although some countries adopt such measures. However, it does require investor targeting, with dedicated public and private sector agencies that promote, inform, market, and encourage a specific kind of investment or type of investor. In general, investment promotion has been a deficient component in overall development planning.

Finally, policy coordination and implementation capacity, and the overall human and technical deficits of public institutions, are perennial challenges in Cape Verde in nearly all policy areas. As noted, given the absence of policy mainstreaming, coordination among the various agencies and ministries is nonexistent. Given the multidisciplinary, crosscutting nature of diaspora mobilization, policy coordination and implementation capacity are critical. Bureaucratic weakness and conflicting mandates aggravate the problem. Municipal governments – the point of closest contact with diaspora – are limited in resources and capacity. Diaspora focused national bureaucracies have their own organizational and human resources limitations. The result is they are small, understaffed, and under-resourced. Project implementation and monitoring are perennial difficulties in Cape Verde's public administration. For example, the ENED contains useful ideas and recommendations, but implementation capacity is absent.

Conclusion

Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated from the category of LDC, it must now devise a new model of growth and development that relies primarily on internal resources. As in the past, the country's diaspora, as a transnational economic resource, can continue to be one of the vital components of the new model. Notwithstanding declining emigration opportunities and generational turnover, the diaspora remains a viable policy option. As noted, the country's structural characteristics leave it with few other realistic options to spur growth and development in the present world economy. Yet it is the positive reasons – a large diaspora intensely devoted to the homeland, a declining but still significant role of remittances, numerous policy and institutional innovations in the areas of diaspora enablers, diaspora building, and diaspora integration – that make the diaspora both a viable and significant option. Harnessing the diaspora's participation across all possible modes of contribution to homeland development has been one of the biggest policy challenges for homeland governments everywhere. A number of countries, such as China, India, Israel, South Korea, and Mexico, have made progress expanding the scale and modes of diaspora contribution. Cape Verde too has made some progress, as the phenomenon of emigrant deposits illustrates. Other policies, such as extending voting rights and dual citizenship, have proven effective instruments to deepen the diaspora's integration. A qualitative leap is required, however. A more effective policy and institutional framework is necessary as is a better organized diaspora.

While this study argued that the diaspora will only increase in importance as a development resource, it is necessarily only one component in the wider national development strategy that must find new sources of growth and human development. The diaspora can only be one part of a broader development strategy. The diaspora is not, and cannot be, the answer to all foreign investment needs of the country. Nor can it ever be the sole or even primary demand market for the country's tourism and merchandise exports. The diaspora is not panacea. Diaspora mobilization is not risk free, as noted previously. As alluded, some of the diaspora integration and diaspora building policies – emigrant deposits, extending suffrage – also engender certain risks, such as exposureof the financial system and divisive partisanship.

Harnessing the full potential contribution of the diaspora is not easy, even under the best of conditions. The diaspora's potential as a development resource must not be exaggerated or oversimplified. This study identified a number of limitations and obstacles in three categories of diaspora engagement efforts

– diaspora enabling, diaspora building and diaspora integration. Multiple policy and institutional obstacles in the homeland hamper the diaspora's full contribution. As a structurally vulnerable micro state in the world economy, policy has always a pivotal ingredient underlying Cape Verde's socioeconomic performance since 1975. The country's enabling environment has been critical for development as well as the diaspora's engagement. These enabling conditions are increasingly under strain today. Aside from these policy and institutional weaknesses, there are also practical reasons that will limit the diaspora's full contribution to national development. These limits, by and large, reflect the diaspora's own internal fragilities. Significant portions of Cape Verde's diaspora in the United States and Europe are on the social, political and economic margins of those societies, and struggle with unemployment, legal status, inadequate housing, crime and youth delinquency, family breakdown, inadequate health care and social insurance, and many other challenges typical in immigrant communities everywhere. As this study argued, one of the biggest obstacle will be the diaspora's own lack of internal organization.

A fully articulated strategy, requiring sustained efforts by both the homeland and the diaspora, will not emerge overnight. A universal formula, or recipe, does not exist. However, Cape Verde is not starting from scratch. It can build on a number of policy and institutional innovations and an enabling environment. Two essential first steps, however, are necessary. The first is the need to build up institutional capacity and commit to diaspora policy mainstreaming. The second involves actions, symbolic and concrete, to promote better internal organization of diaspora communities. As noted, diaspora mobilization is a two-way street. The diaspora's full contribution is crucially dependent on its own ability to mobilize and respond. This requires effective internal organization. As evidenced in the analysis above, Cape Verde has made substantial progress mobilizing its diaspora as a vital economic development resource. Economic transnationalism, in the form of its diaspora communities, has always been a vital economic resource. However, Cape Verde and its diaspora today must reconfigure their relationship to enlarge the scope and modes of diaspora contribution to homeland development.

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ENDING SLAVERY IN CABO VERDE: BETWEEN MANUMISSION AND EMANCIPATION, 1856-1876

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Abstract:
This article explores the ending of slavery in Cabo Verde by using the Committee of Protection of Slaves and Freed-person. Rather than just following the directives from Lisbon, it shows that local leaders were reluctant to establish the institution and cautiously approached the abolition of slavery in the colony. Nevertheless, enslaved Africans and their descendants fully exploited the new laws to gain nominal freedom. Like other parts of the Atlantic world, being freed was a state between manumission and emancipation, because there were struggles over payments, 'rights' for the manumitted individuals and mandatory seven years services were required by law.

Key Words:
Slavery, West Africa, Cabo Verde, Emancipation, Manumission.

Although manumission in Cape Verde started as early as the late fifth century, the *Junta Protectora dos Escravos e Libertos* (Committee for the Protection of Slaves and Freed Peoples), a legal apparatus to end slavery in Cape Verde, was established only in 1856.[1] It was a legalistic, gradual

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1. António Carreira, *Cabo Verde: formação e extinção de uma sociedade escravocrata (1460--1878)* (Porto: Imprensa portuguesa, 1972); António Brásio, *História e missiologia: inéditos e esparsos* (Luanda, Angola: Instituto de Investigação Científica de Angola, 1973); Toby Green, 'Building Slavery in the Atlantic World: Atlantic Connections and the Changing Institution of Slavery in Cabo Verde, Fifteenth-Sixteenth Centuries', *Slavery & Abolition*, 32:2, 227-45.

process in which local abolitionists seemed almost absent, and the process focused on the remuneration of slaveholders.[2] Apparently, the *Junta* was presided over by powerful men, perhaps mostly *brankus* (whites) and *mestiço* (mixed), who possessed slaves, rendering them far from impartial in deciding the fate of slaves and freed persons.[3] On September 4, 1857, the Praia City County Administration listed the population of the town of Praia as the follows: 221 Europeans; 1,302 'indigenous'; and 472 slaves out of 1,995 inhabitants.[4] Cape Verde was the first racialized Atlantic slave society.

Europeans tended to assume the highest echelons of power in Cape Verde, including being slaveholders. Thus, the *Junta's* descriptions of the stories and complaints must be read with skepticism without dismissing all the stories, such as the sketches of the plight of slaves, otherwise these marginalized people would remain nameless and voiceless in the annals of Cape Verdean history.[5] The baptismal records, book of slave registry, and the *Boletim Official Governor Geral de Provincia de Cabo Verde* (Official Bulletin of the Province of Cape Verde), and the *Junta's* deliberations allows some micro-history and biographical outlines that enable a better understanding of macro-structural developments, which is new to the study of slavery in Cape Verde.

In this article, the focus is on the creation of the *Junta* and the social consequences for slaves, freed people, and slaveholders. First, an introduction of the establishment of the *Junta* is provided. Second, then the article explores the issues of the manumission of minors promulgated by a new law, which required baptismal and godparents to purchase their godchildren's freedom. Third, the social effects of the *Junta* is interrogated, particularly the issues of manumission, inheritance, and complaints. Fourth, the article examines the issues of crime, punishment, and

2. For the perspective of Portuguese Empire about abolition see, João Pedro Marques, *Sá da Bandeira e of im da escravidão: Vitória da moral, desforra do interesse*. (Imprensa de Ciências Sociais Series. (Lisbon, Portugal: Instituto Ciencias Sociais, 2008); Marques, *The Sounds of Silence*, *Nineteenth-century Portugal and the Abolition of the slave*, trans. Richard Wall (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Seymour Drescher and Pieter C. Emmer, *Who Abolished Slavery? Slave Revolts and Abolitionism. A Debate with João Pedro Marques* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); João Filho Lopes, *Abolição da escravatura: subsídios para o estudo* (Praia, Cape Verde: Spleen, 2006).
3. This is not to imply that only whites and *mestiços* were slavesowners;
4. *Boletim Official do Governo Geral a Provincia de Cabo Verde* (BOCV), Numero 18, 1857, 91, Praia, Instituto de Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo Verde (IAHNCV). The reference to Praia would refer to only the Plateau, which is the main business district area of Praia today.
5. Cláudio Alves Furtado, 'Raça, Classe e Etnia Nos Estudos e Em Cabo Verde: As Marcas do Silêncio', *Afro-Ásia* 45 (2012): 143-71.

exile as they related to slaves and freed people (*liberto*), although it also included freeborn individuals. Within the abolition strategy of the Portuguese Empire, Cape Verde's strategy for ending slavery was similar to the gradual and legalistic abolition of slavery in Angola, São Tomé, and other Portuguese possession, particularly with the omnipresent specter of the British Empire exerting pressure on the Portuguese Empire to end the slave trade. Initially, Portugal reluctantly accepted the abolitionist pressure of Britain, because of their debt to the latter's support, when France invaded Portugal, causing the monarchy to flee to Brazil in 1807. Suspicious that the British, colluding with the French, invoked the abolition of the slave trade, at least in the Upper Guinea Coast, to gain another foothold in West Africa, such as with the case of Bolama, Portugal was cautiously hesitant to loose any colonial territory.[6] Economically, Portuguese was too weak to quickly abolish slavery, but British encroachments further exacerbated and threatened its feeble colonial grip. Moreover, the exiling of 'criminals' to Upper Guinea followed patterns to that of other Portuguese possessions, such as Brazil, São Tomé, and Angola, as well as Portugal itself.

Creation of the *Junta*

On 1 March 1856, António Maria Barreiros Arrobas, general governor of Cape Verde, noted that the Ministry of Trade of Marine and Overseas enacted the Decree of 14 December 1854, which was to promote the freeing and protection of slaves and freed persons in the overseas provinces.[7] In order to verify the manumission of slaves, the Decree stipulated that slaveholders must register a title for their slaves.[8] This would create the only substantial slave census for Cape Verde.

On 12 November 1856, in Praia, Barreiros Arrobas, governor general of Cape Verde, demanded that 'all the authorities' of his government cooperate with the 'solicitations' made by the interim president of the *Junta* to comply with the Decree.[9] As the architect of the Decree, Bernardo de Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo (but commonly referred to as Sá de Bandeira), in December 1856, reaffirmed that the *Junta* was created:

6. Filho, *Cabo Verde Abolição da Escravatura*, 35-43; Philip J. Havik, '"A Commanding Commercial Position": The African Settlement of Bolama Island and Anglo-Portuguese Rivalry (1830-1870)' in *Brokers of Change, Atlantic Commerce and Cultures in Precolonial Western Africa*, ed. Toby Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 333-77.
7. BOCV, numero 185, 1856, 793-4.
8. BOCV, numero 187, 1856, 815.
9. BOCV, numero 200, 1856, 919.

with special coffers, to apply manumission for infants age 5 (or younger) along with baptism and payment of 5,000 réis to the slave owner in compliance with Article 30 of the Decree; help slaves; promote freedom of slaves; calculate each semester a disposable amount for next the semester to apply for manumission; they should make semiannual reports in compliance with Article 44 by providing detailed accounts of cases of manumission.[10]

The state imposed a tax of 200 *réis* on each freed slave, regardless of age or sex, although individuals age 50 and older were exempted.

Another focus of the law was to control the movement of slaves and end internal slavery in the archipelago. There were a series of decrees *10 December 1836, 25 July 1842, 21 February 1851, and finally, 17 March 1852), which basically stated that families that owned slaves could travel intra-island, but only with two slaves per family, and only with the consent of the slave owner. Entering and departing the different islands, the slaveholder's family had to provide title of the slaves. In March 1857, Arrobas notified the local authorities that the ordinance of the Ministry of Marine and Overseas, no. 44 (10 March 1857), 'prohibited the entry of slaves to the island of São Vicente,' whether from other islands from Cape Verde or the *pontas* [estates] of Portuguese Guinea.[11] Although slavery and the entry of slaves were prohibited there, manumission records reveal that slaves were liberated in São Vicente, which meant that some slaves did enter the island. São Vicente was the last of the inhabited islands to be settled, beginning in the late 1700s. The justification for barring slavery and entry of slaves was that São Vicente had been selected to become the new capital and form a new economy based on supplying coal (and functioning as a telegram center) to passing European ships, particularly the British.

Enacting these laws, however, would prove difficult, especially in the initial phase, because making the *Junta* functional was a gradual process, and the appointments and nominations of officials became bureaucratic problems. On 14 September 1858 and 3 July 1860, Pedro Marciano de Freitas Abreu, acting deputy crown attorney and agriculture, was nominated to be secretary of the *Junta*.[12] On 19 December 1861, Carlos Augusto Franco, general governor of Cape Verde, said that Abreu's first position was 'incompatible' with the other two nominations. In the meantime, Abreu's replacement was Carlos Augusto.[13]

10. BOCV, numero 11, 1857, 50-1.
11. BOCV, numero.177, 1855, 746.
12. BOCV, numero 50, 1861, 229.
13. He should not be confused with the governor of Cape Verde, Carlos Augusto Franco.

Even after appointing a presiding officer for the *Junta*, on 3 December 1863, Governor Franco proclaimed that the establishment of the *Junta* was not functional, despite the Decree of 1856.[14] Franco said that this was a great "public failure" and that the local administration did not fulfill the mandate of the Royal Decree. Franco said that the *Junta* should be operational within two months. In part, the difficulty in implementing the Decree was due to reluctant officers and noncompliant subjects.

On 25 February 1859, for instance, the administration of the island of Maio noted that freed slaves resisted providing the mandatory seven years of service.

> The Administration of Municipality of Maio noted that the Ministry of Marine and Overseas stipulated that freed slaves under Article 29 and the only paragraph of the decree of 14 December 1854 that slaves who obtained their freedom by the general law charter must serve mandatory seven years of service in conformity with the regulation of 25 October 1853.[15]

There was a clarification of the law and Decree, which stated, 'Besides slaves belonging to the state, and in the provinces, slaves under the custody of the local chambers/municipalities and charity organizations (*Misericordias*), upon obtaining freedom, they must also serve the state or corporations.'[16] The corporations were private entities not controlled by the state, such as properties of slave owners, which included slaves. Perhaps, these seven years of service or apprenticeship for freed slaves to their former owners created a dependency and paternalistic relation between the two sides. In Post-emancipation period, some slaves adopted their master's surname and remained very close to the family, maybe, due to survival strategies.[17]

During the nineteenth century, the laws became clearer on slave treatment. The Decree of 16 January 1837 stipulated that sub-delegates of ordinary judges did not have jurisdiction to rule on matters pertaining to slaves fleeing their master to abstain from performing their obligations,

14. BOCV, numero 1, 1864, 1.
15. *Secretaria Geral do Governo* (SGG) Cx. N.º 576, P-04, avulso. Correspondência Recebida do Junta Protectora dos Escravos e Libertos, Fevereiro-Dezembro 1857, 7 peças (avulso): originais e cópias manuscritos; Praia, Instituto de Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo Verde (IAHNCV).
16. BOCV, numero 199, 1856, 910.
17. For lingering relationship between former slaves/their family and master's family see, Américo C. Araújo, *Little Known, The European Side of Cape Verde Islands: A Contribution to the Knowledge of a People* (New Bedford, MA: DAC, 2000), 175;177–8.

but issues related to farming was the responsibility of the court judge.[18] However, with the creation of the *Junta*, these issues would eventually be resolved though with slow-pace and favoured the slave-owners.

Freeing Slaves via the Womb and Baptism

The Law of 25 and 25 July 1855 declared that children of slave women born in Portuguese overseas possessions were free.[19] The Ministry of Marine and Oversea notified the *Junta* to comply with the law of 30 June 1856, which concerned the manumission of slaves and children of slave women, by September 1857.[20] Sá de Bandeira emphasized that it was via baptism and payment that the children of slaves would be manumitted. The Decree of 14 December 1854, Article 6, title 2 stated that slaves that 'belonged' to churches were also free.

Although Church records show that children of slave mothers were being baptized before this law was enacted, the incentive was now linked to the mother's womb, i.e., slave child must be age 5 or younger, were eligible for manumission via baptism but with compensation due to the slave owner. Hence, baptism alone did not mean a slave child would be released from bondage or repatriated to his or her kin group. The law of manumission was based on remunerating the slaveholder. The local Church and the State continued to collaborate, just like when both sanctioned slavery, and now they were working together to gradually abolish slavery, which Marques coins *tolerationism*.[21] At the beginning of colonization of the Cape Verde with Catholicism as the official state religion, baptism meant becoming part of a new community with a new identity (i.e., African slaves were christened with a Christian name).[22] Now, it was being used as moral rhetoric to end their enslavement and create a new bourgeois colonial order.

The important people in the baptismal records were the godparents, who usually provided payment for the manumission. The notion of kinship as relates to godparents in these baptismal acts is not straightforward, but the godparents' significance becomes apparent as some names reappear

18. BOCV, numero 204, 1856, 945.
19. BOCV, numero 203, 1856, 939.
20. SGG, Caixa (Cx.) N.º 576, P-04, avulso.
21. Marques, *The Sounds of Silence*, 1-3; 22-7.
22. António Correia e Silva, 'A sociedade Agrária, Gentes das Àguas: Senhores, Escravos e Forros', in *História Geral de Cabo Verde*, 2nd ed., vol. II. Coordenação, Luís de Albuqerque and Maria Emília Madeira Santos (Lisbon, Portugal: Cenro de Estudos de História e Cartografia Antiga, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical; Praia: Direcção Geral do Património Cultural de Cabo Verde, 1991), 313.

in baptismal manumission cases. Although there is a clear Catholic dimension, godparents should not be seen exclusively from a Catholic perspective, but rather in terms of fostership and kinship groups that were common in Upper Guinea.[23] In the secular realm, godparents served as part of a social network, and cemented social bonding and mutual aid. Thus, the following stories of slave children's baptism represent the new initiative of abolition of slavery in Cape Verde with godparents playing a decisive role.

The Church was an important institution in ending slavery in Cape Verde and propagating the ideal identity of the masses. In January 1853, in the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* (Our Lady of Grace) Church in Praia, M. Carmo, a female slave of Gregorio Xavier, had a baby boy named Joaquim.[24] On 3 April 1853, Joaquim was baptized and his godparents, Francisco João Pereira and Antonia Gonçalvez Pereira, paid 10,000 *réis* for his 'freedom [*liberdade*] and manumission [*alforio*].' The sum was twice the amount for the prescribed manumission of children; however, this was before the creation of the *Junta*. Perhaps *liberdade* was to remove the mandatory apprenticeship and *alforio* included mandatory service.

Some cases demonstrate baptism of a slave child linked to manumission without providing any details about compensation, but clearly identified the godparents as an indication of compensation. In the Lady of Our Grace Church in Praia, on 16 April 1856, Olimpia, slave of Gilberto da Silva, baptized her daughter Bernandina, who was born in 1855.[25] With the agreement of the slave owner, the godparents, Bernando Jozé da Silva and Theresa Cacilda Medina 'freed' Bernandina, but it does not state the amount paid. For instance, on 14 February 1856, Domingas de Affonseca, slave of Marcelino Antonio do Affonceca, gave birth to a boy named Valentin. In February 1856, his godparents, Valentin Tavares Correia and Maria Jozé Ferreira, baptized him, enabling his manumission. Perhaps the mother named her son after the godfather. In a similar case in March 1856, Jusana, slave of Antoni Francisco Costa, gave birth to Luisa. In June 1856, his godparents, João Cabral Franco and Guiomas Leopodina Abreu, baptized Luisa, resulting in his manumission. However, the *Junta* also made payment: the law stipulated that if the godparents could not remunerate the slaveholders, the *Junta* would. Although some slave owners did grant freedom without payment, baptismal records indicate that compensation was the most common path towards 'freedom.'

23. Philip Havik, Silences and Soundbytes: The Gendered Dynamics of Trade and Brokerage in the Pre-Colonial Guinea Bissau Region (Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2004), 86.
24. SGG, Cx. Nº.1, Peça N.º2, Conservatória dos Registos Centrais, folha (f.) 3.
25. SGG, Cx. Nº.1, Peça N.º2, Conservatória dos Registos Centrais, 37.

Other cases were implicit about payment by either godparents or the *Junta* by noting that slave children were manumitted in 'accordance to the law,' i.e., baptism and remuneration. On 19 January 1857, in the same church in Praia, Isabel, slave of Henrique José d' Oliveira, baptized her daughter Mariana.[26] The baptismal record stated that the child was freed in accordance with the law, which meant that her godparents, Antonio Diogo and Maria das Dores Nascimento d'Oliveira, both natives of Portugal, paid the required amount.[27] In addition, in 1857, Lourenço Antonio de Lima and Henriqueta Pereira da Fonseca freed their goddaughter, Elena, a daughter of Arcangela who was a slave of Valentim Tavares Corrêa, in the same manner via baptism. Another example is from May 15, 1857: Maria Fonseca, who was a slave, gave birth to Amelia and with baptism on July 26, 1857, her baby was 'freed in accordance with the law' by her godparents Jozé Joaquim and Rita Gomes.

Other cases illustrate that godparents paid for manumission because local authorities received a receipt for the transaction. For instance, in January 1859, Domingas, a slave of Luis Antonio Fortes, gave birth to Paulo, whom she baptized in May 1859 at the church in Praia.[28] That the 'receipt' of payment presented to Luis Antonio Fortes by Luis Mendes Lopes in accordance with the law testified to Paulo's manumission. His godparents, Pilinio Mendes and Maria Mendes Lopes, who were both from Praia, paid 5,000 *réis*, the amount stipulated by law. In addition, in July 1861, Maria de Conceição, a slave of Pedro Luiz Cordeiro, had a baby girl named Henriqueta, and her godparents, Antonio João Menezes and Maria Purgueira de Jezus, paid Cordeiro 5,000 *réis* with baptism to manumit her in January 1862.[29]

In September 1862, Maria Felicidade, a slave of Major Crato, gave birth to Carolina, who was baptized. Crato received 5,000 *réis*, and Carolina was freed in October 1862.[30] Major Jozé Xavier Crato was a prominent member of the military and a slaveholder. In May 1869, Major Crato freed some of his other slaves, but the document does not indicate who paid the remuneration, if any, for Francisco, Francisco dos Santos, Marçallo, Policarpo, Luiz Antonio, Joaquim Pedro, Theodoro, Caetano, Felicidade, Antonia, Joanna, Violante, Lucio, and Eugenia.[31]

Other acts of manumission did not indicate that any godparents, compensation, or reference to 'the law,' which suggests that slave owners

26. SGG, Cx. N.1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.46.
27. SGG, Cx. N.1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.46.
28. SGG, Cx. N. 1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.76.
29. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º 2, Livro de 1855, f.130.
30. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º 2, Livro de 1855, f.145.
31. BOCV, numero 38, 1869, 226.

granted manumission on their own volition, but this was the most unlikely path towards 'freedom.' In May 1858, Banlha/Ganlla, a slave of Manoel Saches Freire, gave birth to a boy, Christened José.[32] In June 1858, José was 'freed in the act of baptism with the consent of his owner.'[33] Likewise, in May 1862, Maria da Graça, slave of Luis João Pinto, gave birth to Eugenia. By receiving a baptism in August 1862, her slave owner manumitted Eugenia. Neither case acknowledged any godparents or reference to 'the law.' Unless the *Junta* recompensed the slaveholders, the latter gratuitously freed their slaves. Below, in table 1, is a sample of slave children manumitted in 1863.

Table 1. Manumitted Child Slaves Recorded in City of Praia of Santiago, 1-30 March 1863.

Number Of Slave Holders	Number of Registered Freed Persons	Male	Female	Amount of Emolument for each slave	Observations
70	126	65	61	500 *réis*	Amount Retained by the Junta: 31,500 *réis*

Source: *Boletim Official do Governo Geral da Provincia de Cabo-Verde*, N. º 14, 1863, 76.

Manumission and Ambivalent Freedom

'Freedom' was an ambivalent notion, because manumission did not mean the end of service to the owner or the state. In the Atlantic world, it was usually an apprenticeship of seven years, which was to inculcate the bourgeois notion of work and citizenry, because freed slaves tended to work for self-sustenance. The meaning of citizenship and freedom was still tied to religion, race, class, and social origin. In January 1863, the *Junta* stated that it should use the money in its coffers to free slaves, because slaves were petitioning for assistance on a daily basis, but the *Junta* also was cognizant of its budgetary limitation in order to have money for other expenses.[34] Privately owned slaves could purchase their freedom, but state-owned slave were automatically manumitted. Freed slaves

32. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º2, Livro de 1855, f.66.
33. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º2, Livro de 1855, f.66.
34. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.

carried a *carta de liberdade* (freedom letter) to prove their new status. Conflict and tension ensued due to price dispute for manumission and when *libertos*, freed slaves, had to perform the mandatory seven years of service. Slaves also filed petitions about harsh treatment and refused to do work, and slaves attempted to benefit from the new legislations by interpreting the new laws to their advantage. Finally, the government also emancipated some slaves when the *Junta* and individual efforts were not enough, particularly regarding special cases.

In March 1859, the *Junta* demonstrated the difficulty in complying with the Ordinance of the Ministry of Marine and Oversea (*Ministerio da Marinha e Ultramar*). The case involved ten freed slaves that were to serve as sailors (*marinheiroz d' Armada*) under the commander of the Sado War Brig (*Commandante do Brigue de Guerra Sado*).[35] In accordance with Article 29 of the Decree of 14 December 1854, the local administrator of the island of Maio (*Concelho de Maio*) stipulated that the freed slaves should follow this order. In Maio, Manoel Loff, a *liberto*, pulled out a knife and demanded his freedom rather than becoming a sailor. The local authorities of Maio deemed Manoel Loff's reaction as menace to the social harmony of the island and submitted a petition to the *Junta*. *Libertos* contested this type of freedom, which was an apprenticeship. The local authorities of Maio sent Manoel to Praia, the capital, on the schooner *Abelha* for deliberation by the *Junta*, claiming that his act disturbed 'public tranquility.'

In May 1858, the reverend bishop of Cape Verde presided over a complaint by Pedro Semedo Cardozo that his *liberto*, Antonio, 'refused to work.'[36] The *Junta* stated that *libertos* may be reluctant to work, but that the law obligated them for continued service. Once manumitted, *libertos* were sometimes sent to another island to complete their service. For instance, in 1868, the *Junta* mentioned that some freed slaves were sent to Sal, which included Cecilio, a *liberto* of Pedro Semedo Cardozo.[37]

The colonial government implemented 'public works' by conscripting members of the lower classes. In July 1864, on Maio Island, the colonial state used slaves for 'public works' because their owners could not sustain them during the 'crisis,' i.e., the chronic drought and famine in the archipelago.[38] However, 156 slaves were 'excluded' from this work, because former slaves 'complained' that their slave owners abandoned them anticipating the rainy season (*as aguas*). The *Junta* emphasized the potential

35. SGG Cx. N.º 576, P-04, avulso.
36. SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-05.
37. SGG, Cx.576, P-12, avulso.
38. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-08.

for 'robbery' by and of depraved slaves. Given the owner's negligence for food provisions during famine, slaves rebelled by using violence to survive.

The *Junta's* greatest complaints concerned disputes over the price of manumission, because slaves were anxious to take advantage of the law to quickly secure their freedom. Lucas Augusto, a slave of Libania Amarante Augusto, exemplifies the struggle for adequate compensation. In December 1864, the *Junta* considered Lucas Augusto's petition regarding the price of his manumission. Libania requested 20,000 réis for freeing Lucas, who apparently found this too expensive.[39] The *Junta* resolved the quarrel, but as a *liberto* he still had to agree to the seven years of mandatory service to his former owner. From Praia, the *Junta* sent Lucas Augusto to Sal.[40] Perhaps the *Junta* paid for the remaining amount, and Lucas worked in Sal collecting salt, which was one of the main exports of that island. There were several prominent slaveholders and disputes over price, and I will provide details about these cases. For instance, a prominent woman slaveholder was *Dona* Maria de Santa Frederico.

Prominent Woman Slaveholder: Dona Maria de Santa Frederica

In São Nicolau Tolentino Parish, part of Praia County in Santiago, *Dona* Maria de Santa Frederico was a prominent woman. In the Lusophone Atlantic world, people used the title *dona* to indicate respect for women of high status. *Dona* Frederico had at least twenty-one slaves. A baptismal record of São Nicolau Tolentino notes that she was 'the fourth in filiations of all the parish.'[41] Perhaps *Dona* Frederico was a Church enthusiast, but she was also very concerned with the material goods of life.

In December 1868, the *Junta* had a hearing concerning a petition made by Paulo, a slave of *Dona* Maria de Santa Frederico, in a dispute regarding the price for manumission.[42] Eduardo José Rodrigues Fernandes, secretary of the *Junta*, who owned at least two slaves, had written to the judge of São Nicolau Tolentino Parish (Maria de Santa Frederico's residency at Agoa de Gato fell under that jurisdiction) to uphold or dismiss the amount of 40,000 *réis*, which the *Junta* deemed fair.[43] In 1868, in São Nicolau Tolentino Parish, Joaquim Pereira de Carvalho was the justice of the peace

39. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
40. SGG, Cx.576, P-12.
41. SGG, Cx. n.23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia,156.
42. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.9.
43. BOCV, Numero 38, 1869, 226; SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.11.

(*juiz de paz*) and José Antonio Frederico and Francisco de Barros Souza were the substitutes.[44] The judge that Fernandes wrote to was probably Carvalho. At any rate, Paulo had paid 30,060 *réis* for his freedom, but the slave curator explained that his owner demanded 80,000 *réis*. In December 1868, the *Junta* said that the price was 'excessive'; the local judge of São Nicolau Tolentino and *Junta* finally agreed to a 'maximum' price of 40,000. *Dona* Maria de Santa Frederico consented to the new price, prompting the Junta to demand that Paulo gives the remaining balance of 9,940 *réis*. At the end of the deliberations, the *Junta* recommended that the governor uphold the decision rather than 'nullify' it, and they extolled the slave owners because *Dona* Federico acquiesced to the ruling.[45]

Dona Frederico's female slaves, Marcella, Carlota Frederico, and Cecilia Frere, had children.[46] Despite the fact that the children had been baptized, there are no indications that *Dona* Frederico emancipated them. In October 1854, Marcella gave birth to twins, Luis and Maria.[47] In January 1855, Marcella baptized her twins. Their godfather was Luis João de Carvalho, a resident of Penda, and the twins had two godmothers, Maria Claudio Semedo, a resident of Tamosisra, and Luduvina Lopes, a resident of Pinha. The document does not explain the reason behind the selection of two godmothers but only one godfather. The baptism of the twins in 1855 occurred before the Law of the Womb of 1856.

Even with the enactment of the Law of the Womb, the children of *Dona* Frederico's female slaves remained in slavery. In May 1864, her slave, Carlota Frederico, had a baby girl, Maria. In May 1864, Carlota baptized her daughter with the assistance of her godfather, Ijedoro Rodrigues, and her godmother, Maria Rosa Gomes; both were from São Nicolau Tolentino and native to the island of Santiago. Again, there was no manumission. In February 1868, Cecilia Frere gave birth to a boy, Nicolau. In April 1868, Cecilia Frere baptized Nicolau; again, the child remained in bondage. However, in May 1869, Dona Frederico liberated the following slaves: Felicianno, Adrianno, Agostinho, Guilherme, Serafim, Cezar, Augusto, Anastacia, Jezuina, Julia, Maria Guilhermina, Luiza, Joanna Ribeiro, José, Virginia, Catharina, Gloria, and Marcella.[48] It is most likely that Marcella was the mother of Luis and Maria. Besides *Dona* Frederico, another major slave-owner was Pedro Semedo Cardozo.

44. BOCV, Numero 48, 1868, 202.
45. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.10.
46. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, vulso.
47. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 1, Registo Civil da Praia, 98.
48. BOCV, Numero 38, 1869, 227. The document is silent about restitution.

Pedro Semedo Cardozo: Slave-Owner in Cabo Verde

Pedro Semedo Cardozo was a resident of Colegio in São Nicolau Tolentino Parish.[49] There was a João Jose Semedo Cardozo, resident of Colegio, who was most likely his relative.[50] The slave census of 1856 indicated that Pedro Semedo Cardozo owned twenty-seven slaves. With the addition of Felizberta, he owned twenty-eight, which was quite high for the Cape Verdean context.

Table 2. Slaves' Background for Pedro Semedo Cardozo

Name	Born	Age	Skin Color	Occupation
Mathias	Guiné	40	preto[51]	farmer
Dionizio	Guiné	40	fula	farmer
Pedro	São Tiago	41	fula	farmer
Francisco	São Tiago	21	fula	carpenter
Noberto	São Tiago		fula	farmer
Candido	Guiné	46	fula	pastoralist
Cezilo	São Tiago	24	fula	
Jozé	Guiné	20	fula	
Thomas	Guiné	74		farmer
Ambrozio	São Tiago	3	preto	
Claudino	São Tiago	2	preto	
Nicolau	São Tiago	Five months	mulata	
Felipa	São Tiago	47	preta	
Violante	São Tiago	31	preta	
Jezufina	São Tiago	21	preta	
Luiza	Guiné	24	preta	
Camila	São Tiago	18	preta	
Theodora	São Tiago	15	fula	
Maria da Conceição	Guiné	47	preta	
Constança	São Tiago	26	preta	
Gregoria	São Tiago	28	preta	
Thereza	São Tiago	22		
Joaquina	Guiné	34	preta	
Francisca Nº 1	Guiné	34	preta	
Francisca Nº 2	Guiné	32	preta	
Marcelina	Guiné	10	preta	
Roza	Guiné	36		

49. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 02.
50. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 02, Registo Civil da Praia, f.117.
51. In general, there was a three-color code system in the slave census,: *preta* (black), *mulata* (light-skin), and *fula* (brown). The Portuguese believed that some ethnic Fula were not "jet black," whereas slaves, whether born in Cape Verde or from Upper Guinea, were sometimes described as *cor fula* (fula color).

The census indicated that Roza paid 30,000 *réis* for her manumission on July 4, 1867.[52] However, the road to manumission for Roza was a decade-long legal battle. In 1857, when Metheuz Severino de Avellar was curator of slaves and *libertos*, he noted that Roza, a slave owned by Pedro Semedo Cardozo, went to Avellar's house and gave him 20,000 *réis in* the presence of Thomas da Costa Ribeiro and Evaristo António Ramos de Figueiredo to buy her freedom.[53] Avellar wrote to Cardozo inquiring about the price that Cardozo required for Roza's freedom.

About ten years later, in July 1867, the *Junta* was considering the circumstances of this case, because the amount given to the former curator of slaves was a matter of contention. Avellar testified that he delivered 20,000 *réis* to Cardozo; Roza stated that she had given 90,000 réis to Avellar. Evaristo António Ramos de Figueiredo allegedly received 'a certain amount' from Roza. Cardozo claimed to have kept 20,000 *réis* for manumission. Roza paid more to Evaristo, who transferred the money to her slave owner, but Cardozo said that 5,006 *réis* remained for Roza's emancipation. It is difficult to discern the truth, but after ten years, Roza insisted on her position, despite facing very powerful men. If she was fabricating the story, she was quite courageous.

Pedro Semedo Cardozo's female slaves had children. The mothers baptized their children, yet Cardozo did not manumit them, which implies that he demanded indemnification. For example, Cardozo's female slave Francisca Semedo had a baby boy, Anibal.[54] In October 1858, Anibal's godparents, Thomas da Costa Ribeiro and Henriqueta Leopoldin de Mendonça, both from Colegio and natives of Santiago, baptized her at the São Nicolau Tolentino Church, yet without obtaining freedom.[55]

In a baptismal record, Maria Joaquina was listed as a native of Guiné and a 'servant of Pedro Cardoso.'[56] In January 1868, Maria gave birth to a baby boy, Sebastino, described as being born a slave.[57] In June 1868, in the São Nicolau Tolentino Church, Father Pedro Rodrigues Tavares baptized Sebastino. 'The godparents were José Bernardo Rodrigues, a farmer, resident of Fegueira Branca and Roza Maria Tavares,' a slave of Father Tavares, a resident of Colegio, both natives of Guinea.[58] In July 1870, Maria Joaquina

52. SGG\F2.2\Lvo863, f. 11 frente (f)-f.14v.
53. SGG, Cx.576, P-011; These two men must have been of high social standing in Praia.
54. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2.
55. This must be the same Thomas da Costa Ribeiro who was present when Roza, a slave of Pedro Semedo Cardozo, paid Avellar for her freedom.
56. SGG, Cx N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161verso (v).
57. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161v.
58. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161v.

gave birth to a baby girl.[59] Joaquina, however, was listed as resident of São Felippe and *liberto* of Pedro Semedo Cardozo. With her 'freedom,' she no longer lived in Colegio with her master. Presumably she still worked for him, but preferred to live in a different place. In July 1870, in Our Lady of Grace Church in Praia, Father Simeão Gomes Correa, baptized and christened the baby girl as Maria. The godfather was João Tavares and the godmother was Joanna Maria; both were single and farmers.

Finally, in December 1868, Felizberta, a female slave of Semedo Cardozo, had a baby boy.[60] In February 1869, the boy was christened Januario. His godparents were Lucio Lopes and Archangela Lopes, both single and residents of Colegio. Once again, Cardozo did not grant manumission. As one can see, for most slaveholders compensation was essential for manumission.

Slaves also tried to manipulate the new laws in their interest. For instance, the *Junta* wrote that:

> The slaves are indolent by nature, and the laws are incomprehensible to them; they understand that they have legal protection, and they assume they should not work for their owners and that slave owner cannot obligate them to work, because they will not obey the owners, which results in disobedience. The owners punishes them, but slaves argued that the laws prohibit them being physically punished.[61]

The *Junta* emphasized that slaves should be protected in conformity with the new law, but they should also be punished when they commit a crime. According to the *Junta*, 'in Angola, S. Thome and other Portuguese possessions, where there is still slavery, they are corporally punished, in accordance to the crime they committed.'[62] The *Junta* articulated religious and moral parameters to restrict any severe physical punishment in according with with Decree of 16 December 1854. But some slaves did not just rely on the will of the master, but used the *Junta* for fight for their manumission.

59. SGG, Cx. N.º, peça 2, Livro No.3, Registo Civil da Praia, 77.
60. SGG, Cx, N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 178v.
61. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
62. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.

Accusations and Counter-Accusations: The Case of the Female Slave Thereza

Besides issues of money, the *Junta* received complaints from slaves and other entities. In Praia, on 19 April 1859, Thereza, a slave owned by Maria da Conceição, filed a complaint with the governor general counsel (*Conselheiro Governador Geral*) that Maria 'maltreated' her by inflicting injuries. Subsequently, the case was sent to the *Junta*. Maria claimed that Thereza "slowly" inflicted injuries to her hands and feet with the sole purpose of not doing work.[63] Maria da Conçeião allegedly claimed that her neighbor Maria Ignocencia witnessed this and notified another neighbor, José Sanches. Apparently, a person named Barbara also 'testified' that Thereza 'was not touched and not even threaten[ed].' Maria Ignocencia confirmed Maria da Conçeião's statement. When the *Junta* interrogated Thereza, she confessed to the falseness of her complaint.

The *Junta* said that this black woman 'was so perverse' that she stole 600,000 *réis* from her owner's money hidden in a tin can on top of a table a few days later. She fled to the backyard of the house with the tin can, cracked it open, and stole and hid the money. Apparently, Maria da Conçeião confronted her, but Thereza did not confess. Her owner found most of the money buried but Thereza adamantly denied any guilt. The rest of the money was found with a third person. The *Junta* recommended an 'appropriate' punishment. The punishment might have been corporeal or some jail time, which was common for individuals convicted of crimes.

The *Junta* also heard cases about the legality of the enslavement of some slaves. On 3 May 1862, in Praia, the *Junta* began deliberating the legal status of Domingos, a slave of Agostinho José Rodriguez, resident of Santiago.[64] They made their decision on 8 May 1862. The *Junta* noted that the secretary of the general governor had not registered Domingos. He was a native of Bissau, but was not counted by customs when he entered Cape Verde with Lieutenant Colonel Aloves da [Piola Deziasasky].[65] Domingos came from Bissau in 1845 on the Portuguese war grig, *Vouga*.[66] The *Junta* argued that it did not have the documents to determine his freedom. If the documentation of his registration existed, it was 'inadvertently' given to the curator of slaves. In other words, the bureaucracy could not locate his documents, which made determining his status difficult.

63. SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-06.
64. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04.
65. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-07.
66. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, 07.

Eventually, the *Junta* noted that a certain certificate demonstrated that José was 'imported by contraband.' The Decree of 1836 banned the importation and exportation of slaves in Portuguese possessions. Because of this, the *Junta* decided that Domingos technically arrived as a free person. Moreover, Agostinho José Rodriguez did not have the right to register Domingos with the Slave Registry. On 23 May 1862, *Junta* said that Agostinho should properly register Domingos and 'obtain clarification in the documents.'

Even slaveholders petitioned the *Junta* for assistance. On 14 January 1862, Antonio da Costa Ferreira Borges petitioned the *Junta* to have José, a liberated slave who was a native of Bissau, to be sent to his homeland.[67] Jose was hospitalized, but Borges complained that this was a financial burden for him. Hence, Borges argued that his former slave was 'deranged' and he pleaded with the *Junta* to assist José's return to his homeland where he could best convalesce. Borges might have been more concerned about what this freed slave was costing him than José's heath. The document does not provide José's ethnic group or his exact homeland in the Guinea-Bissau region. Moreover, the document is silent about his age or if he had another name. José had been in Cape Verde for about seventeen years.

The *Junta* also paid for the manumission of adults. Gregorio was a native of Santiago, age 26, black, and owned by João Cabral Franco.[68] On 26 April 1863, in the *praça* across the street from Our Lady of Grace Church in Praia, Franco auctioned Gregorio to Francisco Cardozo de Mello. With Mello's death, his son, Francisco, inherited Gregorio. On 3 December 1867, Gregorio paid 50,000 *réis*, with the *Junta* providing 15,000 *réis*, for his manumission. In another case, the *Junta* manumitted Luiz, who was the slave of Jozé Monteiro d' Almeida, a resident of São Thiago Corado Parish on 14 July 1866.[69] Luiz was a mason, a native of Guiné, and age 26 with 'facial markings.'

Although issue of inheritance, such as the case of Gregorio, could be straightforward, other cases were complicated and people sought assistance from the *Junta*. On 30 August 1869, the *Junta* considered an application by Dionizia Sanches Lopes and Maria dos Reis da Fonseca that demanded 'manifesto' (pronouncement) concerning three freed slaves, Athanasio, Antonio, and Lucas, who were owned by Antonio Lopes da Costa.[70] The three slaves submitted documents requesting their freedom.

67. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, 04.
68. SGG\F2.2\Livro (Lv) 0863, 27 v.
69. SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, 29v.
70. SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-07, f4.

The *Junta* noted that due to the 'instructions of 28 May 1868 [they] denied the solicited registration because there was a lack of endorsement of past manifestos by the requesters.'[71] This referred to Article 6 of Decree of 28 October 1857, which stipulated that a new 'possessor' must register the slave as evidence before manumission. Because Antonio Lopes da Costa died after the proclamation of the Decree of 25 February 1868, the documents were deemed 'insufficient.' The *Junta* noted that Antonio Lopes da Costa had died 'more than four years ago,' which meant Dionizia and Maria's petition for these slaves was legally difficult to succeed. The resolution was that 'legitimate heirs to the couple's assets' prevailed rather than the unlawfully submitted manifesto.

On 2 October 1865, the *Junta* said that a plethora of slaves lodged grievances daily about lack of sustenance as well as maltreatment.[72] The *Junta* emphasized that when both sides of the stories (from slaveholders and slaves) were heard that the majority of the complaints were false. The *Junta* adjudication was quite prejudicial because those deliberating were well established and some were slaveholders.

In addition to manumissions being issued by the Junta, the governor-general also provided freedom letters for slaves. In 1856, Francisco Alberto Azevedo, a resident of Praia, had six slaves. Four of them were from Guiné and the other two, Viriginia and Julia, were born on São Tiago Island. Both under age 5, which suggests that their parents were one of his Guinean female slaves, Constança and/or Jozepha.

Table 3. Francisco Alberto Azevedo's Slaves[73]

Name	Born	Age	Color
Jozé de Azevedo	Guiné	20	*fula*
Pedro	Guiné	20	*preto*
Constança	Guiné	30	*fula*
Jozepha	Guiné	30	*preto*
Virginia	São Tiago	4	*preto*
Julia	São Tiago	1	*preto*

The governor-general issued a freedom letter for Pedro.[74] In May 1863, the local authorities altered this information in the slave census of 1856,

71. SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-07, f4v.
72. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
73. SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, f.4f–4v.
74. SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, f.2v.

which means that Pedro was freed between 1856 and 1863. In January 1857, Francisco Alberto Azevedo freed his female slave, Constança, but the local authorities only added this information in the slave census in May 1867.[75] This was when the push to end slavery in Cape Verde was well underway and keeping updated records became crucial.

Others, nevertheless, were only freed when their owners perished, such as in November 1859, when the death of Maria da Penha Franco, a resident of Praia, freed Rufino in her will.[76] The latter was a male, from Guiné, age 35, and described as black. On November 1859, Maria da Penha Franco Jaz, who was a slaveholder, passed away in Praia.[77] (This is not to be confused with Maria da Penha Franco who passed away on the same date.) In her will, Jaz emancipated Forentina, a woman, age 45, from Guine, and also labeled black. *Dona* Anna de Mendonça, a resident of Colegio, divided some of her slaves among her relatives in her will.[78] According to the slave census of 1856, *Dona* Mendonça had eleven slaves: Paulo Semedo, Manoel, Maria, Jozepha, Maria da Boa Esperança, Izabel, Aniceta, Felisberta, Ignes, Bernardina, and Sabina. Ignes was 20 years of age, born on São Tiago Island and described as *fula*. In May 1855, Ignes had a baby named Bernardina, who was baptized in June 1855.[79] The godparents were Paulo Nunes and Maria Luanta, both residents of São Nicolau Colegio. Neither the baptismal record nor the slave census mentions her being manumitted. When *Dona* Mendonça died, in February 1866, her daughter, *Dona* Maria Semedo Ferreira, inherited Izabel, who was from Guiné, age 50, and Ignes, a native of São Thiago, age 20, and described as *fula*. In February 1866, Pedro Semedo Cardozo inherited Felizberta, a female slave from Guiné, age 21, and black.[80] Therefore, manumission came gradually: despite the founding of the *Junta* in 1856, in Cape Verde, slavery was not completely abolished until 1876.

Although obtaining freedom could be a legal nightmare, *libertos*, former owners, and the state had different notions of 'freedom.' Thus, 'freedom' created tensions and conflicts. The state and the elites used free labor for their personal interests, and legal institutions, such as the *Junta*, usually provided control mechanisms. The colonial state inculcated that an exemplary 'free' people were good citizens who perform work for the polity and those who freed them, whether state, private owners, or charity

75. SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, f.2–2v.
76. SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, folha 8 frente-f.8 v.
77. SGG\F2.2\Lv 0863, folha 9 frente-f.9 v.
78. 1856/03-1856/05, SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, N.º2, (f) 2.
79. SGG, Cx. N.º.23, peça 1, 105v.
80. SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, 2v.

organizations. The Catholic Church was instrumental in developing the 'free' citizenry by serving as the institution via which manumission was conducted via baptism, but along with the state, it upheld the compensation to the slave-owners. It was, perhaps, a Portuguese Catholic bourgeois notion of citizenry, which is different from the Weberian notion of a Protestant work ethic. In the history of the Portuguese Empire, the discourse about the criminal exiles (*degredados*) was usually laced with religious overtones of impurities that required spiritual purification. James Sweet believes, that 'The logic of banishment mirrored that of purgatory: Once cleansed of one's sins after a period of strict penance, a convict could reenter society and live an upright godly life.'[81] Thus, slaves as heathens (*gentios*) once freed (*liberto*), needed tutelage to become true citizens, i.e., civilized, which the mandatory service for freed persons entailed to accomplish.

Exile to Upper Guinea

The *Junta* meted out punishment not only to libertos who were 'lazy' but also to those who committed 'crimes.' There is a direct link between slaves and prisoners, because the curator of slaves was also the curator of poor prisoners (*curador de escravo e presos pobres*). Rebellious people and those deemed criminals in Cape Verde were a reservoir of foot soldiers. Exile in the Portuguese Empire was used extensively and later colonial powers, such as the British and the French, used it in Africa and other regions. Just like in Brazil and Portugal, *degredados* were sent to Africa; Cape Verde sent them to mainly Portuguese Guinea. In Brazil, there were loose vagrancy laws that restricted movements and gathering of people to acquire people to serve in Angola.[82] The number of convicts sent to West Africa shows that the colonial government desperately needed foot soldiers in the *praças*, especially those who were resistant to malaria, i.e., Africans.

In Cape Verde, sending exiles to the mainland started with the colonization of the archipelago during the late fifteenth century. Exile was an important factor for commercial activities (i.e., slave trade and 'legitimate' trade) and to wage a war of terror to that eventually would consolidate Portuguese Guinea. In October 1861, in Praia, Carlos Augusto Franco,

81. James Sweet, *Domingos, Álvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 186.
82. Roquinaldo Ferreira, *Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 192–3.

governor of Cape Verde, emphasized the need to establish with 'urgency' a regular means of communication between the fledgling Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde. Finally, the governor suggested that regular communication would be good not only for the two colonies, but for commerce, which had declined in recent times.

In Portuguese Guinea, elite Cape Verdeans, including slave-owners, commanded the fighting forces of *degredados* that consisted of free poor individuals, slaves, and *libertos*. In 1861, for instance, Major José Xavier Crato, a major slaveholder and graduated major of battalion of artillery of Cape Verde (*Mayor Graduado do Batalhão d'Artilheria de Cabo Verde*) was nominated to be auditor for the War Councils.[83] In February 1863, Major Crato, acting as interim governor of Portuguese Guinea, ratified an old treaty of 1843 with the Felupe of Matta de Putama.[84] From at least 1862 to 1865, Major Jozé Xavier Crato led numerous military expeditions and signed treaties with African rulers. During this period, the Portuguese were at war with several African groups for which they desperately required foot soldiers. For instance, in the military fort (*presidio*) of Geba, they were in conflict with the nearby Beafadas of Badora.[85] Major Crato was selected to head a delegation to Geba. From the Portuguese perspective, this antagonism by Beafadas attacking the fort stifled trade, particularly because Cape Verdean/Portuguese merchants on the estates (*pontas*) had established themselves in the slave trade and were making the transition to 'legitimate trade.'

A prominent case handled by the *Junta* concerned *libertos* from São Nicolau Island. In December 1857, João Antonio Leite, an administrator for the Saint Nicholas County (*Concelho de São Nicolau*), lodged a petition about *libertos* who had 'abandoned' their masters and were 'robbing in the streets' and 'turned vagabonds.'[86] Leite requested that the *Junta* to deal with this 'scandal' to bring 'calm to the inhabitants of that island.' In December 1857, Reverend Robert Fernandes Pinto, president of the *Junta*, wrote that it was beyond his authority to determine the 'necessary punishment' for the *libertos*. Therefore, Pinto submitted the case to the governor general counsel (*Conselheiro de Governador Geral*) in December 1857.[87] In January 1858, Arroba, the governor of Cape Verde, wrote to the Portuguese government seeking 'authorization' for the *Junta* to send the

83. BOCV, N.º 46, 1861, 215.
84. SGG, Cx. Nº 347, Peça 3.
85. BOCV, N.º5, 1862, 27, Continuado do numero antecedente.
86. SGG Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.22–23.
87. SGG Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.22–f.22v.

libertos to a 'military colony' in the Rio Grande. The document is silent about the authorization, but given that there were cases from the *Junta* of Justice about exiled convicts sent to West Africa, and that a major slaveholder, Major Crato, led a military expeditionary force from Cape Verde to Portuguese Guinea, it is highly unlikely that this request was denied.

In summary, the *Junta* of Protection of Slaves and *Libertos* ushered in the end of slavery in Cape Verde, even though it was gradual, legalistic, and elitist driven. The Catholic Church and the state collaborated to end slavery in Cape Verde, but with financial recompense for the slaveholders. Furthermore, *libertos* had to serve seven years of service to the state or private entities, probably to instill notions of wageworker, rather than free peasant. A popular form of punishment was 'public works,' which the state used to implement major projects or control the *libertos*, slaves, and the poor majority. Thus, ending of slavery in Cape Verde was caught between manumission and emancipation. While they were manumitted, *libertos*, had to perform mandatory services, against their wills and full citizenship or emancipation was still lacking. Besides mere passive agents in history, slaves and *libertos* used the new law and institution to gain greater freedom and more rights for themselves or just to improve their lot in life. Godparents were vital in manumitting their godchildren, which underlined the sense of kinship and social bond between them.

Like other parts of the Black Atlantic, libertos, 'liberated Africans' had to undergo the mandatory apprenticeship tutelage to become true citizens, i.e., civilized. Thus, they were in a limbo between freedom and enslavement, which occurred with liberated Africans in Brazil, Cuba, Sierra Leone, Luanda, and so on. For the Portuguese Empire, particularly for Cape Verde, the Catholic Church played a vital role in instilling a Catholic outlook that deemed a civilized and full-citizen, ipso facto, was also an upright Catholic.

The historiography of abolition of the black Atlantic have centered on three arguments: Clarksonian (Thomas Clarkson, Reginald Coupland, Leslie Griggs, Seymour Drescher, W.E.H. Lecky, Crane Brinton, Howard Temperley, and João Pedro Marques, etc); the decline school (Eric Williams, David Ryder, Selwyn Carrington, etc); and the revolt school (Michael Craton, Hilary Beckles, Richard Hart, Elikia M'Bokolo, Herbert Aptheker, etc.). With the exception of João Pedro Marques, these schools of thought focus primarily on the British Empire, thus superimposing a British imperial outlook on these processes. Moreover, the imperial framework overlooks that perspective of the colonies or colonial possessions. In the Portuguese Empire, indeed, there has been a tendency to downplay the African colonies, such as Cape Verde, São Tomé e Princípe, Angola, Portuguese East Africa, and

'Portuguese Guinea' as a determining factor in how the ending of slavery unfolded. In the Portuguese Empire, João Pedro Marques promotes the idea of *tolerationism*, as a passive stance about the eventual natural demise of slavery, but neglects in depth focus on Lusophone Africa as it concerns the ending of slavery.[88] With the case of Cape Verde, abolishing slavery was intricately linked to the colonizing enterprise on what became Portuguese Guinea. *Libertos, degredados*, criminals, etc, were used as foot soldiers and functionaries to spearhead the colonizing efforts and protect territories against British and French incursion into what would become 'Portuguese Guinea'.

João Lopes Filho persuasively suggests that rural property holders, usually slave-holders, were not affected by the British pressure, despite in 1836, Sá de Bandeira outlawed re-exporting of slaves from Portuguese possessions and the 1842, Luso-British Comission of 1842 in Boavista to end slave trafficking, but Filho underscored the social tension.[89] Indeed, António Carreira highlighted how social conflicts, including slave revolts, degredados' rebellions, and famines played a part in the decline of slavery. Rudolphe Paul Widmer challenges Carreira's theory of demise of plantation slavery model in Cape Verde during the eighteenth century or before; by illustrating with detail examples that this only occurred in the mid nineteenth century with the official push toward abolition.[90] Nevertheless, James Duffy underscored that for the third Portuguese Empire that slavery and slave trade was crucial for Angola.[91] In the same vein, Augusto Nascimento notes the persistency of slavery and slave-like labor in São Tome from the nineteenth century to the twentieth centuries, with contract laborers, *contratados*, from Cape Verde to São Tomé.[92] Other studies by Frederick Cooper, Rebecca Scott and Thomas C. Holt underscore that post-emancipated societies that freed-people had to negotiate the meaning of freedom, which was constrained by issues of race, labor

88. Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, Review of Marques, *The Sounds of Silence*, e-JPH, Vol. 7, number 2, Winter 2009: 2.
89. Filho, *Cabo Verde Abolição da escravatura*, 77.
90. Rudolphe Paul Widmer, 'Structures coloniales et crises agricoles. Pour une relecture des sécheresses cap-verdiennes du XVIII e siècle', *RAHIA* (*Recherches en Anthropologie & en Histoire de l'Afrique*, Nº 17 (2006) (Èditions du Centre d' Etudes des Mondes Africains (CEMAf) MMSH-Aix-en-Provence.
91. James Duffy, *A Question of Slavery. Labour Policies in Portuguese Africa and the British Protest, 1850-1920* (Harvard Press: 1967).
92. Augusto Nascimento, 'Escravatura, Trabalho Forçado e Contrato em S. Tomé e Príncipe nos séculos XIX-XX: sujeição de Ética Laboral', *Africana Studia*, Nº 7, 2004: 183-217, Edição da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto; http://www.africanos.eu/ceaup/uploads/AS07_183.pdf, accessed 20 Feb 2014.

and citizenship.[93] Even before this post-emancipation reality, enslaved individuals were in a liminal state of existence between manumission and emancipation, in which issues of labor, citizenship, race, and religion determined their new status.

93. Frederick Cooper et al., *Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in Postemancipation Societies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

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